| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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I should have documented that I'd never actually seen that code path
trigger before. Here's a minimal test that did it just now:
function test_foo()
return a+1
end
E2: [string "test_foo"]:2: attempt to perform arithmetic on global 'a' (a nil value)
A simple missing variable doesn't do it since it just evaluates to nil.
Without this commit, the above test was silently continuing to the main
app after failing tests.
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I can't believe I didn't notice this until now.
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Turns out arrow keys are considered `isprint()` on Mac.
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Let's see how much we need to tweak this solution.
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In each session, Teliva has to bootstrap a trusted channel with the
computer owner while running arbitrarily untrusted code. So let's get
really, really precise about what the trusted channel consists of:
- the bottom-most row of screen containing the menu
- the keystrokes the owner types in
- ncurses COLOR_PAIR slots 254 (menu) and 255 (error)
One reason the menu colors are important: we don't want people to get
used to apps that hide the menu colors by setting default
foreground/background to invisible and then drawing their own menu one
row up.
The error COLOR_PAIR I don't see any reason to carve out right now, but
it seems like a good idea for Teliva the framework to not get into the
habit of apps doing some things for it.
I'm not sure how realistic all this is (I feel quite ill-equipped to
think about security), but it seems worthwhile to err on the side of
paranoia. Teliva will be paranoid so people don't have to be.
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Kind of a subtle idea. Teliva the framework is intended to be
trustworthy software that people install on their computers. The apps
people run using Teliva may be less trustworthy. The whole point of
Teliva is to provide a sandbox for running code before you trust it.
One way (of many) apps can be malicious is by subtly getting between
what people see and reality. Imagine, for example, an app that draws a
fake menu bar and offers a different hotkey to edit source code. When
someone presses that hotkey they think they're using the standard Teliva
editor but they're really using an editor within the app, which the app
uses to hide its most malicious bits from view.
Down the road Teliva will have more bits of UI, such as for asking for
permission to read sensitive data. It's important that people understand
what they're granting permission to, that apps can't tamper with the
communications channel between them and Teliva.
This is likely just one of many ways for an app to break out of its
sandbox. Teliva isn't sandboxed yet. I'm just taking my first steps on
this journey. In particular, there are other mechanisms for asking for
user input besides `getch()`. I don't yet have a big-picture view of the
Teliva sandbox.
It seems clear that I need to educate people on the difference between
different parts of screen. Depending on the app you install, most of the
screen may be a dark forest. It'll be important to know where the safe
path is, where you can speak to trusted advisors while in the forest.
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It's still just in app control; I'm resisting the urge to introduce
"smarts".
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Accidentally added at some point. It's a useful debugging aide, but I
don't want to require the additional dependencies on a first run.
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Follows https://github.com/akkartik/wart, https://github.com/akkartik/mu0,
https://github.com/akkartik/mu1 and https://github.com/akkartik/mu.
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Examples:
- you try to write file but disk is full
- you have two Teliva files being edited at the same time
Both are situations where it's impossible to avoid some data loss.
However, we should now at least have some valid state of the .tlv file
saved to disk where we'd previously end up with a zero-size file or
garbage.
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This fixes a segfault when scanning through a long history of recent
changes (say > 20 changes)
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Teliva emits timestamps in multi-line format end in a newline. As a
result, notes get rendered on the next line and are then immediately
overwritten by the contents of the definition.
This bug was masked by my hacky 'original' timestamps which don't use
multi-line format.
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An empty stack is too rigorous a line to hold. Instead we'll just ensure
we leave the stack the way we found it.
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This reverts commit 7c1b9d0b91295323b5ed5ec3e09b46566288bc75.
The 'big hammer' isn't good enough. The recent changes view seems to
need state on the stack across invocations of the editor.
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..even if at the expense of leaking on the heap. Because the Lua stack
has very limited space (~20 slots). When it overflows, we segfault.
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We were missing functions in some larger programs.
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This is a complete mess. I want to abstract reading multiline strings
behind a function, but the lookahead requirements for that are quite
stringent. What's a reasonable abstraction here?
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I really wanted to avoid getting into defining or parsing new file
formats. However, using the entire power of Lua is not ideal, as
described earlier in Konrad Hinsen's bug. In addition to everything
else, it's a vector for arbitrary code execution when someone loads an
untrusted image.
I could use JSON, but it requires ugly string escaping. Seems cleaner to
just use YAML. But YAML is complex and needs its own dependencies. If
I'm going to do my own, might as well make the multi-line string format
really clear.
I can't yet write the new format.
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Not my aesthetic choice, but essential at the moment for quickly
interpreting Lua errors.
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Introduced Nov 28. Let's see if my intermittent segfaults stop now.
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Steps to reproduce:
* Run teliva with some app.
* Press ctrl-e to edit the app.
* Select some function.
* Press ctrl-g and type in some Lua keyword like 'function' or 'while'
(Since the first word in a function is often 'function', it becomes
the default if you press ctrl-g immediately after entering the editor
for a function.)
* Type nothing. Run the app.
Desired behavior: app continues to run. The definition for the keyword
is silently ignored (in future we may want to provide an error message)
Behavior before this commit: app silently exited with non-zero status,
and refused to restart thereafter until the .tlv file was manually
edited to delete the definition for the Lua keyword.
Behavior after this commit: app throws an error message like these:
* For `function`:
```
src/teliva: x.tlv:99: '(' expected near '='
sorry, you'll need to edit the image directly. press any key to exit.
```
* For `while`:
```
src/teliva: x.tlv:99: unexpected symbol near 'while'
sorry, you'll need to edit the image directly. press any key to exit.
```
You still need to edit the .tlv file manually, but the steps for
recovery are a bit more discoverable.
To fix this properly I also need to fix a looming security hole I've
been thinking about for some time. The long-term goal of Teliva is to
put the human running apps in control of what they do, by sandboxing
accesses to the file system, network and so on. However, even after we
build gates on all of Lua's standard libraries, we're still parsing .tlv
files as Lua, with all of its power available.
Solution: load .tlv files as some sort of JSON-like subset of Lua. Maybe
I should just use JSON, and rely on code that's already in Teliva, even
if I'm introducing a new notation in the process.
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Still sucks, though..
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Also start using 256 colors, under the assumption most people will have
them.
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