From 0f2a143ad8c8b0981e6e5f27e535ae1cb74ca157 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Silva If you want to disable pager / paging you can set globally; Adjust iptables.sh with
- your network configuration then run it; /etc/rc.d/iptables sources
+ host configuration and create tables with rules that later are
+ used to match packages. Adjust /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh
+ with your network configuration, edit /etc/iptables/ipt-server.sh matching rules with interfaces. Default configuration; Prepare disk or target location where new system will
- be installed. Follow steps describe how to create efi and
- separate partitions such as;
- bios grub, EFI, boot, root, var, usr, swap and home.
+ be installed. Follow steps describe how to create efi system,
+ for bios_boot systems is only needed the boot partition in
+ the beginning of the disk and can use ext4 file system for example.
For more information about gpt partitions table read
- devil-detail grub2 on gpt.
- Script setup-target.sh
- creates follow partitions;
# useradd -U -m -k /etc/skel -s /bin/bash username
- # usermod -G adm,wheel,audio,video username
+ # usermod -G adm,wheel,audio,video,users username
# passwd username
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From c432a9f7e5e2faccf09d3465266f08561299acf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Silva
$ git config --global user.name "User Name"
$ git config --global user.email user@devbox
+ $ git config --global core.editor "vim"
2.3.3.1. Server iptables
- 2.3.3.1. Iptable scripts
+
+
+ source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh
+ source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh
+
+ case $1 in
+ start)
+ ipt_clear
+ ipt_tables
+ case $TYPE in
+ bridge)
+
+ ## load bridge configuration
+ source /etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh
+
+ ## log everything else and drop
+ ipt_log
+
+ iptables-save > /etc/iptables/bridge.v4
+ ;;
+ server)
+
+
+ ## load server configuration
+ source /etc/iptables/iptables-conf.sh
+
+ ## log everything else and drop
+ ipt_log
+
+ iptables-save > /etc/iptables/server.v4
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ stop)
+
+ ipt_clear
+ ;;
+ restart)
+ $0 stop
+ $0 start
+ ;;
+ *)
+ echo "Usage: $0 [start|stop|restart]"
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+
+ 2.3.3.2. Server iptables
+
+
- server)
+ echo "setting server network..."
+
+ # Unlimited on loopback
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
- echo "Setting server network..."
####### Input Chain ######
$IPT -A INPUT -j blocker
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_https_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_in
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_https_in
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_in
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_in
+ #$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j cli_http_in
+
+
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_in
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_in
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_in
+ $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_in
####### Output Chain ######
$IPT -A OUTPUT -j blocker
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${DNS} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_dns_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_out
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${DNS} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_dns_out
+ #$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_out
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_out
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_out
- ## log everything else and drop
- iptables_log
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_out
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out
- iptables-save > /etc/iptables/net.v4
- exit 0
-
- ;;
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_out
+ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_out
+
# bash core/scripts/iptables.sh
- 2.3.3.2. Client iptables
+ 2.3.3.3. Client iptables
- 2.3.3.3. Bridge iptables
+ 2.3.3.4. Bridge iptables
$IPT -A FORWARD -j blocker
@@ -351,7 +414,7 @@
$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out
$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j cli_https_in
-
+
2.3.4. Wpa and dhcpd
diff --git a/tools/conf/etc/skel/.gitconfig b/tools/conf/etc/skel/.gitconfig
index 3af5f03..730d8d9 100644
--- a/tools/conf/etc/skel/.gitconfig
+++ b/tools/conf/etc/skel/.gitconfig
@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@
tool = vimdiff
[merge]
tool = vimdiff
+ conflictstyle = diff3
[difftool]
prompt = false
diff --git a/tools/conf/etc/skel/.vimrc b/tools/conf/etc/skel/.vimrc
index 2a45faf..0a3656d 100644
--- a/tools/conf/etc/skel/.vimrc
+++ b/tools/conf/etc/skel/.vimrc
@@ -110,7 +110,9 @@ map 1.1.2. Prepare target
Create gpt label and set unit size to use;
@@ -93,14 +94,40 @@There are different ways to achieve disk encryption, + the method described uses cryptosetup to create cryptodevice + with lvm inside containing + root and other partitions such as; + var, usr, swap and home. + +
+ (parted) mkpart primary 1132 100% + (parted) set 4 lvm on ++ +
Create encrypted block for lvm;
+ ++ # modprobe dm-crypt + # cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda4 + # cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sda4 cryptlvm ++ +
Create physical group and volume group;
+ ++ # pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm + vgcreate vg_system /dev/mapper/cryptlvm ++
Core collection installation on root partition uses approximately 2G. Partition with 8G-20G is recommended for a server or desktop with dedicated ports partition or using only compiled packages. Partition size 20G;
+- (parted) mkpart primary ext4 1132 21132 - (parted) name 4 root + # lvcreate -L 20G -n lv_root vg_system
- (parted) mkpart primary ext4 21132 23132 - (parted) name 5 var + # lvcreate -L 2G -n lv_var vg_system
Is better to create swap partition later using - lvm.
-- (parted) mkpart primary linux-swap 23132 27132 - (parted) name 6 swap + # lvcreate -L 4G -n lv_swap vg_system
Home partition on desktop fill the rest of disk - space while on server this partition can be unnecessary. +
On desktop fill the rest of disk space while on server + this partition can be replaced with /srv. Fill the rest of disk space;
-Is better to create home partition later using - lvm.
-- (parted) mkpart primary ext4 27132 100% - (parted) name 7 home + # lvcreate -L 120G -n lv_home vg_system
$ sudo mkfs.fat -F 32 /dev/sda2 $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda3 - $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda4 - $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda5 - $ sudo mkswap /dev/sda6 - $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda7 + $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/vg_system/lv_root + $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/vg_system/lv_var + $ sudo mkswap /dev/vg_system/lv_swap + $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/vg_system/lv_home
Export target root partition;
+Export target root partition;
-- $ export BLK_ROOT=/dev/sda -+
+ $ export BLK_ROOT=/dev/vg_system/lv_root +-
Export target root directory you want to install;
+Export target root directory you want to install;
$ export CHROOT=/mnt-
If you are installing to a directory and not partitions you don't need to mount;
+If you are installing to a directory and not partitions you don't need to mount;
$ sudo mount $BLK_ROOT $CHROOT @@ -192,11 +210,11 @@ $ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/tmp $ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/proc $ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/sys -+ -
If partition layout is different or target is a directory is not necessary to mount, create only the directories;
+If partition layout is different or target is a directory is not necessary to mount, create only the directories;
-++$ sudo mount $BLK_BOOT $CHROOT/boot $ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/boot/efi $ sudo mount $BLK_EFI $CHROOT/boot/efi @@ -297,6 +315,17 @@ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/efivar#* pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/efibootmgr#* pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/dosfstools#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/ported#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libgcrypt#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/cryptsetup#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/popt#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libgpg-error#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libevent#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libtirpc#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/git#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/tmux#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/prt-utils#* + pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/elfutils#*@@ -344,7 +373,7 @@ Core OS Index- -This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file Gnu Free Documentation License for copying conditions.
-- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From 91c23096800cfd1a31cd24f6eae93f6d037d5661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvino SilvaDate: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:54:52 +0100 Subject: core install fixed script names --- core/install.html | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/core/install.html b/core/install.html index 69a82cf..dfe218a 100644 --- a/core/install.html +++ b/core/install.html @@ -156,9 +156,10 @@ 1.1.3. Prepare Install
From now on script - setup-install.sh - create file systems, install packages, configure host - metadata and setup ports;
+ setup-target.sh + create file systems, install-core.sh install core packages and + setup-core.sh + configure host metadata and setup ports;Export target root partition;
-- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From 175b83995519059948b5d2e9da4a76c7ab070bc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvino SilvaDate: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 23:03:43 +0000 Subject: fix core script setup-target.sh --- core/scripts/setup-target.sh | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/core/scripts/setup-target.sh b/core/scripts/setup-target.sh index ecbe018..69b8640 100755 --- a/core/scripts/setup-target.sh +++ b/core/scripts/setup-target.sh @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/sh -DEV=/dev +DEV=/dev/sda +VG=vg_system SETUP_TARGET="print" CHROOT="/mnt" @@ -13,22 +14,21 @@ SCRIPTPATH=$(dirname "$SCRIPT") DIR=$(dirname "$SCRIPTPATH"); DIR_LOCAL="$(dirname $(dirname ${DIR}))/local"; -ISO_FILE="${DIR_LOCAL}/crux-3.4.iso" - ##read BLK_EFI BLK_EFI="${DEV}2" ##read BLK_BOOT BLK_BOOT="${DEV}3" ##read BLK_ROOT -BLK_ROOT="${DEV}4" +BLK_CRYPT="${DEV}4" +BLK_ROOT="/dev/$VG/lv_root" ##read BLK_VAR -BLK_VAR="${DEV}5" +BLK_VAR="/dev/${VG}/lv_var" ##read BLK_USR -BLK_USR="${DEV}6" +#BLK_USR="${DEV}6" ##read BLK_SWP -BLK_SWP="${DEV}7" +BLK_SWP="/dev/${VG}/lv_swap" ##read BLK_HOME -BLK_HOME="${DEV}8" +BLK_HOME="/dev/${VG}/lv_home" # First we define the function @@ -64,16 +64,21 @@ partition_target () { set 2 boot on \ mkpart primary ext4 125 1128 \ name 3 boot \ - mkpart primary ext4 1128 5128 \ - name 4 root \ - mkpart primary ext4 5128 6128 \ - name 5 var \ - mkpart primary ext4 6128 14128 \ - name 6 usr \ - mkpart primary linux-swap 14128 18128 \ - name 7 swap \ - mkpart primary ext4 18128 100% \ - name 8 home + mkpart primary 1128 100% \ + set 4 lvm on + + modprobe dm-crypt + cryptsetup luksFormat ${BLK_CRYPT} + cryptsetup luksOpen ${BLK_CRYPT} cryptlvm + + pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm + vgcreate ${VG} /dev/mapper/cryptlvm + + lvcreate -L 20G -n lv_root ${VG} + lvcreate -L 4G -n lv_var ${VG} + lvcreate -L 8G -n lv_swap ${VG} + lvcreate -L 120G -n lv_home ${VG} + } mount_target () { @@ -85,8 +90,8 @@ mount_target () { mkfs.ext4 $BLK_ROOT echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_VAR with ext4:" mkfs.ext4 $BLK_VAR - echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_USR with ext4:" - mkfs.ext4 $BLK_USR + #echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_USR with ext4:" + #mkfs.ext4 $BLK_USR echo "1.1.2 Creating Swap File System on $BLK_SWP:" mkswap $BLK_SWP echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_HOME with ext4:" @@ -104,8 +109,8 @@ mount_target () { mkdir -p $CHROOT/var mount $BLK_VAR $CHROOT/var - mkdir -p $CHROOT/usr - mount $BLK_USR $CHROOT/usr + #mkdir -p $CHROOT/usr + #mount $BLK_USR $CHROOT/usr mkdir -p $CHROOT/home mount $BLK_HOME $CHROOT/home @@ -152,16 +157,16 @@ enable_target () { print_target() { echo "Device: $DEV" echo "CHROOT: $CHROOT" - echo "ISO_FILE: $ISO_FILE" - echo "Option Selected: $SETUP_TARGET\n" + echo "Option Selected: $SETUP_TARGET" echo "1.1.2 EFI block; ($BLK_EFI)" echo "1.1.2 boot block; ($BLK_BOOT)" + echo "1.1.2 cryptlvm block; ($BLK_CRYPT)" echo "1.1.2 root block; ($BLK_ROOT)" echo "1.1.2 var block; ($BLK_VAR)" echo "1.1.2 usr block; ($BLK_USR)" echo "1.1.2 swap block; ($BLK_SWP)" - echo "1.1.2 home block; ($BLK_HOME)\n" + echo "1.1.2 home block; ($BLK_HOME)" } -- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From b0d9f669aa8032e63ea7dc8e2eebe6fe022129b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvino Silva Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:28:05 +0100 Subject: added core default grub config --- core/conf/default/grub | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) create mode 100644 core/conf/default/grub diff --git a/core/conf/default/grub b/core/conf/default/grub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc7934a --- /dev/null +++ b/core/conf/default/grub @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +GRUB_DISABLE_LINUX_UUID=false +GRUB_ENABLE_LINUX_LABEL=false +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="rd.luks.uuid=luks-15f15024-e994-43e3-9de4-694ba94aaf7f rd.lvm.lv=vg_system/lv_root" +GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y -- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From 045ea9a3815a56609af07a3c7d9df6fcc18910a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvino Silva Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 23:39:05 +0000 Subject: iptables scripts revision --- core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh | 220 +++++++++++++++---------------------- core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh | 7 +- core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh | 2 - core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh | 10 ++ core/conf/rc.d/iptables | 76 ++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh index fa987a5..a54cbf2 100644 --- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh +++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ #!/bin/bash - -echo "setting bridge ${BR_IF} network..." -echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward +echo "setting bridge network..." +source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh +source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh +ipt_clear +ipt_tables # Unlimited on loopback $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT @@ -9,174 +11,126 @@ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT -####### NAT Prerouting Chain ###### +######## NAT Prerouting Chain ###### #$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.254:53 -#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.254:53 -$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.4:443 -#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: PREROUTING: " - -####### Forward Chain ###### -$IPT -A FORWARD -j blocker -$IPT -A FORWARD -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT -$IPT -A FORWARD -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT - -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT - -# Allow access from bridge to gateway wifi interface -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_http_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_https_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_ftp_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ftp_out +##$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.254:53 +#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.4:443 +##$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: PREROUTING: " -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_dns_in -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_https_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_https_out - -# allow output from BR_NET to external -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT - -# allow input from public bridged interface facing Internet -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_http_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_https_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_git_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_ftp_in - -######## Forward TAP2 ssh, http and https ###### -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_ssh_in -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_ssh_out +######## Forward Chain ###### +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A FORWARD -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT # -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_http_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_http_out - -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_https_in -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_https_out +## Allow all for BR_NET +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT +## DHCP +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s 0.0.0.0 -d 255.255.255.255 -j srv_dhcp -#Less noise -$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -p udp --dport 519 --sport 520 -j DROP +## Allow access from bridge to gateway wifi interface +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_http_in +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_https_in +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_ftp_in +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ftp_out +##$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_dns_in +##$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_https_in +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_https_out -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out tap2 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out tap1 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT -# -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out tap3 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out tap1 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT -# -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out tap2 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out tap3 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT -# -# -# Tap1 -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap1 -j cli_http_in -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_http_out -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap1 -j cli_https_in -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap1 -j cli_ftp_in -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ftp_out -# -# -## Tap3 -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_out -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap3 -j cli_git_in -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap3 -j cli_http_in -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_http_out -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap3 -j cli_https_in -# -# -# Tap1, Tap2 and Tap3 can access external https - -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out -#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j cli_https_in - +## allow output from BR_NET to external +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -s ${DNS} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_dns_in +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_http_in +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_https_in +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_ssh_in +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_git_in +$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -p tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT -# -# #$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_rip -# -# $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_dhcp -# $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_dhcp +##Less noise +#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -p udp --dport 519 --sport 520 -j DROP -# -####### Input Chain ###### +######## Input Chain ###### $IPT -A INPUT -j blocker -#Less noise -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --sport 3030 --dport 1024:65535 -j DROP -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j DROP -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 138 --dport 138 -j DROP -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${WIFI_NET} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp +##Less noise +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --sport 3030 --dport 1024:65535 -j DROP +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -s ${GW} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -s ${GW} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -d 10.255.255.255 -p udp --sport 520 --dport 520 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 138 --dport 138 -j ACCEPT -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_dns_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -s ${WIFI_NET} -d ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_in - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -j srv_dhcp -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -s ${GW} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_dhcp +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_dns_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp $IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in $IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_in $IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_git_in $IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_ssh_in $IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_in -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_in +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${WIFI_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_in +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -s ${GW} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_dhcp +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_in +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_in +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_in +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_in +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_in -# c2.ank /iso -> c9.ank /srv/qemu/iso -$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_http_in -# hyperbola servers -$IPT -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 1024:65535 --sport 50100 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +## PXE server +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -p udp -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} --dport 69 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -p udp -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} --dport 1024:65535 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT -####### Output Chain ###### -$IPT -A OUTPUT -j blocker +######## Output Chain ###### -#Less noise +##Less noise $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --dport 3030 --sport 1024:65535 -j DROP -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_dhcp $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_dns_out $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${WIFI_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_icmp +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j srv_icmp +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_ssh_out $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_git_out $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_http_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_dhcp $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_out $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_git_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_icmp -# Hyperbola servers -$IPT -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 50100 -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT -# c2.ank /iso -> c9.ank /srv/qemu/iso -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_http_out +## PXE Server +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -p udp --dport 1024:65535 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT -####### PostRouting Chain ###### -#Less noise -#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT -#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT -#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -p udp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT +######## PostRouting Chain ###### +##Less noise +##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT +##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -p udp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${WIFI_IF} -j MASQUERADE +##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: POSTROUTING: " -$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${WIFI_IF} -j MASQUERADE +## log everything else and drop +ipt_log -#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: POSTROUTING: " +iptables-save > /etc/iptables/bridge.v4 diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh index 52669dc..c3dac16 100644 --- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh +++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #!/bin/bash -TYPE=bridge -#TYPE=server + +IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables" SPAMLIST="blockedip" SPAMDROPMSG="BLOCKED IP DROP" @@ -19,4 +19,5 @@ PUB_IF="enp8s0" # private interface for virtual/internal WIFI_IF="wlp7s0" -WIFI_NET="192.168.1.0/24" +#WIFI_NET="192.168.1.0/24" +WIFI_NET="10.0.0.0/8" diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh index 6ea613a..12c3834 100644 --- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh +++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ #!/bin/bash -IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables" - ipt_clear () { echo "clear all iptables tables" diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh index 225fd31..027cd11 100644 --- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh +++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh @@ -1,10 +1,15 @@ echo "setting server network..." +source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh +source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh +ipt_clear +ipt_tables # Unlimited on loopback $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d 10.255.255.255 -j ACCEPT ####### Input Chain ###### $IPT -A INPUT -j blocker @@ -35,3 +40,8 @@ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_out $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_out + +## log everything else and drop +ipt_log + +iptables-save > /etc/iptables/server.v4 diff --git a/core/conf/rc.d/iptables b/core/conf/rc.d/iptables index d4f9ebc..f8896cc 100644 --- a/core/conf/rc.d/iptables +++ b/core/conf/rc.d/iptables @@ -1,38 +1,82 @@ -source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh -source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh +IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables" +TYPE=bridge +#TYPE=server +#TYPE=open + case $1 in start) - ipt_clear - ipt_tables + echo "clear all iptables tables" + + ${IPT} -F + ${IPT} -X + ${IPT} -t nat -F + ${IPT} -t nat -X + ${IPT} -t mangle -F + ${IPT} -t mangle -X + ${IPT} -t raw -F + ${IPT} -t raw -X + ${IPT} -t security -F + ${IPT} -t security -X + + # Set Default Rules + ${IPT} -P INPUT DROP + ${IPT} -P FORWARD DROP + ${IPT} -P OUTPUT DROP + + ${IPT} -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT + ${IPT} -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT + + case $TYPE in bridge) - ## load bridge configuration - source /etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh - - ## log everything else and drop - ipt_log + echo "setting bridge ${BR_IF} network..." + echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward - iptables-save > /etc/iptables/bridge.v4 + ## load bridge configuration + iptables-restore /etc/iptables/bridge.v4 - ;; + ;; server) ## load server configuration - source /etc/iptables/iptables-conf.sh + iptables-restore /etc/iptables/server.v4 + + ;; + open) - ## log everything else and drop - ipt_log + ## load client configuration + iptables-restore /etc/iptables/open.v4 - iptables-save > /etc/iptables/server.v4 ;; + esac ;; stop) - ipt_clear + echo "clear all iptables tables" + + ${IPT} -F + ${IPT} -X + ${IPT} -t nat -F + ${IPT} -t nat -X + ${IPT} -t mangle -F + ${IPT} -t mangle -X + ${IPT} -t raw -F + ${IPT} -t raw -X + ${IPT} -t security -F + ${IPT} -t security -X + + # Set Default Rules + ${IPT} -P INPUT DROP + ${IPT} -P FORWARD DROP + ${IPT} -P OUTPUT DROP + + ${IPT} -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT + ${IPT} -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT + ;; restart) $0 stop -- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From f905c797c8f2ec87a8aa641a44c49fc1d0a23ebe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvino Date: Sat, 8 Jun 2019 01:49:10 +0100 Subject: core network better iptables documentation --- core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh | 6 +- core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh | 47 +++++++++ core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh | 13 ++- core/conf/iptables/open.v4 | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ core/conf/iptables/server.v4 | 204 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ core/conf/rc.d/iptables | 110 ++++++++------------ core/index.html | 1 + core/network.html | 191 ++++++++--------------------------- tools/wireless.html | 10 +- 9 files changed, 566 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-) create mode 100644 core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh create mode 100644 core/conf/iptables/open.v4 create mode 100644 core/conf/iptables/server.v4 diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh index a54cbf2..cd93687 100644 --- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh +++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/bash echo "setting bridge network..." -source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh -source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh +source ipt-conf.sh +source ipt-firewall.sh ipt_clear ipt_tables @@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_out ## log everything else and drop ipt_log -iptables-save > /etc/iptables/bridge.v4 +iptables-save > bridge.v4 diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ef1254 --- /dev/null +++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +echo "setting client network..." +source ipt-conf.sh +source ipt-firewall.sh +ipt_clear +ipt_tables + +# Unlimited on loopback +$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT + +####### Input Chain ###### +$IPT -A INPUT -j blocker + +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_dns_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_http_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ssh_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j srv_icmp +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_pops_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_smtps_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_irc_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ftp_in +$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_gpg_in + + +####### Output Chain ###### +$IPT -A OUTPUT -j blocker + +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_dns_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ssh_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j srv_icmp +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_pops_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_smtps_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_irc_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ftp_out +$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_gpg_out + +## log everything else and drop +ipt_log + +iptables-save > open.v4 diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh index 027cd11..370db60 100644 --- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh +++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -echo "setting server network..." -source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh -source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh +echo "setting server iptables ..." +source ipt-conf.sh +source ipt-firewall.sh ipt_clear ipt_tables # Unlimited on loopback $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT -$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT -$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d 10.255.255.255 -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT +#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT ####### Input Chain ###### $IPT -A INPUT -j blocker @@ -44,4 +43,4 @@ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_out ## log everything else and drop ipt_log -iptables-save > /etc/iptables/server.v4 +iptables-save > server.v4 diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/open.v4 b/core/conf/iptables/open.v4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30e476d --- /dev/null +++ b/core/conf/iptables/open.v4 @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +*security +:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +*raw +:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +*nat +:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +*mangle +:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 +*filter +:INPUT DROP [0:0] +:FORWARD DROP [0:0] +:OUTPUT DROP [0:0] +:blocker - [0:0] +:cli_dns_in - [0:0] +:cli_dns_out - [0:0] +:cli_ftp_in - [0:0] +:cli_ftp_out - [0:0] +:cli_git_in - [0:0] +:cli_git_out - [0:0] +:cli_gpg_in - [0:0] +:cli_gpg_out - [0:0] +:cli_http_in - [0:0] +:cli_http_out - [0:0] +:cli_https_in - [0:0] +:cli_https_out - [0:0] +:cli_irc_in - [0:0] +:cli_irc_out - [0:0] +:cli_pops_in - [0:0] +:cli_pops_out - [0:0] +:cli_smtps_in - [0:0] +:cli_smtps_out - [0:0] +:cli_ssh_in - [0:0] +:cli_ssh_out - [0:0] +:srv_db_in - [0:0] +:srv_db_out - [0:0] +:srv_dhcp - [0:0] +:srv_dns_in - [0:0] +:srv_dns_out - [0:0] +:srv_git_in - [0:0] +:srv_git_out - [0:0] +:srv_http_in - [0:0] +:srv_http_out - [0:0] +:srv_https_in - [0:0] +:srv_https_out - [0:0] +:srv_icmp - [0:0] +:srv_rip - [0:0] +:srv_ssh_in - [0:0] +:srv_ssh_out - [0:0] +-A INPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -i lo -j ACCEPT +-A INPUT -j blocker +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_dns_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_http_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_https_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_git_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_ssh_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j srv_icmp +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_pops_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_smtps_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_irc_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_ftp_in +-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_gpg_in +-A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: INPUT: " --log-level 7 +-A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: FORWARD: " --log-level 7 +-A OUTPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -o lo -j ACCEPT +-A OUTPUT -j blocker +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_dns_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_https_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_ssh_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_git_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_git_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j srv_icmp +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_pops_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_smtps_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_irc_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_ftp_out +-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_gpg_out +-A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: OUTPUT: " --log-level 7 +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop sync: " --log-level 7 +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -j DROP +-A blocker -f -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop frag: " +-A blocker -f -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,PSH,URG -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop null: " +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop syn rst syn rs" +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop xmas: " +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop fin scan: " +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,ACK,URG -j DROP +-A blocker -j RETURN +-A cli_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT +-A cli_dns_in -j RETURN +-A cli_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -j ACCEPT +-A cli_dns_out -j RETURN +-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 21 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 20 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_in -j RETURN +-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 21 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 20 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_out -j RETURN +-A cli_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_git_in -j RETURN +-A cli_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_git_out -j RETURN +-A cli_gpg_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 11371 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_gpg_in -j RETURN +-A cli_gpg_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 11371 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_gpg_out -j RETURN +-A cli_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_in -p udp -m udp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_in -j RETURN +-A cli_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_out -j RETURN +-A cli_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_in -p udp -m udp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_in -j RETURN +-A cli_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_out -j RETURN +-A cli_irc_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 6667 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_irc_in -j RETURN +-A cli_irc_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 6667 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_irc_out -j RETURN +-A cli_pops_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 995 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_pops_in -j RETURN +-A cli_pops_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 995 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_pops_out -j RETURN +-A cli_smtps_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 465 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_smtps_in -j RETURN +-A cli_smtps_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 465 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_smtps_out -j RETURN +-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_in -j RETURN +-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_out -j RETURN +-A srv_db_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 5432 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_db_in -j RETURN +-A srv_db_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 5432 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_db_out -j RETURN +-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 68 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dhcp -j RETURN +-A srv_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_in -j RETURN +-A srv_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_out -j RETURN +-A srv_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_git_in -j RETURN +-A srv_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_git_out -j RETURN +-A srv_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_http_in -j RETURN +-A srv_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_http_out -j RETURN +-A srv_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_https_in -j RETURN +-A srv_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_https_out -j RETURN +-A srv_icmp -p icmp -j ACCEPT +-A srv_icmp -j RETURN +-A srv_rip -p udp -m udp --sport 520 --dport 520 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_rip -j RETURN +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH" +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH" +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -j RETURN +-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_out -j RETURN +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019 diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/server.v4 b/core/conf/iptables/server.v4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed202ee --- /dev/null +++ b/core/conf/iptables/server.v4 @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +*security +:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +*raw +:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +*nat +:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +*mangle +:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0] +:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0] +:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 +*filter +:INPUT DROP [0:0] +:FORWARD DROP [0:0] +:OUTPUT DROP [0:0] +:blocker - [0:0] +:cli_dns_in - [0:0] +:cli_dns_out - [0:0] +:cli_ftp_in - [0:0] +:cli_ftp_out - [0:0] +:cli_git_in - [0:0] +:cli_git_out - [0:0] +:cli_gpg_in - [0:0] +:cli_gpg_out - [0:0] +:cli_http_in - [0:0] +:cli_http_out - [0:0] +:cli_https_in - [0:0] +:cli_https_out - [0:0] +:cli_irc_in - [0:0] +:cli_irc_out - [0:0] +:cli_pops_in - [0:0] +:cli_pops_out - [0:0] +:cli_smtps_in - [0:0] +:cli_smtps_out - [0:0] +:cli_ssh_in - [0:0] +:cli_ssh_out - [0:0] +:srv_db_in - [0:0] +:srv_db_out - [0:0] +:srv_dhcp - [0:0] +:srv_dns_in - [0:0] +:srv_dns_out - [0:0] +:srv_git_in - [0:0] +:srv_git_out - [0:0] +:srv_http_in - [0:0] +:srv_http_out - [0:0] +:srv_https_in - [0:0] +:srv_https_out - [0:0] +:srv_icmp - [0:0] +:srv_rip - [0:0] +:srv_ssh_in - [0:0] +:srv_ssh_out - [0:0] +-A INPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -i lo -j ACCEPT +-A INPUT -j blocker +-A INPUT -s 212.55.154.174/32 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j cli_dns_in +-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_https_in +-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_in +-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_git_in +-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_https_in +-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j cli_https_in +-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_in +-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_git_in +-A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: INPUT: " --log-level 7 +-A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: FORWARD: " --log-level 7 +-A OUTPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -o lo -j ACCEPT +-A OUTPUT -j blocker +-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 212.55.154.174/32 -o enp8s0 -j cli_dns_out +-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_https_out +-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_out +-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_git_out +-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -o enp8s0 -j cli_https_out +-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -o enp8s0 -j srv_https_out +-A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_out +-A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_git_out +-A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: OUTPUT: " --log-level 7 +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop sync: " --log-level 7 +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -j DROP +-A blocker -f -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop frag: " +-A blocker -f -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,PSH,URG -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop null: " +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop syn rst syn rs" +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop xmas: " +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop fin scan: " +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -j DROP +-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,ACK,URG -j DROP +-A blocker -j RETURN +-A cli_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT +-A cli_dns_in -j RETURN +-A cli_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -j ACCEPT +-A cli_dns_out -j RETURN +-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 21 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 20 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_in -j RETURN +-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 21 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 20 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ftp_out -j RETURN +-A cli_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_git_in -j RETURN +-A cli_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_git_out -j RETURN +-A cli_gpg_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 11371 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_gpg_in -j RETURN +-A cli_gpg_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 11371 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_gpg_out -j RETURN +-A cli_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_in -p udp -m udp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_in -j RETURN +-A cli_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_http_out -j RETURN +-A cli_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_in -p udp -m udp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_in -j RETURN +-A cli_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_https_out -j RETURN +-A cli_irc_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 6667 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_irc_in -j RETURN +-A cli_irc_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 6667 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_irc_out -j RETURN +-A cli_pops_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 995 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_pops_in -j RETURN +-A cli_pops_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 995 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_pops_out -j RETURN +-A cli_smtps_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 465 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_smtps_in -j RETURN +-A cli_smtps_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 465 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_smtps_out -j RETURN +-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_in -j RETURN +-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A cli_ssh_out -j RETURN +-A srv_db_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 5432 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_db_in -j RETURN +-A srv_db_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 5432 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_db_out -j RETURN +-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 68 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dhcp -j RETURN +-A srv_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_in -j RETURN +-A srv_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_dns_out -j RETURN +-A srv_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_git_in -j RETURN +-A srv_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_git_out -j RETURN +-A srv_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_http_in -j RETURN +-A srv_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_http_out -j RETURN +-A srv_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_https_in -j RETURN +-A srv_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_https_out -j RETURN +-A srv_icmp -p icmp -j ACCEPT +-A srv_icmp -j RETURN +-A srv_rip -p udp -m udp --sport 520 --dport 520 -j ACCEPT +-A srv_rip -j RETURN +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH" +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH" +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP +-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_in -j RETURN +-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT +-A srv_ssh_out -j RETURN +COMMIT +# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019 diff --git a/core/conf/rc.d/iptables b/core/conf/rc.d/iptables index f8896cc..cc7c765 100644 --- a/core/conf/rc.d/iptables +++ b/core/conf/rc.d/iptables @@ -4,85 +4,59 @@ TYPE=bridge #TYPE=server #TYPE=open +echo "clear all iptables tables" + +${IPT} -F +${IPT} -X +${IPT} -t nat -F +${IPT} -t nat -X +${IPT} -t mangle -F +${IPT} -t mangle -X +${IPT} -t raw -F +${IPT} -t raw -X +${IPT} -t security -F +${IPT} -t security -X + +# Set Default Rules +${IPT} -P INPUT DROP +${IPT} -P FORWARD DROP +${IPT} -P OUTPUT DROP + +${IPT} -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT +${IPT} -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT case $1 in start) - echo "clear all iptables tables" + case $TYPE in + bridge) - ${IPT} -F - ${IPT} -X - ${IPT} -t nat -F - ${IPT} -t nat -X - ${IPT} -t mangle -F - ${IPT} -t mangle -X - ${IPT} -t raw -F - ${IPT} -t raw -X - ${IPT} -t security -F - ${IPT} -t security -X + echo "setting bridge network..." + echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward - # Set Default Rules - ${IPT} -P INPUT DROP - ${IPT} -P FORWARD DROP - ${IPT} -P OUTPUT DROP + ## load bridge configuration + iptables-restore /etc/iptables/bridge.v4 - ${IPT} -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT - ${IPT} -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT + ;; + server) + echo "setting server network..." + ## load server configuration + iptables-restore /etc/iptables/server.v4 - case $TYPE in - bridge) - - echo "setting bridge ${BR_IF} network..." - echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward - - ## load bridge configuration - iptables-restore /etc/iptables/bridge.v4 - - ;; - server) - - ## load server configuration - iptables-restore /etc/iptables/server.v4 - - ;; - open) - - ## load client configuration - iptables-restore /etc/iptables/open.v4 - - ;; - - esac ;; - stop) - - echo "clear all iptables tables" - - ${IPT} -F - ${IPT} -X - ${IPT} -t nat -F - ${IPT} -t nat -X - ${IPT} -t mangle -F - ${IPT} -t mangle -X - ${IPT} -t raw -F - ${IPT} -t raw -X - ${IPT} -t security -F - ${IPT} -t security -X - - # Set Default Rules - ${IPT} -P INPUT DROP - ${IPT} -P FORWARD DROP - ${IPT} -P OUTPUT DROP + open) - ${IPT} -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT - ${IPT} -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT + echo "setting client network..." + ## load client configuration + iptables-restore /etc/iptables/open.v4 ;; - restart) - $0 stop - $0 start - ;; + esac + ;; + stop) + + ;; *) - echo "Usage: $0 [start|stop|restart]" - ;; + echo "Usage: $0 [start|stop]" + ;; esac diff --git a/core/index.html b/core/index.html index 87330b1..d19f9e0 100644 --- a/core/index.html +++ b/core/index.html @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ 2.3.2. Static ip 2.3.3. Iptables 2.3.4. Wpa and dhcpd +2.3.5. NetworkManager diff --git a/core/network.html b/core/network.html index 18dd220..c87acf9 100644 --- a/core/network.html +++ b/core/network.html @@ -9,7 +9,8 @@2.3. Network
-Operation of the network can be handle with init scripts;
+Operation of the network can be handle with init scripts or with + network manager;
-
- /etc/rc.d/iptables
@@ -24,11 +25,13 @@- Configure Wireless interface, launch wpa_supplicant to handle wireless authenticationand dynamic (dhcp) connection to router and add as default gateway.
+- /etc/rc.d/networkmanager
+- Use network manager to handle connections.
Choose wireless or net as connection to outside world and configure - /etc/rc.conf to run at startup, example - connecting using wireless interface;
+Choose wireless (wlan), cable network (net) or network manager in + /etc/rc.conf to handle configuration of the + network at startup, example using network manager;
# @@ -40,7 +43,7 @@ TIMEZONE="Europe/Lisbon" HOSTNAME=machine SYSLOG=sysklogd - SERVICES=(lo iptables wlan crond) + SERVICES=(lo iptables networkmanager crond) # End of file@@ -116,33 +119,7 @@For more information about firewall systems read arch wiki iptables - an nftables.
- -To setup iptables rules a set of scripts is used, init script - /etc/rc.d/iptables - loads set of rules from file /etc/iptables/net.v4 at boot time. - Start option "open" option allows everything to outside - and blocks everything from outside, "stop" will block and log - everything. Setup init script and rules ;
- -- # mkdir /etc/iptables - # cp core/conf/iptables/net.v4 /etc/iptables/ - # cp core/conf/rc.d/iptables /etc/rc.d/ - # chmod +x /etc/rc.d/iptables -- -Change /etc/rc.conf and add iptables;
- -- SERVICES=(iptables lo net crond) -- -See current rules and packets counts;
- -- # iptables -L -n -v | less -+ and nftables.Diagram of a package route throw iptables;
@@ -286,135 +263,42 @@ -c, --set-counters packets bytes2.3.3.1. Iptable scripts
- -/etc/rc.d/iptables sources - host configuration and create tables with rules that later are - used to match packages.
+See current rules and packets counts;
- source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh - source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh - - case $1 in - start) - ipt_clear - ipt_tables - case $TYPE in - bridge) - - ## load bridge configuration - source /etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh - - ## log everything else and drop - ipt_log - - iptables-save > /etc/iptables/bridge.v4 - ;; - server) - - - ## load server configuration - source /etc/iptables/iptables-conf.sh - - ## log everything else and drop - ipt_log - - iptables-save > /etc/iptables/server.v4 - ;; - esac - ;; - stop) - - ipt_clear - ;; - restart) - $0 stop - $0 start - ;; - *) - echo "Usage: $0 [start|stop|restart]" - ;; - esac + # iptables -L -n -v | less-2.3.3.2. Server iptables
+2.3.3.1. Iptable scripts
-Adjust /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh - with your network configuration, edit /etc/iptables/ipt-server.sh matching rules with interfaces.
+Scripts help to setup iptables rules so they can be saved using iptables-save + and later restored using iptables-restore utilities. Init script + /etc/rc.d/iptables + loads set of rules from /etc/iptables folder at boot time. + Start option "open" option allows everything to outside + and blocks new connections from outside, "stop" will block and log + everything.
-Default configuration;
+Setup init script and rules;
- echo "setting server network..." - - # Unlimited on loopback - $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT - $IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT - - ####### Input Chain ###### - $IPT -A INPUT -j blocker - - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_https_in - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_in - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_in - #$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j cli_http_in - - - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_in - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_in - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_in - $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_in - - ####### Output Chain ###### - $IPT -A OUTPUT -j blocker - - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${DNS} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_dns_out - #$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_out - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_out - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_out - - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_out - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out - - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_out - $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_out + # mkdir /etc/iptables + # cp core/conf/iptables/net.v4 /etc/iptables/ + # cp core/conf/rc.d/iptables /etc/rc.d/ + # chmod +x /etc/rc.d/iptables+Change /etc/rc.conf and add iptables;
- # bash core/scripts/iptables.sh + SERVICES=(iptables lo net crond)-2.3.3.3. Client iptables
- - -2.3.3.4. Bridge iptables
- -- $IPT -A FORWARD -j blocker - $IPT -A FORWARD -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT - $IPT -A FORWARD -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT - - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_in - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_ssh_out ++Change /etc/rc.d/iptables and define type; server, bridge or open.
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_https_in - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_https_out - - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_rip - - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_dhcp - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_dhcp - - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out - $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j cli_https_in -Adjust /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh + with your network configuration, and adjust + /etc/iptables/ipt-server.sh, /etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh, /etc/iptables/ipt-open.sh according with host necessities.
2.3.4. Wpa and dhcpd
@@ -503,11 +387,24 @@ > save_config
List wifi networks;
+ ++ nmcli device wifi list ++ +
Connect to a wifi network;
+ ++ nmcli device wifi connect "network name" password "network password" +Core OS Index
This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file Gnu Free Documentation License for copying conditions.
diff --git a/tools/wireless.html b/tools/wireless.html index 7481069..f4eeddb 100644 --- a/tools/wireless.html +++ b/tools/wireless.html @@ -5,7 +5,15 @@+ # iwlist wlp2s0 scan + # iwconfig wlp2s0 essid name_of_network ++ +
Tested on debian system only.
-- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From 44ee76746ec6f23f3e67602770e4a04ab8471e95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: SilvinoCheck kernel configuration or use the provided with linux-gnu port diff --git a/core/conf/sysctl.conf b/core/conf/sysctl.conf index 4606791..771112a 100644 --- a/core/conf/sysctl.conf +++ b/core/conf/sysctl.conf @@ -3,50 +3,18 @@ # kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4 + kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 + # Shared Memory #kernel.shmmax = 500000000 # Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated # fs.file-nr= vm.mmap_min_addr=65536 + # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768 kernel.pid_max = 65536 -# -# Memory Protections -# - -# If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error. -# Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel. -# Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly, -# the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be -# remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time -# clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure -# that hwclock operates correctly. -# -# If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier, -# you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this -# option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead. -kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1 - -# If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking -# daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries -# will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX -# or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal, -# the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent -# fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and -# restart the daemon. -# In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their -# existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will -# be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes. -# -# It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing -# section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious -# signal. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "deter_bruteforce" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1 - # # Filesystem Protections # @@ -55,341 +23,9 @@ kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1 # Increase system file descriptor limit fs.file-max = 65535 -# If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users -# will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in -# world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the -# symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be -# able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is -# enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1 - - -# Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition -# that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache -# verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of -# the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink -# to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one -# that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the -# symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete, -# race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option -# will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option -# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1 -kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15 - -# if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't -# own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of -# the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1 - -# If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will -# be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems -# will be protected in the following ways: -# * No new writable mounts will be allowed -# * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write -# * Write operations will be denied on all block devices -# This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1, -# it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting -# behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only -# filesystem. -# Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM -# and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via -# config or at runtime. -# This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems. -#kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1 - -# if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a -# chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o, -# system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable -# files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time. -# This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this -# if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of -# tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "chroot_caps" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1 - -#kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod -# or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects -# against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot -# again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking -# out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "chroot_deny_chroot" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1 - -# If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing -# to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory -# outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option -# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to -# mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it -# would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same -# as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from -# anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which -# they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended -# that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "chroot_deny_mknod" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to -# mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use -# a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It -# works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This -# function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out -# of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach -# to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail. -# It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, -# a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1 - -# If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to -# write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc -# interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to -# connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix -# domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended -# that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1 - -# If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted -# applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot. -# The man page on chroot(2) states: -# Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working -# directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at -# `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a -# `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'. -# -# It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break -# any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to -# kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid, -# getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise -# the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of -# processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply -# removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice" -# is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1 - -# -# Kernel Auditing -# - -# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate -# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to -# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the -# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "audit_group" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1 - -# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate -# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to -# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the -# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "audit_group" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99 - -# If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the -# other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution -# will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track -# of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "exec_logging" is created. -# WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially -# on an active system. -kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will -# be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current -# limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is -# created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored. -kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1 - -# If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged -# to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain -# applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and -# is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace -# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "audit_ptrace" is created. -#kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1 - -# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace -# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "audit_ptrace" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1 - -# If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as -# SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program -# occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "signal_logging" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1 - -# If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged. -# This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep -# their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "forkfail_logging" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1 - -# If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "timechange_logging" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1 - -# if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit -# usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when -# denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also -# log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT -# is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging" -# is created. -kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1 - -# -# Executable Protections -# - - -# if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8) -# to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer. -# The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other -# identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a -# system for a targeted exploit. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1 - # Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 -# If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring -# programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you -# have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been -# enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make -# fine-grained exceptions. -# -# This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace -# processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process. -# This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work, -# but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1 - -# If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable -# binaries. This option is useful in environments that -# remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to -# prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds -# consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally -# be read out when run without privileges while ptracing. -# -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec" -# is created. -kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1 - -# If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid -# in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids, -# gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread -# to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most -# cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior -# on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the -# same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue -# running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled, -# a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1 - -# If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared -# memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes -# given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks: -# 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match -# that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object -# 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't -# match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object -# It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects, -# with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to -# privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to -# research by Tim Brown: -# http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/ -# who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with -# CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "harden_ipc" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the -# supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted." -# These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in -# root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option -# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1 -kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100 - -# If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will -# decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This -# option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most -# users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this -# entry will default to on for backward-compatibility. -kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under -# a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to, -# the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a -# "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID. -# Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to -# execute files in directories they own that are not group or -# world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by -# root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "tpe_restrict_all" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1 - - -kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1 - # # Network Protections # @@ -455,7 +91,6 @@ net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 #net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 #net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 - # Make sure no one can alter the routing tables # Act as a router, necessary for Access Point net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 @@ -495,96 +130,4 @@ net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1800 # Sen SynAck retries to 3 net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3 -# If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP -# destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets -# sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists. -# This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the -# loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature -# makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network -# visibility against scanners. -# -# The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD -# blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not -# just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no -# problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain -# connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote -# end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this -# side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this -# feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks. -# The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket -# can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not -# all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider -# disabling this feature on the haproxy host. -# -# If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names -# "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created. -# While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off -# toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as -# "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4 -# prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK -# state. -kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1 -kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will -# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server -# applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1 - -# Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to -# add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID -# specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "socket_all_gid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will -# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be -# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group -# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers -# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1 - -# Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for. -# Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to -# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl -# option with name "socket_client_gid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will -# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be -# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group -# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers -# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1 - -# Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for. -# Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to -# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl -# option with name "socket_server_gid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99 - -# -# Physical Protections -# - -# If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb" -# will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new -# USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB -# device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be -# used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities -# in various USB device drivers. -# -# For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any -# relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros -# as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl. -kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0 - -# -# Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set -# -kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0 - # End of file diff --git a/core/exim.html b/core/exim.html index 7e1fd28..3b86bb7 100644 --- a/core/exim.html +++ b/core/exim.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
-Exim come with default configuration we will change to mach system settings /etc/exim/exim.conf.
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ $ sudo prt-get depinst mailx -Exim creates a key for you if you just copy exim.conf and start daemon;
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ # chmod 644 /etc/ssl/certs/exim.cert -Exim come with default aliases we will change to mach system settings /etc/exim/aliases;
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ #### -Tony Finch publish a nice configuration reference. @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ # exim -bt bob@remote.com -
$ prt-get depinst fetchmail diff --git a/core/hardening.html b/core/hardening.html index 1455398..8e9788f 100644 --- a/core/hardening.html +++ b/core/hardening.html @@ -2,25 +2,51 @@ -2.2. Hardening +2.6. Hardening Core OS Index -2.2. Hardening
+2.6. Hardening
-Check apparmor, - sysctl, - toolchain and - samhain before running tests.
+2.6.0.1 System configuration
-Mount some filesystems in read only
-Check processes running as root
-Check processes users premissions
+
+ $ sudo prt-get depinst checksec ++ +
- $ sudo prt-get depinst checksec lynis + $ sudo prt-get depinst lynis
Lynis gives a view of system overall configuration, without changing @@ -44,7 +70,7 @@ Core OS Index
This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file Gnu Free Documentation License for copying conditions.
diff --git a/core/index.html b/core/index.html index d19f9e0..c9d5d4b 100644 --- a/core/index.html +++ b/core/index.html @@ -103,49 +103,47 @@Operation of the network can be handle with init scripts or with network manager;
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ described scripts then proceed to update system. -This example will use Chaos Computer Club @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
# /etc/resolv.conf.head can replace this line - nameserver 213.73.91.35 + nameserver 2.2.73.91.35 # /etc/resolv.conf.tail can replace this line@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ # chattr +i /etc/resolv.conf -
Current example of /etc/rc.d/net;
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ # ip route add default via ${GW} -For more information about firewall systems read arch wiki iptables @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ # iptables -L -n -v | less -
Scripts help to setup iptables rules so they can be saved using iptables-save and later restored using iptables-restore utilities. Init script @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ with your network configuration, and adjust /etc/iptables/ipt-server.sh, /etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh, /etc/iptables/ipt-open.sh according with host necessities.
-There is more information on Wiki Wifi Start Scripts and @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ # iwconfig wlp2s0 essid NAME key s:ABCDE12345 -
Configure wpa supplicant edit;
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ init script to auto load wpa configuration and dhcp client. -# wpa_cli @@ -387,18 +387,33 @@ > save_config-
Wifi status;
+ ++ $ nmcli radio wifi + $ nmcli radio wifi on +
List wifi networks;
- nmcli device wifi list + $ nmcli device wifi rescan + $ nmcli device wifi list
Connect to a wifi network;
- nmcli device wifi connect "network name" password "network password" + $ nmcli device wifi connect "network name" password "network password" ++ +
Edit and save network configuration;
+ ++ $ nmcli connection edit "network name" + nmcli> save persistentCore OS Index diff --git a/core/package.html b/core/package.html index e0f8eae..7d4c8b5 100644 --- a/core/package.html +++ b/core/package.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ -
For more information read crux handbook Package management front-end: @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ $ prt-get depinst prt-utils prt-get-bashcompletion -
Before build software get latest version of port collections;
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ $ prt-get update -fr $(revdep) -Installing using prt-get tool;
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@If you user pkgmk and pkgadd allways check if README, pre and post instal files exist.
-Clone this documentation;
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ $ sudo ports -u 6c37 -$ prt-get info port_name @@ -166,13 +166,13 @@ $ pkginfo -o filename-
$ prt-get depends port_name-
Example how to get ports installed from contrib. Maybe there is a "cleaner" way to this, for now is ok;
diff --git a/core/samhain.html b/core/samhain.html index d28a6d2..a209864 100644 --- a/core/samhain.html +++ b/core/samhain.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ -Read Samhain Manual, @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
For more information on configuration check Monitoring Policies. @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ # samhain status -
Manual, You can update the database while the daemon is running, as long diff --git a/core/sysctl.html b/core/sysctl.html index d06afde..a5af197 100644 --- a/core/sysctl.html +++ b/core/sysctl.html @@ -2,24 +2,18 @@
-Sysctl references Arch TCP/IP stack hardening, Cyberciti Nginx Hardning, - Cyberciti Security Hardening, - Grsecurity and PaX Configuration.
