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| -rw-r--r-- | core/conf/sysctl.conf | 463 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/exim.html | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/hardening.html | 48 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/index.html | 58 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/network.html | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/package.html | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/samhain.html | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/sysctl.html | 481 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/toolchain.html | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/tty-terminal.html | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/storage.html | 61 |
12 files changed, 190 insertions, 1012 deletions
diff --git a/core/apparmor.html b/core/apparmor.html index 9954593..5c9b541 100644 --- a/core/apparmor.html +++ b/core/apparmor.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.2.1. AppArmor</title> + <title>2.6.1. AppArmor</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1>2.2.1. AppArmor</h1> + <h1>2.6.1. AppArmor</h1> <p>Check <a href="linux.html#configure">kernel configuration</a> or use the provided with <a href="reboot.html#linux">linux-gnu</a> port diff --git a/core/conf/sysctl.conf b/core/conf/sysctl.conf index 4606791..771112a 100644 --- a/core/conf/sysctl.conf +++ b/core/conf/sysctl.conf @@ -3,51 +3,19 @@ # kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4 + kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 + # Shared Memory #kernel.shmmax = 500000000 # Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated # fs.file-nr= vm.mmap_min_addr=65536 + # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768 kernel.pid_max = 65536 # -# Memory Protections -# - -# If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error. -# Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel. -# Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly, -# the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be -# remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time -# clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure -# that hwclock operates correctly. -# -# If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier, -# you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this -# option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead. -kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1 - -# If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking -# daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries -# will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX -# or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal, -# the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent -# fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and -# restart the daemon. -# In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their -# existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will -# be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes. -# -# It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing -# section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious -# signal. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "deter_bruteforce" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1 - -# # Filesystem Protections # @@ -55,341 +23,9 @@ kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1 # Increase system file descriptor limit fs.file-max = 65535 -# If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users -# will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in -# world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the -# symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be -# able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is -# enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1 - - -# Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition -# that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache -# verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of -# the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink -# to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one -# that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the -# symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete, -# race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option -# will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option -# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1 -kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15 - -# if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't -# own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of -# the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1 - -# If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will -# be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems -# will be protected in the following ways: -# * No new writable mounts will be allowed -# * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write -# * Write operations will be denied on all block devices -# This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1, -# it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting -# behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only -# filesystem. -# Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM -# and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via -# config or at runtime. -# This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems. -#kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1 - -# if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a -# chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o, -# system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable -# files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time. -# This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this -# if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of -# tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "chroot_caps" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1 - -#kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod -# or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects -# against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot -# again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking -# out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "chroot_deny_chroot" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1 - -# If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing -# to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory -# outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option -# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to -# mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it -# would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same -# as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from -# anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which -# they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended -# that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "chroot_deny_mknod" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to -# mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use -# a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It -# works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This -# function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out -# of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach -# to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail. -# It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, -# a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1 - -# If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to -# write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc -# interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to -# connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix -# domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended -# that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1 - -# If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted -# applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot. -# The man page on chroot(2) states: -# Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working -# directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at -# `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a -# `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'. -# -# It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break -# any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to -# kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid, -# getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1 - -# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise -# the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of -# processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply -# removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice" -# is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1 - -# -# Kernel Auditing -# - -# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate -# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to -# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the -# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "audit_group" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1 - -# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate -# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to -# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the -# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "audit_group" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99 - -# If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the -# other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution -# will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track -# of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with -# name "exec_logging" is created. -# WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially -# on an active system. -kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will -# be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current -# limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is -# created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored. -kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1 - -# If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged -# to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain -# applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and -# is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace -# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "audit_ptrace" is created. -#kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1 - -# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace -# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "audit_ptrace" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1 - -# If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as -# SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program -# occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "signal_logging" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1 - -# If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged. -# This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep -# their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "forkfail_logging" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1 - -# If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "timechange_logging" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1 - -# if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit -# usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when -# denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also -# log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT -# is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the -# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging" -# is created. -kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1 - -# -# Executable Protections -# - - -# if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8) -# to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer. -# The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other -# identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a -# system for a targeted exploit. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1 - # Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 -# If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring -# programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you -# have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been -# enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make -# fine-grained exceptions. -# -# This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace -# processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process. -# This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work, -# but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl -# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is -# created. -kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1 - -# If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable -# binaries. This option is useful in environments that -# remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to -# prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds -# consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally -# be read out when run without privileges while ptracing. -# -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec" -# is created. -kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1 - -# If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid -# in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids, -# gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread -# to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most -# cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior -# on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the -# same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue -# running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled, -# a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1 - -# If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared -# memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes -# given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks: -# 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match -# that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object -# 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't -# match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object -# It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects, -# with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to -# privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to -# research by Tim Brown: -# http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/ -# who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with -# CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects. -# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "harden_ipc" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the -# supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted." -# These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in -# root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option -# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1 -kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100 - -# If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will -# decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This -# option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most -# users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this -# entry will default to on for backward-compatibility. -kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 0 - -# If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under -# a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to, -# the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a -# "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID. -# Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to -# execute files in directories they own that are not group or -# world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by -# root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name -# "tpe_restrict_all" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1 - - -kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1 - # # Network Protections # @@ -455,7 +91,6 @@ net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 #net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 #net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 - # Make sure no one can alter the routing tables # Act as a router, necessary for Access Point net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 @@ -495,96 +130,4 @@ net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1800 # Sen SynAck retries to 3 net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3 -# If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP -# destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets -# sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists. -# This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the -# loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature -# makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network -# visibility against scanners. -# -# The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD -# blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not -# just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no -# problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain -# connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote -# end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this -# side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this -# feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks. -# The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket -# can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not -# all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider -# disabling this feature on the haproxy host. -# -# If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names -# "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created. -# While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off -# toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as -# "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4 -# prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK -# state. -kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1 -kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will -# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server -# applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1 - -# Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to -# add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID -# specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option -# with name "socket_all_gid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will -# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be -# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group -# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers -# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1 - -# Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for. -# Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to -# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl -# option with name "socket_client_gid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201 - -# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will -# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be -# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group -# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers -# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a -# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1 - -# Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for. -# Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to -# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl -# option with name "socket_server_gid" is created. -kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99 - -# -# Physical Protections -# - -# If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb" -# will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new -# USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB -# device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be -# used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities -# in various USB device drivers. -# -# For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any -# relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros -# as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl. -kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0 - -# -# Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set -# -kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0 - # End of file diff --git a/core/exim.html b/core/exim.html index 7e1fd28..3b86bb7 100644 --- a/core/exim.html +++ b/core/exim.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.6. Exim</title> + <title>2.5. Exim</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1>2.6. Exim</h1> + <h1>2.5. Exim</h1> - <h2 id="conf">2.6.1. Exim Configuration</h2> + <h2 id="conf">2.5.1. Exim Configuration</h2> <p>Exim come with default configuration we will change to mach system settings <a href="conf/etc/exim/exim.conf">/etc/exim/exim.conf</a>.