#
#
# Nim's Runtime Library
# (c) Copyright 2021 Nim contributors
#
# See the file "copying.txt", included in this
# distribution, for details about the copyright.
#
## .. warning:: This module was added in Nim 1.6. If you are using it for cryptographic purposes,
## keep in mind that so far this has not been audited by any security professionals,
## therefore may not be secure.
##
## `std/sysrand` generates random numbers from a secure source provided by the operating system.
## It is a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
## and should be unpredictable enough for cryptographic applications,
## though its exact quality depends on the OS implementation.
##
## | Targets | Implementation |
## | :--- | ----: |
## | Windows | `BCryptGenRandom`_ |
## | Linux | `getrandom`_ |
## | MacOSX | `SecRandomCopyBytes`_ |
## | iOS | `SecRandomCopyBytes`_ |
## | OpenBSD | `getentropy openbsd`_ |
## | FreeBSD | `getrandom freebsd`_ |
## | JS (Web Browser) | `getRandomValues`_ |
## | Node.js | `randomFillSync`_ |
## | Other Unix platforms | `/dev/urandom`_ |
##
## .. _BCryptGenRandom: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptgenrandom
## .. _getrandom: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrandom.2.html
## .. _getentropy: https://www.unix.com/man-page/mojave/2/getentropy
## .. _SecRandomCopyBytes: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1399291-secrandomcopybytes?language=objc
## .. _getentropy openbsd: https://man.openbsd.org/getentropy.2
## .. _getrandom freebsd: https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=getrandom&manpath=FreeBSD+12.0-stable
## .. _getRandomValues: https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/#Crypto-method-getRandomValues
## .. _randomFillSync: https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#crypto_crypto_randomfillsync_buffer_offset_size
## .. _/dev/urandom: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki//dev/random
##
## On a Linux target, a call to the `getrandom` syscall can be avoided (e.g.
## for targets running kernel version < 3.17) by passing a compile flag of
## `-d:nimNoGetRandom`. If this flag is passed, sysrand will use `/dev/urandom`
## as with any other POSIX compliant OS.
##
runnableExamples:
doAssert urandom(0).len == 0
doAssert urandom(113).len == 113
doAssert urandom(1234) != urandom(1234) # unlikely to fail in practice
##
## See also
## ========
## * `random module <random.html>`_
##
when not defined(js):
import std/oserrors
when defined(posix):
import posix
when defined(nimPreviewSlimSystem):
import std/assertions
const
batchImplOS = defined(freebsd) or defined(openbsd) or defined(zephyr)
batchSize {.used.} = 256
when batchImplOS:
template batchImpl(result: var int, dest: var openArray[byte], getRandomImpl) =
let size = dest.len
if size == 0:
return
let
chunks = (size - 1) div batchSize
left = size - chunks * batchSize
for i in 0 ..< chunks:
let readBytes = getRandomImpl(addr dest[result], batchSize)
if readBytes < 0:
return readBytes
inc(result, batchSize)
result = getRandomImpl(addr dest[result], left)
when defined(js):
import std/private/jsutils
when defined(nodejs):
{.emit: "const _nim_nodejs_crypto = require('crypto');".}
proc randomFillSync(p: Uint8Array) {.importjs: "_nim_nodejs_crypto.randomFillSync(#)".}
template urandomImpl(result: var int, dest: var openArray[byte]) =
let size = dest.len
if size == 0:
return
var src = newUint8Array(size)
randomFillSync(src)
for i in 0 ..< size:
dest[i] = src[i]
else:
proc getRandomValues(p: Uint8Array) {.importjs: "window.crypto.getRandomValues(#)".}
# The requested length of `p` must not be more than 65536.
proc assign(dest: var openArray[byte], src: Uint8Array, base: int, size: int) =
getRandomValues(src)
for j in 0 ..< size:
dest[base + j] = src[j]
template urandomImpl(result: var int, dest: var openArray[byte]) =
let size = dest.len
if size == 0:
return
if size <= batchSize:
var src = newUint8Array(size)
assign(dest, src, 0, size)
return
let
chunks = (size - 1) div batchSize
left = size - chunks * batchSize
var srcArray = newUint8Array(batchSize)
for i in 0 ..< chunks:
assign(dest, srcArray, result, batchSize)
inc(result, batchSize)
var leftArray = newUint8Array(left)
assign(dest, leftArray, result, left)
elif defined(windows):
type
PVOID = pointer
BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE = PVOID
PUCHAR = ptr uint8
NTSTATUS = clong
ULONG = culong
const
STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x00000000
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG = 0x00000002
proc bCryptGenRandom(
hAlgorithm: BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE,
pbBuffer: PUCHAR,
cbBuffer: ULONG,
dwFlags: ULONG
): NTSTATUS {.stdcall, importc: "BCryptGenRandom", dynlib: "Bcrypt.dll".}
proc randomBytes(pbBuffer: pointer, cbBuffer: Natural): int {.inline.} =
bCryptGenRandom(nil, cast[PUCHAR](pbBuffer), ULONG(cbBuffer),
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG)
template urandomImpl(result: var int, dest: var openArray[byte]) =
let size = dest.len
if size == 0:
return
result = randomBytes(addr dest[0], size)
elif defined(linux) and not defined(nimNoGetRandom) and not defined(emscripten):
# TODO using let, pending bootstrap >= 1.4.0
var SYS_getrandom {.importc: "SYS_getrandom", header: "<sys/syscall.h>".}: clong
const syscallHeader = """#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>"""
proc syscall(n: clong): clong {.
