| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
| |
http://gnats.netbsd.org/56664 reported.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
I'm kinda sorta able to get lcurses running on NetBSD 9.2 without this
particular hack.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Our sandboxing model is a blunt caricature, just two booleans. But let's
see how far this gets us.
Still doesn't persist, and definitely has no effect.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Let's see how much we need to tweak this solution.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In each session, Teliva has to bootstrap a trusted channel with the
computer owner while running arbitrarily untrusted code. So let's get
really, really precise about what the trusted channel consists of:
- the bottom-most row of screen containing the menu
- the keystrokes the owner types in
- ncurses COLOR_PAIR slots 254 (menu) and 255 (error)
One reason the menu colors are important: we don't want people to get
used to apps that hide the menu colors by setting default
foreground/background to invisible and then drawing their own menu one
row up.
The error COLOR_PAIR I don't see any reason to carve out right now, but
it seems like a good idea for Teliva the framework to not get into the
habit of apps doing some things for it.
I'm not sure how realistic all this is (I feel quite ill-equipped to
think about security), but it seems worthwhile to err on the side of
paranoia. Teliva will be paranoid so people don't have to be.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Kind of a subtle idea. Teliva the framework is intended to be
trustworthy software that people install on their computers. The apps
people run using Teliva may be less trustworthy. The whole point of
Teliva is to provide a sandbox for running code before you trust it.
One way (of many) apps can be malicious is by subtly getting between
what people see and reality. Imagine, for example, an app that draws a
fake menu bar and offers a different hotkey to edit source code. When
someone presses that hotkey they think they're using the standard Teliva
editor but they're really using an editor within the app, which the app
uses to hide its most malicious bits from view.
Down the road Teliva will have more bits of UI, such as for asking for
permission to read sensitive data. It's important that people understand
what they're granting permission to, that apps can't tamper with the
communications channel between them and Teliva.
This is likely just one of many ways for an app to break out of its
sandbox. Teliva isn't sandboxed yet. I'm just taking my first steps on
this journey. In particular, there are other mechanisms for asking for
user input besides `getch()`. I don't yet have a big-picture view of the
Teliva sandbox.
It seems clear that I need to educate people on the difference between
different parts of screen. Depending on the app you install, most of the
screen may be a dark forest. It'll be important to know where the safe
path is, where you can speak to trusted advisors while in the forest.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Short of syntax errors that keep us from parsing the teliva_program
table, we should now be able to recover gracefully from everything.
Yesterday I started to try to add this to load_definitions before
realizing most errors are only noticed while running `main`. But I
didn't think of recovering from the docall of `main` until this morning.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
All the spaghetti is hiding another issue: when we load editor state,
that code path currently never leads to importing the edited buffer back
into the image.
Yet another attempt at drawing the state diagram:
Wgetch -> switch_to_editor -> select_view
select_view -> load_editor_state | big_picture_view
load_editor_state -> edit_from -> editorProcessKeypress
big_picture_view -> edit_image -> edit_buffer -> resumeEdit* -> load_editor_buffer -> editorProcessKeypress
big_picture_view -> recent_changes
recent_changes -> big_picture_view | edit_buffer
The problem is that load_editor_state doesn't eventually call
load_editor_buffer the way its sibling big_picture_view does.
For starters, it's confusing that switch_to_editor calls
big_picture_view which calls other editor functions. What is 'editor'
here, anyway?
Let's rename switch_to_editor to developer_mode. So the app starts out
in user mode, and might eventually transition to developer mode.
Developer mode is a black hole; to leave it and return to user mode we
restart the entire app.
The architecture in my mind is now:
- Teliva consists of user mode and developer mode
- Developer mode consists of multiple views
- Each view, when it needs to edit something:
- initializes kilo
- loads a buffer into it
- resumes editing the buffer as necessary
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Teliva's constantly restarting without the user being aware of it. So
far I figured saving history across the user actually exiting and
restarting Teliva was just a happy "feature". However, it looks like
that's actually more complex to implement. Keeping editor state across
user-visible restarts results in these problems:
- opening the editor after restart has the cursor position messed up, no
matter what definition you open.
- more seriously, opening the editor after restart can't seem to get to
the big-picture view anymore.
Rather than try to debug what's going on, I'm going to just cordon off
that part of the state space for now.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
I'd like to enable -Wextra as well, but that creates some false
positives.
I've at least made my changes clean w.r.t. -Wextra.
Now we have 4 remaining warnings with gcc 9.3 that seem genuine. Need to
fix those.
|
| |
|
|
| |
From lcurseslib.c to lcurses/ directory.
|
|
|
Until now we had just the bare minimum bindings needed for the demos
built so far. Now we have all of lcurses building in place with minimal
changes.
The changes in this commit can run hanoi.lua when inlined into Lua 5.1,
but don't work with Teliva.
|