</p> @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ $ sudo prt-get depinst mailx </pre> - <h2 id="cert">2.6.2. Certificates</h2> + <h2 id="cert">2.5.2. Certificates</h2> <p>Exim creates a key for you if you just copy exim.conf and start daemon;</p> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ # chmod 644 /etc/ssl/certs/exim.cert </pre> - <h2 id="alias">2.6.3. Aliases</h2> + <h2 id="alias">2.5.3. Aliases</h2> <p>Exim come with default aliases we will change to mach system settings <a href="conf/etc/exim/aliases">/etc/exim/aliases;</a></p> @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ #### </pre> - <h2 id="smarthost">2.6.4. Smarthost</h2> + <h2 id="smarthost">2.5.4. Smarthost</h2> <p>Tony Finch publish a nice <a href="http://www-uxsup.csx.cam.ac.uk/~fanf2/hermes/conf/exim/etc/etc.cam/configure">configuration reference</a>. @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ # exim -bt bob@remote.com </pre> - <h2 id="fetchmail">2.6. Fetchmail</h2> + <h2 id="fetchmail">2.5. Fetchmail</h2> <pre> $ prt-get depinst fetchmail diff --git a/core/hardening.html b/core/hardening.html index 1455398..8e9788f 100644 --- a/core/hardening.html +++ b/core/hardening.html @@ -2,25 +2,51 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.2. Hardening</title> + <title>2.6. Hardening</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1>2.2. Hardening</h1> + <h1>2.6. Hardening</h1> - <p>Check <a href="apparmor.html">apparmor</a>, - <a href="sysctl.html">sysctl</a>, - <a href="toolchain.html">toolchain</a> and - <a href="samhain.html">samhain</a> before running tests.</p> + <h2>2.6.0.1 System configuration</h2> - <p>Mount some filesystems in read only</p> - <p>Check processes running as root</p> - <p>Check processes users premissions</p> + <dl> + <dt>File systems</dt> + <dd>Check <a href="install.html#fstab">fstab</a> and current mount options. Mount filesystems in read only, only strict necessary in rw.</dd> + <dt>Sys</dt> + <dd>Check kernel settings with <a href="sysctl.html">sysctl</a>.</dd> + <dt>Iptables</dt> + <dd>Check if <a href="network.html#iptables">iptables</a> rules are loaded and are correctly logging.</dd> + <dt>Apparmor</dt> + <dd>Check if <a href="apparmor.html">apparmor</a> is active and enforcing policies.</dd> + <dt>Samhain</dt> + <dd>Check if <a href="samhain.html">samhain</a> is running.</dd> + <dt>Toolchain</dt> + <dd>Build ports using hardened <a href="toolchain.html">toolchain</a> settings.</dd> + </dl> + + <h2>System security</h2> + + <pre> + $ sudo prt-get depinst checksec + </pre> + + <dl> + <dt>User / Pam</dt> + <dd>Normal user is not part of wheel group + or have administration rights.</dd> + <dd>Disable su.</dd> + <dt>Processes</dt> + <dd>Check processes running as root</dd> + <dd>Check processes users premissions</dd> + </dl> + + <h2>2.6.0.2 Lynis</h2> <pre> - $ sudo prt-get depinst checksec lynis + $ sudo prt-get depinst lynis </pre> <p>Lynis gives a view of system overall configuration, without changing @@ -44,7 +70,7 @@ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> <p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a> for copying conditions.</p> diff --git a/core/index.html b/core/index.html index d19f9e0..c9d5d4b 100644 --- a/core/index.html +++ b/core/index.html @@ -103,49 +103,47 @@ <li><a href="linux.html#remove">2.1.6. Remove</a></li> </ul> </li> - <li><a href="hardening.html">2.2. Hardening</a> + <li><a href="network.html">2.2. Network</a> <ul> - <li><a href="apparmor.html">2.2.1. AppArmor</a></li> - <li><a href="sysctl.html">2.2.2. Sysctl</a></li> - <li><a href="toolchain.html">2.2.3. Toolchain</a></li> - <li><a href="samhain.html">2.2.4. Samhain</a></li> + <li><a href="network.html#resolv">2.2.1. Resolver</a></li> + <li><a href="network.html#static">2.2.2. Static ip</a></li> + <li><a href="network.html#iptables">2.2.3. Iptables</a></li> + <li><a href="network.html#wpa">2.2.4. Wpa and dhcpd</a></li> + <li><a href="network.html#nm">2.2.5. NetworkManager</a></li> </ul> </li> - <li><a href="network.html">2.3. Network</a> + <li><a href="package.html">2.3. Package Management</a> <ul> - <li><a href="network.html#resolv">2.3.1. Resolver</a></li> - <li><a href="network.html#static">2.3.2. Static ip</a></li> - <li><a href="network.html#iptables">2.3.3. Iptables</a></li> - <li><a href="network.html#wpa">2.3.4. Wpa and dhcpd</a></li> - <li><a href="network.html#nm">2.3.5. NetworkManager</a></li> + <li><a href="package.html#sysup">2.3.1. Update system</a></li> + <li><a href="package.html#depinst">2.3.2. Install ports and dependencies</a></li> + <li><a href="package.html#ports">2.3.3. Ports collections</a></li> + <li><a href="package.html#info">2.3.3. Show port information</a></li> + <li><a href="package.html#depends">2.3.4. Show port dependencies</a></li> + <li><a href="package.html#printf">2.3.5. Print information</a></li> </ul> </li> - - <li><a href="package.html">2.4. Package Management</a> + <li><a href="tty-terminal.html">2.4. Terminals and shells</a> <ul> - <li><a href="package.html#sysup">2.4.1. Update system</a></li> - <li><a href="package.html#depinst">2.4.2. Install ports and dependencies</a></li> - <li><a href="package.html#ports">2.4.3. Ports collections</a></li> - <li><a href="package.html#info">2.4.3. Show port information</a></li> - <li><a href="package.html#depends">2.4.4. Show port dependencies</a></li> - <li><a href="package.html#printf">2.4.5. Print information</a></li> + <li><a href="dash.html">2.4.1. Dash</a></li> + <li><a href="bash.html">2.4.2. Bash</a></li> + <li><a href="tmux.html">2.4.3. Tmux</a></li> </ul> </li> - - <li><a href="tty-terminal.html">2.5. Terminals and shells</a> + <li><a href="exim.html">2.5. Exim</a> <ul> - <li><a href="dash.html">2.5.1. Dash</a></li> - <li><a href="bash.html">2.5.2. Bash</a></li> - <li><a href="tmux.html">2.5.3. Tmux</a></li> + <li><a href="exim.html#conf">2.5.1. Exim configuration</a></li> + <li><a href="exim.html#cert">2.5.2. Certificates</a></li> + <li><a href="exim.html#alias">2.5.3. Aliases</a></li> + <li><a href="exim.html#smarthost">2.5.4. Smarthost</a></li> + <li><a href="exim.html#fetchmail">2.5.5. Fetchmail</a></li> </ul> </li> - <li><a href="exim.html">2.6. Exim</a> + <li><a href="hardening.html">2.6. Hardening</a> <ul> - <li><a href="exim.html#conf">2.6.1. Exim configuration</a></li> - <li><a href="exim.html#cert">2.6.2. Certificates</a></li> - <li><a href="exim.html#alias">2.6.3. Aliases</a></li> - <li><a href="exim.html#smarthost">2.6.4. Smarthost</a></li> - <li><a href="exim.html#fetchmail">2.6.5. Fetchmail</a></li> + <li><a href="apparmor.html">2.6.1. AppArmor</a></li> + <li><a href="sysctl.html">2.6.2. Sysctl</a></li> + <li><a href="toolchain.html">2.6.3. Toolchain</a></li> + <li><a href="samhain.html">2.6.4. Samhain</a></li> </ul> </li> diff --git a/core/network.html b/core/network.html index c87acf9..4a412ad 100644 --- a/core/network.html +++ b/core/network.html @@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.3. Network</title> + <title>2.2. Network</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1>2.3. Network</h1> + <h1>2.2. Network</h1> <p>Operation of the network can be handle with init scripts or with <a href="#nm">network manager</a>;</p> @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ described scripts then proceed to <a href="package.html#sysup">update system.