importc: "syscall", varargs, header: syscallHeader.}
# When reading from the urandom source (GRND_RANDOM is not set),
# getrandom() will block until the entropy pool has been
# initialized (unless the GRND_NONBLOCK flag was specified). If a
# request is made to read a large number of bytes (more than 256),
# getrandom() will block until those bytes have been generated and
# transferred from kernel memory to buf.
template urandomImpl(result: var int, dest: var openArray[byte]) =
let size = dest.len
if size == 0:
return
while result < size:
let readBytes = syscall(SYS_getrandom, addr dest[result], cint(size - result), 0).int
if readBytes == 0:
doAssert false
elif readBytes > 0:
inc(result, readBytes)
else:
if osLastError().int in {EINTR, EAGAIN}:
discard
else:
result = -1
break
elif defined(openbsd):
proc getentropy(p: pointer, size: cint): cint {.importc: "getentropy", header: "<unistd.h>".}
# Fills a buffer with high-quality entropy,
# which can be used as input for process-context pseudorandom generators like `arc4random`.
# The maximum buffer size permitted is 256 bytes.
proc getRandomImpl(p: pointer, size: int): int {.inline.} =
result = getentropy(p, cint(size)).int
elif defined(zephyr):
proc sys_csrand_get(dst: pointer, length: csize_t): cint {.importc: "sys_csrand_get", header: "<random/rand32.h>".}
# Fill the destination buffer with cryptographically secure
# random data values
#
proc getRandomImpl(p: pointer, size: int): int {.inline.} =
# 0 if success, -EIO if entropy reseed error
result = sys_csrand_get(p, csize_t(size)).int
elif defined(freebsd):
type cssize_t {.importc: "ssize_t", header: "<sys/types.h>".} = int
proc getrandom(p: pointer, size: csize_t, flags: cuint): cssize_t {.importc: "getrandom", header: "<sys/random.h>".}
# Upon successful completion, the number of bytes which were actually read
# is returned. For requests larger than 256 bytes, this can be fewer bytes
# than were requested. Otherwise, -1 is returned and the global variable
# errno is set to indicate the error.
proc getRandomImpl(p: pointer, size: int): int {.inline.} =
result = getrandom(p, csize_t(size), 0)
elif defined(ios) or defined(macosx):
{.passl: "-framework Security".}
const errSecSuccess = 0 ## No error.
type
SecRandom {.importc: "struct __SecRandom".} = object
SecRandomRef = ptr SecRandom
## An abstract Core Foundation-type object containing information about a random number generator.
proc secRandomCopyBytes(
rnd: SecRandomRef, count: csize_t, bytes: pointer
): cint {.importc: "SecRandomCopyBytes", header: "<Security/SecRandom.h>".}
## https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1399291-secrandomcopybytes
template urandomImpl(result: var int, dest: var openArray[byte]) =
let size = dest.len
if size == 0:
return
result = secRandomCopyBytes(nil, csize_t(size), addr dest[0])
else:
template urandomImpl(result: var int, dest: var openArray[byte]) =
let size = dest.len
if size == 0:
return
# see: https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/ which justifies using urandom instead of random
let fd = posix.open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)
if fd < 0:
result = -1
else:
try:
var stat: Stat
if fstat(fd, stat) != -1 and S_ISCHR(stat.st_mode):
let
chunks = (size - 1) div batchSize
left = size - chunks * batchSize
for i in 0 ..< chunks:
let readBytes = posix.read(fd, addr dest[result], batchSize)
if readBytes < 0:
return readBytes
inc(result, batchSize)
result = posix.read(fd, addr dest[result], left)
else:
result = -1
finally:
discard posix.close(fd)
proc urandomInternalImpl(dest: var openArray[byte]): int {.inline.} =
when batchImplOS:
batchImpl(result, dest, getRandomImpl)
else:
urandomImpl(result, dest)
proc urandom*(dest: var openArray[byte]): bool =
## Fills `dest` with random bytes suitable for cryptographic use.
## If the call succeeds, returns `true`.
##
## If `dest` is empty, `urandom` immediately returns success,
## without calling the underlying operating system API.
##
## .. warning:: The code hasn't been audited by cryptography experts and
## is provided as-is without guarantees. Use at your own risks. For production
## systems we advise you to request an external audit.
result = true
when defined(js): discard urandomInternalImpl(dest)
else:
let ret = urandomInternalImpl(dest)
when defined(windows):
if ret != STATUS_SUCCESS:
result = false
else:
if ret < 0:
result = false
proc urandom*(size: Natural): seq[byte] {.inline.} =
## Returns random bytes suitable for cryptographic use.
##
## .. warning:: The code hasn't been audited by cryptography experts and
## is provided as-is without guarantees. Use at your own risks. For production
## systems we advise you to request an external audit.
result = newSeq[byte](size)
when defined(js): discard urandomInternalImpl(result)
else:
if not urandom(result):
raiseOSError(osLastError())