- -Since kernels on machine-ports have PaX - and grsecurity, - /etc/sysctl.conf can have follow - values;
+ Cyberciti Security Hardening.# @@ -27,50 +21,18 @@ # kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4 + kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 + # Shared Memory #kernel.shmmax = 500000000 # Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated # fs.file-nr= vm.mmap_min_addr=65536 + # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768 kernel.pid_max = 65536 - # - # Memory Protections - # - - # If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error. - # Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel. - # Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly, - # the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be - # remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time - # clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure - # that hwclock operates correctly. - # - # If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier, - # you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this - # option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead. - kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1 - - # If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking - # daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries - # will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX - # or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal, - # the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent - # fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and - # restart the daemon. - # In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their - # existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will - # be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes. - # - # It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing - # section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious - # signal. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "deter_bruteforce" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1 - # # Filesystem Protections # @@ -79,341 +41,9 @@ # Increase system file descriptor limit fs.file-max = 65535 - # If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users - # will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in - # world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the - # symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be - # able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is - # enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1 - - - # Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition - # that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache - # verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of - # the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink - # to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one - # that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the - # symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete, - # race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option - # will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option - # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1 - kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15 - - # if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't - # own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of - # the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1 - - # If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will - # be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems - # will be protected in the following ways: - # * No new writable mounts will be allowed - # * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write - # * Write operations will be denied on all block devices - # This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1, - # it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting - # behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only - # filesystem. - # Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM - # and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via - # config or at runtime. - # This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems. - #kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1 - - # if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a - # chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o, - # system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable - # files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time. - # This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this - # if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of - # tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "chroot_caps" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1 - - #kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod - # or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects - # against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot - # again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking - # out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "chroot_deny_chroot" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1 - - # If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing - # to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory - # outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option - # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to - # mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it - # would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same - # as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from - # anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which - # they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended - # that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "chroot_deny_mknod" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to - # mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use - # a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It - # works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This - # function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out - # of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach - # to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail. - # It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, - # a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1 - - # If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to - # write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc - # interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to - # connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix - # domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended - # that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1 - - # If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted - # applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot. - # The man page on chroot(2) states: - # Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working - # directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at - # `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a - # `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'. - # - # It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break - # any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to - # kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid, - # getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise - # the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of - # processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply - # removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice" - # is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1 - - # - # Kernel Auditing - # - - # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate - # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to - # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the - # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "audit_group" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1 - - # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate - # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to - # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the - # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "audit_group" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99 - - # If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the - # other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution - # will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track - # of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "exec_logging" is created. - # WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially - # on an active system. - kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0 - - # If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will - # be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current - # limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is - # created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored. - kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged - # to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain - # applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and - # is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0 - - # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace - # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "audit_ptrace" is created. - #kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace - # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "audit_ptrace" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0 - - # If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1 - - # If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as - # SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program - # occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "signal_logging" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged. - # This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep - # their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "forkfail_logging" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1 - - # If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "timechange_logging" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1 - - # if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit - # usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when - # denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also - # log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT - # is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging" - # is created. - kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1 - - # - # Executable Protections - # - - - # if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8) - # to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer. - # The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other - # identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a - # system for a targeted exploit. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1 - # Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 - # If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring - # programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you - # have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been - # enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make - # fine-grained exceptions. - # - # This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace - # processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process. - # This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work, - # but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1 - - # If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable - # binaries. This option is useful in environments that - # remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to - # prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds - # consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally - # be read out when run without privileges while ptracing. - # - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec" - # is created. - kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1 - - # If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid - # in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids, - # gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread - # to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most - # cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior - # on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the - # same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue - # running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled, - # a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1 - - # If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared - # memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes - # given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks: - # 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match - # that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object - # 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't - # match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object - # It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects, - # with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to - # privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to - # research by Tim Brown: - # http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/ - # who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with - # CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "harden_ipc" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the - # supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted." - # These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in - # root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option - # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1 - kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100 - - # If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will - # decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This - # option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most - # users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this - # entry will default to on for backward-compatibility. - kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under - # a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to, - # the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a - # "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID. - # Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to - # execute files in directories they own that are not group or - # world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by - # root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "tpe_restrict_all" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1 - - - kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1 - # # Network Protections # @@ -519,105 +149,18 @@ # Sen SynAck retries to 3 net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3 - # If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP - # destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets - # sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists. - # This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the - # loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature - # makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network - # visibility against scanners. - # - # The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD - # blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not - # just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no - # problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain - # connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote - # end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this - # side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this - # feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks. - # The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket - # can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not - # all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider - # disabling this feature on the haproxy host. - # - # If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names - # "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created. - # While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off - # toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as - # "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4 - # prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK - # state. - kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1 - kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will - # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server - # applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1 - - # Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to - # add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID - # specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "socket_all_gid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will - # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be - # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group - # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers - # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1 - - # Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for. - # Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to - # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl - # option with name "socket_client_gid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will - # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be - # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group - # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers - # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1 - - # Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for. - # Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to - # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl - # option with name "socket_server_gid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99 - - # - # Physical Protections - # - - # If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb" - # will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new - # USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB - # device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be - # used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities - # in various USB device drivers. - # - # For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any - # relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros - # as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl. - kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0 - - # - # Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set - # - kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0 - # End of file+
Reload sysctl settings;
+ ++ # sysctl --system +Core OS Index
This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file Gnu Free Documentation License for copying conditions.
diff --git a/core/toolchain.html b/core/toolchain.html index 57113fd..9662217 100644 --- a/core/toolchain.html +++ b/core/toolchain.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ -Add flags to pkgmk configuration and change specific ports that don't build with hardening flags. More information about diff --git a/core/tty-terminal.html b/core/tty-terminal.html index 6eb08d3..d033ec2 100644 --- a/core/tty-terminal.html +++ b/core/tty-terminal.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
-SMART provides statistics of disk firmware, this system - handle errors has their occur. Badblocks detect bad blocks - by writing and reading from disk in a destructive test. - Example of how to view SMART statistics of a disk;
+SMART provides statistics of disk firmware, + this system handle errors has their occur. Badblocks are detected by writing and reading from disk in + a destructive test. Example of how to view SMART + statistics of a disk;
# smartctl -t long /dev/sdb1 # smartctl -a /dev/sdb1 | less + # hdparm -I /dev/sda | less ++ +
Mechanical hard drives spindown disks + and put heads in hold position to save energy + and protect the disk. This spindow spinup + can shorter the life expectancy of the hard + drive. Relevant output from smartctl;
+ +Settings with hdparm [options] [device];
+ ++ # hdparm -S 0 /dev/sda + # hdparm -B 255 /dev/sda ++ +
Set persistent values using udev, edit /etc/udev/rules.d/69-hdparm.rules;
+ ++ ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEM=="block", KERNEL=="sda", RUN=="/usr/bin/hdparm -B 255 -S 0 /dev/sda"
Search for bad blocks using @@ -28,6 +80,7 @@ # badblocks -nsv /dev/sdb1 +
Temp partition with 20M-50M;
-- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From aef9e68386cff79c5d5ebd5288c5c1cd971eca72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: SilvinoIf you user pkgmk and pkgadd allways check if README, pre and post +
If you user pkgmk and pkgadd allways check if README, pre and post instal files exist.
Get new ports;
- $ sudo ports -u machine-ports - $ sudo ports -u 6c37-dropin - $ sudo ports -u 6c37 + $ sudo ports -u ports
This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file Gnu Free Documentation License for copying conditions.
diff --git a/core/ports.html b/core/ports.html index e921351..07d52d2 100644 --- a/core/ports.html +++ b/core/ports.html @@ -76,10 +76,11 @@ # /etc/pkgmk.conf: pkgmk(8) configuration # - export CFLAGS="-O2 -g -march=x86-64 -pipe" + export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=x86-64" export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" - # export MAKEFLAGS="-j2" + export JOBS=$(nproc) + export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS" case ${PKGMK_ARCH} in "64"|"") @@ -96,14 +97,16 @@ ;; esac - #PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(http://machine.example.org/ports/distfiles/) + PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(https://hive.gnu.systems/mirror/distfiles/) # PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="$PWD" PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="/usr/ports/distfiles" # PKGMK_PACKAGE_DIR="$PWD" PKGMK_PACKAGE_DIR="/usr/ports/packages" # PKGMK_WORK_DIR="$PWD/work" - PKGMK_WORK_DIR="/usr/ports/work/$name" + PKGMK_WORK_DIR="/usr/ports/work/${name}" # PKGMK_DOWNLOAD="no" + # PKGMK_IGNORE_SIGNATURE="no" + # PKGMK_IGNORE_MD5SUM="no" # PKGMK_IGNORE_FOOTPRINT="no" # PKGMK_IGNORE_NEW="no" # PKGMK_NO_STRIP="no" @@ -136,39 +139,36 @@ # note: the order matters: the package found first is used prtdir /usr/ports/core prtdir /usr/ports/opt - prtdir /usr/ports/contrib - prtdir /usr/ports/ports prtdir /usr/ports/xorg - # 6c37 team provides a collection with freetype-iu, fontconfig-iu - # and cairo-iu ports. - # the following line enables the multilib compat-32 collection #prtdir /usr/ports/compat-32 # the following line enables the user maintained contrib collection - # prtdir /usr/ports/6c37-dropin - # prtdir /usr/ports/6c37 + prtdir /usr/ports/contrib + prtdir /usr/ports/ports + prtdir /usr/ports/mate + prtdir /usr/ports/kde ### use mypackage form local directory # prtdir /home/packages/build:mypackage ### log options: - writelog enabled # (enabled|disabled) - logmode overwrite # (append|overwrite) - rmlog_on_success yes # (no|yes) - logfile /usr/ports/pkgbuild/%n-%v-%r.log + # writelog enabled # (enabled|disabled) + # logmode overwrite # (append|overwrite) + # rmlog_on_success yes # (no|yes) + logfile /var/log/pkgbuild/%n.log # path, %p=path to port dir, %n=port name # %v=version, %r=release ### use alternate cache file (default: /var/lib/pkg/prt-get.cache # cachefile /mnt/nfs/cache - ### print readme information: + ### print README information: readme verbose # (verbose|compact|disabled) ### prefer higher versions in sysup / diff - preferhigher no # (yes|no) + preferhigher yes # (yes|no) ### use regexp search # useregex no # (yes|no) @@ -177,16 +177,35 @@ ### --install-scripts option runscripts yes # (no|yes) - ### expert section ### ### alternative commands - makecommand sudo -h -u pkgmk fakeroot pkgmk + makecommand sudo -H -u pkgmk fakeroot pkgmk addcommand sudo pkgadd removecommand sudo pkgrm runscriptcommand sudo sh +Ccache avoids same code to be compiled by saving + the output from compilers and identifying same + input by using hashes and distcc distributes + compiling process across machines.