</a></p> - <h2 id="resolv">2.3.1. Resolver</h2> + <h2 id="resolv">2.2.1. Resolver</h2> <p>This example will use <a href="http://www.chaoscomputerclub.de/en/censorship/dns-howto">Chaos Computer Club</a> @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ <pre> # /etc/resolv.conf.head can replace this line - nameserver 213.73.91.35 + nameserver 2.2.73.91.35 # /etc/resolv.conf.tail can replace this line </pre> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ # chattr +i /etc/resolv.conf </pre> - <h2 id="static">2.3.2. Static IP</h2> + <h2 id="static">2.2.2. Static IP</h2> <p>Current example of <a href="conf/rc.d/net">/etc/rc.d/net</a>;</p> @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ # ip route add default via ${GW} </pre> - <h2 id="iptables">2.3.3. Iptables</h2> + <h2 id="iptables">2.2.3. Iptables</h2> <p>For more information about firewall systems read arch wiki <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Iptables">iptables</a> @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ # iptables -L -n -v | less </pre> - <h3 id="ipt_scripts">2.3.3.1. Iptable scripts</h3> + <h3 id="ipt_scripts">2.2.3.1. Iptable scripts</h3> <p>Scripts help to setup iptables rules so they can be saved using iptables-save and later restored using iptables-restore utilities. Init script @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ with your network configuration, and adjust <a href="conf/ipt-server.sh">/etc/iptables/ipt-server.sh</a>, <a href="conf/ipt-bridge.sh">/etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh</a>, <a href="conf/ipt-open.sh">/etc/iptables/ipt-open.sh</a> according with host necessities.</p> - <h2 id="wpa">2.3.4. Wpa and dhcpd</h2> + <h2 id="wpa">2.2.4. Wpa and dhcpd</h2> <p>There is more information on <a href="http://crux.nu/Wiki/WifiStartScripts">Wiki Wifi Start Scripts</a> and @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ # iwconfig wlp2s0 essid NAME key s:ABCDE12345 </pre> - <h3>2.3.4.1. Wpa Supplicant</h3> + <h3>2.2.4.1. Wpa Supplicant</h3> <p>Configure wpa supplicant edit;</p> @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ init script to auto load wpa configuration and dhcp client.</p> - <h3>2.3.4.2. Wpa Cli</h3> + <h3>2.2.4.2. Wpa Cli</h3> <pre> # wpa_cli @@ -387,18 +387,33 @@ > save_config </pre> - <h2 id="nm">2.3.5. Network Manager</h2> + <h2 id="nm">2.2.5. Network Manager</h2> + + <p>Wifi status;</p> + + <pre> + $ nmcli radio wifi + $ nmcli radio wifi on + </pre> <p>List wifi networks;</p> <pre> - nmcli device wifi list + $ nmcli device wifi rescan + $ nmcli device wifi list </pre> <p>Connect to a wifi network;</p> <pre> - nmcli device wifi connect "network name" password "network password" + $ nmcli device wifi connect "network name" password "network password" + </pre> + + <p>Edit and save network configuration;</p> + + <pre> + $ nmcli connection edit "network name" + nmcli> save persistent </pre> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> diff --git a/core/package.html b/core/package.html index e0f8eae..7d4c8b5 100644 --- a/core/package.html +++ b/core/package.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.4. Package Management</title> + <title>2.3. Package Management</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1>2.4. Package Management</h1> + <h1>2.3. Package Management</h1> <p>For more information read crux handbook Package management front-end: @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ $ prt-get depinst prt-utils prt-get-bashcompletion </pre> - <h2 id="sysup">2.4.1. Update System</h2> + <h2 id="sysup">2.3.1. Update System</h2> <p>Before build software get latest version of port collections;</p> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ $ prt-get update -fr $(revdep) </pre> - <h2 id="depinst">2.4.2. Install port and dependencies</h2> + <h2 id="depinst">2.3.2. Install port and dependencies</h2> <p>Installing using prt-get tool;</p> @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ <p>If you user pkgmk and pkgadd allways check if README, pre and post instal files exist.</p> - <h3 id="ports">2.4.3. Ports collections</h3> + <h3 id="ports">2.3.3. Ports collections</h3> <p>Clone this documentation;</p> @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ $ sudo ports -u 6c37 </pre> - <h2 id="info">2.4.4. Show port information</h2> + <h2 id="info">2.3.4. Show port information</h2> <pre> $ prt-get info port_name @@ -166,13 +166,13 @@ $ pkginfo -o filename </pre> - <h2 id="depends">2.4.5. Show port dependencies</h2> + <h2 id="depends">2.3.5. Show port dependencies</h2> <pre> $ prt-get depends port_name </pre> - <h2 id="printf">2.4.6. Print information</h2> + <h2 id="printf">2.3.6. Print information</h2> <p>Example how to get ports installed from contrib. Maybe there is a "cleaner" way to this, for now is ok;</p> diff --git a/core/samhain.html b/core/samhain.html index d28a6d2..a209864 100644 --- a/core/samhain.html +++ b/core/samhain.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.2.4. Samhain</title> + <title>2.6.4. Samhain</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1 id="samhain">2.2.4. Samhain</h1> + <h1 id="samhain">2.6.4. Samhain</h1> <p>Read <a href="http://www.la-samhna.de/samhain/manual/">Samhain Manual</a>, @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ <dd>log file</dd> </dl> - <h2 id="conf">2.2.4.1. Configure</h2> + <h2 id="conf">2.6.4.1. Configure</h2> <p>For more information on configuration check <a href="http://www.la-samhna.de/samhain/manual/filedef.htm">Monitoring Policies</a>. @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ # samhain status </pre> - <h2 id="updatedb">2.2.4.2. Update database</h2> + <h2 id="updatedb">2.6.4.2. Update database</h2> <p><a href="http://www.la-samhna.de/samhain/manual/updating-the-file-signature-database.html">Manual</a>, You can update the database while the daemon is running, as long diff --git a/core/sysctl.html b/core/sysctl.html index d06afde..a5af197 100644 --- a/core/sysctl.html +++ b/core/sysctl.html @@ -2,24 +2,18 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.2.2. Sysctl</title> + <title>2.6.2. Sysctl</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1 id="sysctl">2.2.2. Sysctl</h1> + <h1 id="sysctl">2.6.2. Sysctl</h1> <p>Sysctl references <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/sysctl#TCP.2FIP_stack_hardening">Arch TCP/IP stack hardening</a>, <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/linux-unix-bsd-nginx-webserver-security.html">Cyberciti Nginx Hardning</a>, - <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-kernel-etcsysctl-conf-security-hardening/">Cyberciti Security Hardening</a>, - <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Grsecurity/Appendix/Grsecurity_and_PaX_Configuration_Options">Grsecurity and PaX Configuration</a>.</p> - - <p>Since kernels on machine-ports have <a href="pax.grsecurity.net">PaX</a> - and <a href="http://grsecurity.net/announce.php">grsecurity</a>, - <a href="conf/sysctl.conf">/etc/sysctl.conf</a> can have follow - values;</p> + <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-kernel-etcsysctl-conf-security-hardening/">Cyberciti Security Hardening</a>.</p> <pre> # @@ -27,51 +21,19 @@ # kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4 + kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 + # Shared Memory #kernel.shmmax = 500000000 # Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated # fs.file-nr= vm.mmap_min_addr=65536 + # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768 kernel.pid_max = 65536 # - # Memory Protections - # - - # If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error. - # Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel. - # Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly, - # the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be - # remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time - # clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure - # that hwclock operates correctly. - # - # If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier, - # you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this - # option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead. - kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1 - - # If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking - # daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries - # will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX - # or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal, - # the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent - # fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and - # restart the daemon. - # In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their - # existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will - # be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes. - # - # It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing - # section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious - # signal. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "deter_bruteforce" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1 - - # # Filesystem Protections # @@ -79,341 +41,9 @@ # Increase system file descriptor limit fs.file-max = 65535 - # If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users - # will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in - # world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the - # symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be - # able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is - # enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1 - - - # Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition - # that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache - # verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of - # the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink - # to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one - # that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the - # symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete, - # race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option - # will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option - # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1 - kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15 - - # if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't - # own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of - # the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1 - - # If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will - # be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems - # will be protected in the following ways: - # * No new writable mounts will be allowed - # * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write - # * Write operations will be denied on all block devices - # This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1, - # it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting - # behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only - # filesystem. - # Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM - # and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via - # config or at runtime. - # This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems. - #kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1 - - # if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a - # chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o, - # system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable - # files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time. - # This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this - # if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of - # tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "chroot_caps" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1 - - #kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod - # or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects - # against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot - # again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking - # out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "chroot_deny_chroot" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1 - - # If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing - # to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory - # outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option - # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to - # mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it - # would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same - # as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from - # anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which - # they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended - # that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "chroot_deny_mknod" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to - # mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use - # a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It - # works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This - # function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out - # of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach - # to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail. - # It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, - # a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1 - - # If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to - # write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc - # interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to - # connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix - # domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended - # that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1 - - # If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted - # applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot. - # The man page on chroot(2) states: - # Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working - # directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at - # `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a - # `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'. - # - # It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break - # any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to - # kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid, - # getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1 - - # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise - # the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of - # processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply - # removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice" - # is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1 - - # - # Kernel Auditing - # - - # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate - # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to - # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the - # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "audit_group" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1 - - # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate - # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to - # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the - # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "audit_group" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99 - - # If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the - # other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution - # will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track - # of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with - # name "exec_logging" is created. - # WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially - # on an active system. - kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0 - - # If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will - # be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current - # limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is - # created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored. - kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged - # to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain - # applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and - # is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0 - - # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace - # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "audit_ptrace" is created. - #kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace - # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "audit_ptrace" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0 - - # If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1 - - # If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as - # SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program - # occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "signal_logging" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged. - # This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep - # their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "forkfail_logging" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1 - - # If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "timechange_logging" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1 - - # if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit - # usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when - # denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also - # log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT - # is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the - # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging" - # is created. - kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1 - - # - # Executable Protections - # - - - # if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8) - # to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer. - # The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other - # identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a - # system for a targeted exploit. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1 - # Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 - # If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring - # programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you - # have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been - # enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make - # fine-grained exceptions. - # - # This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace - # processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process. - # This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work, - # but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl - # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is - # created. - kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1 - - # If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable - # binaries. This option is useful in environments that - # remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to - # prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds - # consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally - # be read out when run without privileges while ptracing. - # - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec" - # is created. - kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1 - - # If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid - # in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids, - # gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread - # to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most - # cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior - # on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the - # same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue - # running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled, - # a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1 - - # If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared - # memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes - # given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks: - # 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match - # that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object - # 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't - # match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object - # It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects, - # with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to - # privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to - # research by Tim Brown: - # http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/ - # who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with - # CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects. - # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "harden_ipc" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the - # supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted." - # These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in - # root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option - # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1 - kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100 - - # If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will - # decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This - # option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most - # users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this - # entry will default to on for backward-compatibility. - kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 1 - - # If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under - # a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to, - # the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a - # "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID. - # Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to - # execute files in directories they own that are not group or - # world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by - # root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name - # "tpe_restrict_all" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1 - - - kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1 - # # Network Protections # @@ -519,105 +149,18 @@ # Sen SynAck retries to 3 net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3 - # If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP - # destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets - # sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists. - # This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the - # loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature - # makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network - # visibility against scanners. - # - # The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD - # blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not - # just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no - # problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain - # connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote - # end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this - # side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this - # feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks. - # The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket - # can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not - # all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider - # disabling this feature on the haproxy host. - # - # If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names - # "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created. - # While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off - # toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as - # "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4 - # prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK - # state. - kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1 - kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will - # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server - # applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1 - - # Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to - # add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID - # specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option - # with name "socket_all_gid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will - # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be - # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group - # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers - # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1 - - # Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for. - # Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to - # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl - # option with name "socket_client_gid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201 - - # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will - # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be - # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group - # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers - # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a - # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1 - - # Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for. - # Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to - # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl - # option with name "socket_server_gid" is created. - kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99 - - # - # Physical Protections - # - - # If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb" - # will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new - # USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB - # device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be - # used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities - # in various USB device drivers. - # - # For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any - # relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros - # as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl. - kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0 - - # - # Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set - # - kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0 - # End of file </pre> + <p>Reload sysctl settings;</p> + + <pre> + # sysctl --system + </pre> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> <p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation. - Copyright (C) 2018 + Copyright (C) 2019 Hive Team. See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a> for copying conditions.</p> diff --git a/core/toolchain.html b/core/toolchain.html index 57113fd..9662217 100644 --- a/core/toolchain.html +++ b/core/toolchain.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.2.3. Toolchain</title> + <title>2.6.3. Toolchain</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1 id="toolchain">2.2.3. Toolchain</h1> + <h1 id="toolchain">2.6.3. Toolchain</h1> <p>Add flags to pkgmk configuration and change specific ports that don't build with hardening flags. More information about diff --git a/core/tty-terminal.html b/core/tty-terminal.html index 6eb08d3..d033ec2 100644 --- a/core/tty-terminal.html +++ b/core/tty-terminal.html @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ <html dir="ltr" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> - <title>2.5. Consoles, terminals and shells</title> + <title>2.4. Consoles, terminals and shells</title> </head> <body> <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a> - <h1>2.5. Consoles, terminals and shells</h1> + <h1>2.4. Consoles, terminals and shells</h1> <dl> <dt>Consoles</dt> diff --git a/tools/storage.html b/tools/storage.html index 932e724..f90bca0 100644 --- a/tools/storage.html +++ b/tools/storage.html @@ -11,14 +11,66 @@ <h2 id="fsck">1. Maintenance</h2> - <p>SMART provides statistics of disk firmware, this system - handle errors has their occur. Badblocks detect bad blocks - by writing and reading from disk in a destructive test. - Example of how to view SMART statistics of a disk;</p> + <p>SMART provides statistics of disk firmware, + this system handle errors has their occur. Badblocks are detected by writing and reading from disk in + a destructive test. Example of how to view SMART + statistics of a disk;</p> <pre> # smartctl -t long /dev/sdb1 # smartctl -a /dev/sdb1 | less + # hdparm -I /dev/sda | less + </pre> + + <p>Mechanical hard drives spindown disks + and put heads in hold position to save energy + and protect the disk. This spindow spinup + can shorter the life expectancy of the hard + drive. Relevant output from smartctl;</p> + + <p>Settings with hdparm [options] [device];</p> + + <dl> + <dt>-B</dt> + + <dd>Set the Advanced Power Management feature. + Possible values are between 1 and 255, low + values mean more aggressive power management + and higher values mean better performance. + Values from 1 to 127 permit spin-down, whereas + values from 128 to 254 do not. A value of 255 + completely disables the feature.</dd> + + <dt>-S</dt> + + <dd>Set the standby (spindown) timeout for + the drive. The timeout specifies how long to + wait in idle (with no disk activity) before + turning off the motor to save power. The value + of 0 disables spindown, the values from 1 to + 240 specify multiples of 5 seconds and values + from 241 to 251 specify multiples of 30 + minutes.</dd> + + <dt>-M</dt> + + <dd>Set the Automatic Acoustic Management + feature. Most modern hard disk drives have the + ability to speed down the head movements to + reduce their noise output. The possible value + depends on the disk, some disks may not support + this feature.</dd> + </dl> + + <pre> + # hdparm -S 0 /dev/sda + # hdparm -B 255 /dev/sda + </pre> + + <p>Set persistent values using udev, edit /etc/udev/rules.d/69-hdparm.rules;</p> + + <pre> + ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEM=="block", KERNEL=="sda", RUN=="/usr/bin/hdparm -B 255 -S 0 /dev/sda" </pre> <p>Search for bad blocks using @@ -28,6 +80,7 @@ # badblocks -nsv /dev/sdb1 </pre> + <h2 id="mv">2. Moving data</h2> <p>Temp partition with 20M-50M;</p> |