#
# /etc/sysctl.conf: configuration for system variables, see sysctl.conf(5)
#

kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
# Shared Memory
#kernel.shmmax = 500000000
# Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated
# fs.file-nr=
vm.mmap_min_addr=65536
# Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
kernel.pid_max = 65536

#
# Memory Protections
#

#  If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
#  Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
#  Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
#  the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock.  hwclock can be
#  remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time 
#  clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure 
#  that hwclock operates correctly.
#  
#  If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
#  you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
#  option enabled.  In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1

#  If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
#  daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
#  will be deterred.  When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
#  or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
#  the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
#  fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
#  restart the daemon.
#  In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
#  existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
#  be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
#  
#  It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
#  section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
#  signal.
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
#  "deter_bruteforce" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1

#
# Filesystem Protections
#

# Optimization for port usefor LBs
# Increase system file descriptor limit
fs.file-max = 65535

#  If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
#  will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
#  world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
#  symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
#  able to hardlink to files they do not own.  If the sysctl option is
#  enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1


#  Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
#  that prevents it from being used as a security feature.  As Apache
#  verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
#  the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
#  to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
#  that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
#  symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race.  If you say Y here, a complete,
#  race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
#  will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
#  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1
kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15

#  if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
#  own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
#  the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in.  If the sysctl
#  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1

#  If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
#  be created.  By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
#  will be protected in the following ways:
#  * No new writable mounts will be allowed
#  * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
#  * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
#  This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
#  it cannot be turned off.  Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
#  behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
#  filesystem.
#  Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
#  and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
#  config or at runtime.
#  This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
#kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1

#  if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
#  chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
#  system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
#  files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
#  This is left an option because it can break some apps.  Disable this
#  if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
#  tasks.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
#  name "chroot_caps" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1

#kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
#  or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits.  This protects
#  against another published method of breaking a chroot.  If the sysctl
#  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
#  again outside the chroot.  This is a widely used method of breaking
#  out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed.  If the sysctl 
#  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name 
#  "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1

#  If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
#  to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
#  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  If the sysctl option
#  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
#  mknod.  The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
#  would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
#  as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
#  anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
#  they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data).  It is recommended
#  that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
#  "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
#  mount or remount filesystems.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
#  sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
#  a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41.  It
#  works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem.  This
#  function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
#  of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed.  If the sysctl
#  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot     = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
#  to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
#  It is recommended that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
#  a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1

#  If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
#  write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
#  interface.  It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
#  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
#  "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
#  connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
#  domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot.  It is recommended
#  that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
#  with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1

#  If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
#  applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
#  The man page on chroot(2) states:
#  Note that usually chhroot does not change  the  current  working
#  directory,  so  that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
#  `/'.  In particular, the  super-user  can  escape  from  a
#  `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
#  
#  It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
#  any software.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
#  name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir  = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
#  kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid, 
#  getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot.  If the sysctl
#  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1

#  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
#  the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
#  processes outside the chroot.  This provides more security than simply
#  removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set.  If the
#  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
#  is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1

#
# Kernel Auditing
#

#  If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
#  on a group you specify.  This option is recommended if you only want to
#  watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
#  entire system.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
#  name "audit_group" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1

#  If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
#  on a group you specify.  This option is recommended if you only want to
#  watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
#  entire system.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
#  name "audit_group" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99

#  If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
#  other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
#  will be logged).  Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
#  of their users.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
#  name "exec_logging" is created.
#  WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
#  on an active system.
kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0				

#  If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
#  be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
#  limit.  It is highly recommended that you say Y here.  If the sysctl
#  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
#  created.  If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1

#  If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
#  to syslog.  This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
#  applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
#  is therefore left as an option.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
#  sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0	

#  If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
#  will be logged.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
#  with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
#kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1

#  If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
#  will be logged.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
#  with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0

#  If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged.  If the
#  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1

#  If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
#  SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
#  occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
#  "signal_logging" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1

#  If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
#  This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
#  their process limit.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
#  with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1

#  If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
#  "timechange_logging" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1

#  if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
#  usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
#  denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature.  This feature will also
#  log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
#  is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK.  If the 
#  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
#  is created.
kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1

#
# Executable Protections
#


#  if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
#  to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
#  The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
#  identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
#  system for a targeted exploit.
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1

# Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2

#  If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
#  programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated.  If you
#  have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
#  enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
#  fine-grained exceptions.
#  
#  This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
#  processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
#  This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
#  but attaching to arbitrary processes will not.  If the sysctl
#  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
#  created.
kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1