+ +Don't set native or generic on /etc/pkgmk.conf.
++ $ prt-get depinst ccache distcc ++ +
Add to /etc/profile;
+ ++ export PATH="/usr/lib/ccache/:$PATH" + export CCACHE_DIR="/var/cache/ccache" + export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux" ++ Core OS Index
This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From 83eba7ffb016b7d8bea6e35ac229089213c06e70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino This document and others under tools extend
- core network
- witch allow to connect to the internet in the most
- common environments. Follow documents allow to configure
- tap interfaces for virtual machines, audit network,
- dns cache and encryption, etc. On core is configured a sub-domain from
+ This document extend
+ core network,
+ that cover the most common environments, with
+ virtual networks and bridges. To configure a sub-domain from
afraid.org,
generate cron job
to update ip every 5 minutes, check
- about dynamic interface. To run as system cron job add as root and remove path line from example;Network Tools
-
# crontab -e-
Example from afraid uses curl and will log output to /tmp/freedns*, - change to /var/log/freedns
+Replace KEY and domain_name with correct one;
+ ++ 4,9,14,19,24,29,34,39,44,49,54,59 * * * * sleep 22 ; wget --no-check-certificate -O - https://freedns.afraid.org/dynamic/update.php?[KEY]= >> /var/log/freedns_domain_name.log 2>&1 & +
Change iptables init script /etc/rc.d/iptables - to load new rules from - /etc/iptables/br-lan.v4. - Now change iptables-br.sh + and set TYPE to bridge, + /etc/iptables/bridge.v4. + Now change + ipt-conf.sh + and ipt-bridge.sh with your network configuration and run;
- # bash core/scripts/iptables-br.sh + # bash ipt-bridge.sh+
Copy bridge.v4 to /etc/iptables and restart + iptables.
+ Tools IndexThis is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file Gnu Free Documentation License for copying conditions.
-- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From d418554cda9c0489fdebea35957467dfbeb00473 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvino# pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm - vgcreate vg_system /dev/mapper/cryptlvm + # vgcreate vg_system /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
Core collection installation on root partition uses
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From 5adacc390c152b1540372d653712cb41fcb76b7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Add to /etc/profile; Configure pkgmk and define number of cores available,
+ in this example get dynamically Edit /etc/pkgmk.conf; Set ccaching directory and instructs to use distcc backend; Set distcc hosts and respective number of cpu cores to send work; Configure distcc daemon, edit /etc/rc.d/distccd; Create /etc/distcc.conf;
This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From 8ed4702bc69f8855fcd7c9d192f48c8d12fe75f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Mechanical hard drives spindown disks
and put heads in hold position to save energy
and protect the disk. This spindow spinup
can shorter the life expectancy of the hard
- drive. Relevant output from smartctl; Settings with hdparm [options] [device]; Create /etc/distcc.conf;
This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From f4f8011dfe20f374a52a38b72a87fa92769a6523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Set ccaching directory and instructs to use distcc backend; Set ccaching directory and instructs to
+ use distcc backend; Set distcc hosts and respective number of cpu cores to send work; Set distcc hosts and respective number of
+ cpu cores to send work; Configure distcc daemon, edit /etc/rc.d/distccd; Host name "worker" must be configured on
+ /etc/hosts. Configure distcc daemon, edit
+ /etc/rc.d/distccd; Create /etc/distcc.conf; Configure pkgmk and define number of cores available,
- in this example get dynamically Edit /etc/pkgmk.conf; Set ccaching directory and instructs to
- use distcc backend; Set distcc hosts and respective number of
- cpu cores to send work;
+ ## local compile only
+ #export JOBS=$(nproc)
+ #export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS"
+
+ # compile using distcc
+ # set static cpu cores available
+ ##export MAKEFLAGS="-j 8"
+ # get dynamically cpu cores available
+ export MAKEFLAGS="/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null"
+ export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS"
+
+
+
+ # ccache settings
export PATH="/usr/lib/ccache/:$PATH"
- export CCACHE_DIR="/var/cache/ccache"
+ export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/cache/ccache"
+ export CCACHE_PREFIX="distcc"
export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
+
+ export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 worker/4"
+ export DISTCC_DIR="/urs/ports/distcc"
+
+
+
+ #!/usr/bin/env bash
+ #
+ # /etc/rc.d/distccd: start/stop distcc daemon
+ #
+
+ . /etc/distcc.conf
+ if [ -z "$DISTCC_ALLOW" ]; then
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Core OS Index
# smartctl -t long /dev/sdb1
# smartctl -a /dev/sdb1 | less
- # hdparm -I /dev/sda | less
+ # hdparm -I /dev/sda | grep "Advanced power management level"
+ # hdparm -I /dev/sda | grep "Recommended acoustic management value"
+
+
-
+ DISTCC_ALLOW="10.0.0.0/8"
+ DISTCC_USER="pkgmk"
+ DISTCC_LOG_LEVEL="info"
-
Core OS Index
# ccache settings
export PATH="/usr/lib/ccache/:$PATH"
- export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/cache/ccache"
+ export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/ccache"
export CCACHE_PREFIX="distcc"
export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From fd50d963db28959f1cf652dbc3f6d24e31b63a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino
# ccache settings
@@ -224,13 +225,16 @@
export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
-
export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 worker/4"
export DISTCC_DIR="/urs/ports/distcc"
-
#!/usr/bin/env bash
@@ -239,7 +243,7 @@
#
. /etc/distcc.conf
- if [ -z "$DISTCC_ALLOW" ]; then
+ if [ -z "$DISTCC_ALLOW" ]; then
+ # ccache settings
+ export PATH="/usr/lib/ccache/:$PATH"
+ export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/ccache"
+ export CCACHE_PREFIX="distcc"
+ export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
+
## local compile only
@@ -214,26 +224,16 @@
export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS"
-
- # ccache settings
- export PATH="/usr/lib/ccache/:$PATH"
- export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/ccache"
- export CCACHE_PREFIX="distcc"
- export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
-
-
export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 worker/4" export DISTCC_DIR="/urs/ports/distcc"-
Host name "worker" must be configured on - /etc/hosts. Configure distcc daemon, edit +
Configure distcc daemon, edit /etc/rc.d/distccd;
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ Core OS Index-This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file Gnu Free Documentation License for copying conditions.
-- cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0 From e52ad7baa28982fb63154d7eda40c54982f8d276 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: SilvinoDate: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 03:46:58 +0100 Subject: fix core ports pkgmk.conf --- core/conf/pkgmk.conf | 24 +++++++++++++----------- core/ports.html | 26 +++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/core/conf/pkgmk.conf b/core/conf/pkgmk.conf index 14cc258..7a7c6e7 100644 --- a/core/conf/pkgmk.conf +++ b/core/conf/pkgmk.conf @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # /etc/pkgmk.conf: pkgmk(8) configuration # -export CFLAGS="-O2 -g -march=x86-64" +export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=x86-64" export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" ## ccache settings @@ -10,21 +10,23 @@ export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" #export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/ccache" #export CCACHE_PREFIX="distcc" #export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux" +#export DISTCC_DIR="/usr/ports/distcc" # -#export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 worker/4" -#export DISTCC_DIR="/urs/ports/distcc" +## compile using ccache and distcc +#export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 xborg/4" +# +## compile using distcc without ccache +##export PATH="/usr/lib/distcc/:$PATH" +##export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4,lzo,cpp xborg/4,lzo,cpp cb1/2,lzo,cpp" +# +#export MAKEFLAGS="-j $(/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null)" +#export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS" # local compile only +#export MAKEFLAGS="-j 8" export JOBS=$(nproc) export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS" -## compile using distcc -## set static cpu cores available -###export MAKEFLAGS="-j 8" -## get dynamically cpu cores available -#export MAKEFLAGS="/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null" -#export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS" - case ${PKGMK_ARCH} in "64"|"") ;; @@ -40,7 +42,7 @@ case ${PKGMK_ARCH} in ;; esac -PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(http://c1.ank/distfiles/ http://c1.ank/archive/distfiles/) +PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(https://hive.gnu.systems/mirror/distfiles/) # PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="$PWD" PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="/usr/ports/distfiles" # PKGMK_PACKAGE_DIR="$PWD" diff --git a/core/ports.html b/core/ports.html index a977568..d7ea41c 100644 --- a/core/ports.html +++ b/core/ports.html @@ -211,26 +211,22 @@ export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
- ## local compile only - #export JOBS=$(nproc) - #export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS" - - # compile using distcc - # set static cpu cores available - ##export MAKEFLAGS="-j 8" - # get dynamically cpu cores available - export MAKEFLAGS="/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null" - export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS" --
Set distcc hosts and respective number of cpu cores to send work, hosts names, exp; "worker" must be configured on /etc/hosts.
- export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 worker/4" - export DISTCC_DIR="/urs/ports/distcc" + export DISTCC_DIR="/usr/ports/distcc" + + # compile using ccache and distcc + export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 xborg/4" + + # compile using distcc without ccache + #export PATH="/usr/lib/distcc/:$PATH" + #export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4,lzo,cpp xborg/4,lzo,cpp cb1/2,lzo,cpp" + + export MAKEFLAGS="-j $(/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null)" + export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS"
Configure distcc daemon, edit
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From f0c45e7842ef205123124ba7ec2a1d044749c328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Configure pkgmk and define number of cores available,
- in this example get dynamically Edit /etc/pkgmk.conf and
+ in this example get dynamically Edit
+ /etc/pkgmk.conf and
set ccaching directory and instructs to use distcc
backend;
- export DISTCC_DIR="/usr/ports/distcc" - - # compile using ccache and distcc - export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 xborg/4" - - # compile using distcc without ccache - #export PATH="/usr/lib/distcc/:$PATH" - #export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4,lzo,cpp xborg/4,lzo,cpp cb1/2,lzo,cpp" + ### compile using distcc without ccache + ##export PATH="/usr/lib/distcc/:$PATH" + ##export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4,lzo,cpp xborg/4,lzo,cpp" + ##export PUMP_BUILD=yes - export MAKEFLAGS="-j $(/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null)" + # distcc settings + export JOBS=$(/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null) + export DISTCC_DIR="/usr/ports/distcc" + export MAKEFLAGS="-j ${JOBS}" export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS" + + # local compile only + #export JOBS=$(nproc) + #export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS"
Configure distcc daemon, edit
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From d0caaf447c7aef7bd329e7d1a99fb127c658f784 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Check kernel configuration or
- use the provided with linux-gnu port
+ use the provided with linux-gnu port
to support apparmor. AppArmor enforce rules on applications based
on security policies. User space tools are provided by apparmor port
and its dependencies, install them; apparmor_parser options; Profiles are located at /etc/apparmor.d/ and
+ /usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles contain profiles
+ that require testing;
+
+ Profiles are parsed using
+ apparmor_parser; To create a new profile, let's say for lynx,
+ first find where the application is; Now create a file with path to executable in
+ /etc/apparmor.d; Create basic profile template; This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file Gnu Free Documentation License
for copying conditions. Tools use log as a source to build profiles, it is
+ necessary to disable log rate limit; Start aa-genprof; Execute application with all common application options
+ and parts; After initial automatic configuration enable profile in
+ complain mode. Use aa-logprof when rules need to be adapted. Once profile rules become well defined enable profile in
+ enforce mode with aa-enforce; Monitor logs with aa-notify;
+
+
To create a new profile, let's say for lynx,
@@ -136,8 +165,6 @@
}
-
-
Core OS Index
This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
Copyright (C) 2019
diff --git a/core/hardening.html b/core/hardening.html
index 8e9788f..d94cda6 100644
--- a/core/hardening.html
+++ b/core/hardening.html
@@ -10,15 +10,16 @@
Check "normal" users groups, make sure they are not admin or wheel group; ps -U root -u root u, ps axl | awk '$7 != 0 && $10 !~ "Z"', process permission; ps -o gid,rdig,supgid -p "$pid" Maintain, secure with hash, and enforce secure passwords with pam-cracklib. Cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth. Check pam modules, test on virtual machine, user can lockout during tests. Check files (processes) set uid and set gid; To setuid (4744); To remove (0664) from su and Xorg (user must be part of input and video for xorg to run); To set gid (2744) To remove (0774); Check files (processes); getfacl filename.2.6.1. AppArmor
Profiles
+
+
+ # cp -r /usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles/* /etc/apparmor.d/
+ # sudo rm /etc/apparmor.d/README
+ # bash /etc/rc.d/apparmor restart
+
+
+
Usage: apparmor_parser [options] [profile]
@@ -93,11 +106,41 @@
--skip-bad-cache-rebuild Do not try rebuilding the cache if it is rejected by the kernel
--warn n Enable warnings (see --help=warn)
- #
+
+ Create profile with audit
+
+ Create profile manually
+
+
+ $ whereis lynx
+ lynx: /usr/bin/lynx /usr/etc/lynx.lss /usr/etc/lynx.cfg /usr/etc/lynx.cfg~ /usr/share/man/man1/lynx.1.gz
+
+
+
+ # vim /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.lynx
+
+
+
+ #include <tunables/global>
+
+ profile lynx /usr/bin/lynx {
+ #include <abstractions/base>
+ }
+
+
+
Core OS Index
# useradd -U -m -k /etc/skel -s /bin/bash username
- # usermod -G adm,wheel,audio,video,users username
+ # usermod -G adm,wheel,audio,input,video,users username
# passwd username
--
cgit 1.4.1-2-gfad0
From 951a8a84411da6b71cee11d8c9feb993b984acf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvino Create profile with audit
+
+ # sysctl -w kernel.printk_ratelimit=0
+
+
+
+ $ sudo aa-genprof /usr/bin/lynx
+
+
+
+ # aa-logprof
+
+
+ Create profile manually
2.6. Hardening
- 2.6.0.1 System configuration
+ 2.6.0.2 System security
- System security
$ sudo prt-get depinst checksec
-
-
2.6.0.1 System configuration
+
+ 1.1 - Users groups, passwords and sudo.
+
+ 1.2 - Linux PAM
+
+
+ # find / -perm -4000 >> /root/setuid_files
+ # find / -perm 2000 >> /root/setguid_files
+
+
+
+ # chmod u+s filename
+
+
+
+ # chmod u-s /usr/bin/su
+ # chmod u-s /usr/bin/X
+
+
+
+ # chmod g+s filename
+
+
+ # chmod g-s filename
+
+
+
Check capabilities;
++ # getcap filename ++ +
Check sudo, sudoers and sudo replay.
+ +Don't run editor as root, instead run sudoedit filename or sudo --edit filename. Editor can be set as a environment variable;
+ ++ $ export SUDO_EDITOR=vim ++ +
Set rvim as default on sudo config;
+ ++ # visudo + + Defaults editor=/usr/bin/rvim ++ +
Once sudo is correctly configured, disable root login;
+ ++ # passwd --lock root ++ +
+ $ prt-get depinst audit ++ +
Example audit when file /etc/passwd get modified;
+ ++ $ auditctl -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k passwd_changes ++ +
Audit when a module get's loaded;
+ ++ # auditctl -w /sbin/insmod -p x -k module_insertion ++
$ sudo prt-get depinst lynis-
Lynis gives a view of system overall configuration, without changing - default profile it runs irrelevant tests. Create a lynis profile by - coping default one and run lynis;
+Lynis gives a view of system overall configuration, + without changing default profile it runs irrelevant tests. + Create a lynis profile by coping default one and run lynis;
$ sudo cp /etc/lynis/default.prf /etc/lynis/custom.prf diff --git a/core/sysctl.html b/core/sysctl.html index a5af197..afee463 100644 --- a/core/sysctl.html +++ b/core/sysctl.html @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768 kernel.pid_max = 65536 + #Yama LSM by default + kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1 + # # Filesystem Protections # @@ -48,6 +51,8 @@ # Network Protections # + net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 0 + # Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits # min, default, and max number of bytes to use # set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths diff --git a/tools/irssi.html b/tools/irssi.html index d4fcc0d..dbb1372 100644 --- a/tools/irssi.html +++ b/tools/irssi.html @@ -1,9 +1,39 @@ + + + + +-Irssi + + - Start up irssi, then: - /connect irc.freenode.net - /nick MyIRCNick - /SERVER ADD -auto -network freenode irc.freenode.net 6667+ Tools Index + + Irssi
+ +Default configuration file is at /usr/etc/irssi.conf;
+ ++ $ mkdir .irssi + $ cp /usr/etc/irssi.conf .irssi/config ++ +Start up irssi, then:
+ ++ /connect irc.freenode.net + /nick MyIRCNick + /SERVER ADD -auto -network freenode irc.freenode.net 6667 <password> + /CHANNEL ADD -auto #crux freenode +- (you may have to shutdown and restart irssi at this point for it to recognize the network name "freenode" in the next step) - /CHANNEL ADD -auto #crux freenode + + Tools Index ++ This is part of the Hive System Documentation. + Copyright (C) 2019 + Hive Team. + See the file Gnu Free Documentation License + for copying conditions.
+ + diff --git a/tools/x.html b/tools/x.html index c693062..3efaf7a 100644 --- a/tools/x.html +++ b/tools/x.html @@ -17,34 +17,7 @@Xorg
- $ sudo prt-get depinst xorg-server \ - xorg-xinit \ - xorg-xrdb \ - xorg-xdpyinfo \ - xorg-xauth \ - xorg-xmodmap \ - xorg-xrandr \ - xorg-xgamma \ - xorg-xf86-input-evdev \ - xorg-xf86-input-synaptics \ - xsel \ - xkeyboard-config -- -Fonts
- -- $ sudo prt-get depinst xorg-font-util \ - xorg-font-alias \ - xorg-font-dejavu-ttf \ - xorg-font-cursor-misc \ - xorg-font-misc-misc \ - console-font-terminus \ - xorg-font-terminus \ - xorg-font-mutt-misc - - $ prt-get search xorg-font-bitstream | xargs sudo prt-get depinst - $ prt-get search xorg-font-bh | xargs sudo prt-get depinst + $ prt-get depinst meta-desktop@@ -53,35 +26,6 @@ $ prt-get depinst otf-sourcecode
- $ sudo prt-get depinst \ - alsa-utils \ - libdrm \ - mesa3d \ - ffmpeg \ - gstreamer \ - gstreamer-vaapi \ - gst-plugins-base \ - gst-plugins-good \ - gst-plugins-bad \ - gst-plugins-ugly \ - cmus \ - dmenu \ - st \ - gparted \ - gimp \ - libreoffice \ - ca-certificates \ - linux-pam \ - gstreamer \ - libgd \ - icu \ - syndaemon \ - firefox --
@@ -92,7 +36,7 @@ mate-