#  If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
#  binaries.  This option is useful in environments that
#  remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
#  prevent infoleaking of their contents.  This option adds
#  consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
#  be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
#  
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
#  is created.
kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1

#  If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
#  in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
#  gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
#  to be propagated to the other threads of the process.  In most
#  cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
#  on behalf of the application.  Other libcs do not act in the
#  same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
#  running with root privileges.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
#  a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1

#  If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
#  memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
#  given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
#  1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
#     that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
#  2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
#     match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
#  It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
#  with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
#  privilege escalation.  This feature was developed in response to
#  research by Tim Brown:
#  http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
#  who found hundreds of such insecure usages.  Processes with
#  CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
#  "harden_ipc" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1

#  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
#  supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
#  These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
#  root-owned directories writable only by root.  If the sysctl option
#  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100

#  If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
#  decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.  This
#  option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
#  users on the system.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
#  with name "tpe_invert" is created.  Unlike other sysctl options, this
#  entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 0

#  If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
#  a weaker TPE restriction.  This is separate from, and in addition to,
#  the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere.  Thus, if a
#  "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
#  Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
#  execute files in directories they own that are not group or
#  world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
#  root.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
#  "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1


kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1

#
# Network Protections
#

# Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits
# min, default, and max number of bytes to use
# set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths
# Tcp Windows etc
net.core.rmem_max = 8388608
net.core.wmem_max = 8388608
net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 5000
net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 1

# Both ports linux-blob and linux-libre don't build with ipv6
# Disable ipv6
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1

# Tuen IPv6
#net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0
#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
#net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0
#net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0
#net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 0

# Avoid a smurf attack, ping scanning
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1

# Turn on protection for bad icmp error messages
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1

# Turn on syncookies for SYN flood attack protection
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1

## protect against tcp time-wait assassination hazards
## drop RST packets for sockets in the time-wait state
## (not widely supported outside of linux, but conforms to RFC)
net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1

## tcp timestamps
## + protect against wrapping sequence numbers (at gigabit speeds)
## + round trip time calculation implemented in TCP
## - causes extra overhead and allows uptime detection by scanners like nmap
## enable @ gigabit speeds
net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 0
#net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 1

# Turn on and log spoofed, source routed, and redirect packets
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1

## ignore echo broadcast requests to prevent being part of smurf attacks (default)
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1

## sets the kernels reverse path filtering mechanism to value 1(on)
## will do source validation of the packet's recieved from all the interfaces on the machine
## protects from attackers that are using ip spoofing methods to do harm
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
#net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
#net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1


# Make sure no one can alter the routing tables
# Act as a router, necessary for Access Point
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
# No source routed packets here
# Discard packets with source routes, ip spoofing
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0


net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0

net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0

# Increase system IP port limits
net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 2000 65000

# Increase TCP max buffer size setable using setsockopt()
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 8388608
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 87380 8388608

# Disable proxy_arp
net.ipv4.conf.default.proxy_arp = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.proxy_arp = 0

# Disable bootp_relay
net.ipv4.conf.default.bootp_relay = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.bootp_relay = 0

# Decrease TCP fin timeout
net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 30
# Decrease TCP keep alive time
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1800
# Sen SynAck retries to 3
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3

#  If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
#  destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
#  sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
#  This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the 
#  loopback interface from blackholing.  Enabling this feature 
#  makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
#  visibility against scanners.
#  
#  The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
#  blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
#  just SYNs.  Under most application behavior this causes no
#  problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
#  connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
#  end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state.  Because of this
#  side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
#  feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
#  The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
#  can spend in LAST_ACK state.  If you're using haproxy and not
#  all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
#  disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
#  
#  If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
#  "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
#  While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
#  toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
#  "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2".  The default value of 4
#  prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
#  state.
kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4

#  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
#  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
#  applications from your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
#  sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1

#  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
#  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
#  specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
#  with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200

#  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
#  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
#  able to run servers.  If this option is enabled, all users in the group
#  you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
#  from the shell on your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
#  sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1

#  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
#  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
#  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
#  option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201

#  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
#  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
#  able to run servers.  If this option is enabled, all users in the group
#  you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
#  from the shell on your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
#  sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1

#  Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
#  Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
#  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
#  option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99

#
# Physical Protections
#

#  If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
#  will be created.  Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
#  USB devices from being recognized by the OS.  Any attempted USB
#  device insertion will be logged.  This option is intended to be
#  used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
#  in various USB device drivers.
#  
#  For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
#  relevant init scripts.  This option is safe to enable in distros
#  as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0

#
# Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
#
kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0

# End of file