1 files changed, 23 insertions, 23 deletions

diff --git a/article/math-science-and-philosophy.html b/article/math-science-and-philosophy.html
index dd1a5fb..17ad329 100644
--- a/article/math-science-and-philosophy.html
+++ b/article/math-science-and-philosophy.html
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ specific conditions, etc. are all, formally, abstract activities with
 little reference to the physical world.</p>
 <p>However, humans do not truly invent ideas out of pure thought. The
 basic building blocks of our analytical cognition, which may be in some
-sense considered “axioms” of our perspective of the world, result from
+sense considered ``axioms'' of our perspective of the world, result from
 us observing the world around us, finding patterns, which then evolve
 into abstract ideas. Consider the possibility that the formation of
 numbers as a concept in mathematics results from humans using primitive
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ imperfection, is used in every part of physics, not just for its
 calculations but also for representation of ideas down to the basic
 level. I find this to be uncanny. What if the physics theories we derive
 are erroneous because of erroneous mathematical systems or concepts? I
-believe that part of the answer is “experiments”, to return to the
+believe that part of the answer is ``experiments'', to return to the
 empirical nature of, well, empirical sciences, and see if the theories
 actually predict the results. But there are tons of logistical issues
 that prevent us from doing so, not to mention the inherent downside to
@@ -146,32 +146,32 @@ unforseeable implications.</p>
 <p>The addition of mathematical concepts into physics doesn’t only bring
 the maths we want to bring over, it brings all relevant definitions,
 axioms, logic, proofs, theorems, etc. all along with it. Once we
-“assign” that a physical entity is “represented” by a “corresponding
-concept” in mathematics, we can only abide by the development thereof.
+``assign'' that a physical entity is ``represented'' by a ``corresponding
+concept'' in mathematics, we can only abide by the development thereof.
 So although physics originally isn’t guided by mathematics, the act of
 choosing the part of math that’s useful in physics puts physics under
 the iron grip of mathematical logic, which is inconsistent and
 potentially incomplete, as contrary to the realistic and observable
 nature that physics is supposed to be.</p>
 <p>I had a brief chat with Mr. Coxon and he aclled how the existence of
-neutrinos were predicted “mathematically” before they were
+neutrinos were predicted ``mathematically'' before they were
 experimentally discovered physically. I do not know the history of all
 this, but Mr. Coxon said that physicists
 looked at a phenomenon (I believe that was beta decay) and went like:
-“where did that missing energy go”? and proposed that there was a
+``where did that missing energy go''? and proposed that there was a
 particle called a neutrino that fills in the missing gap.
 (Alternatively, they could have challenged the conservation of energy,
-which leads us to the topic of “why do we find it so hard to challenge
+which leads us to the topic of ``why do we find it so hard to challenge
 theories that seem beautiful, and why does conservation and symmetry
-seem beautiful”, but let’s get back on topic...) Then twnety years later
-neutrinos were “discovered” physically by experiments. Mr. Coxon said
+seem beautiful'', but let’s get back on topic...) Then twnety years later
+neutrinos were ``discovered'' physically by experiments. Mr. Coxon said
 that it looked like that mathematics predicted and in some resepct
-“guided” physics. Personally I believe that this isn’t a purely
-“mathematical” pre-discovery and it’s more of a “conservation of energy,
+``guided'' physics. Personally I believe that this isn’t a purely
+``mathematical'' pre-discovery and it’s more of a ``conservation of energy,
 a physics theory was applied, and math was used as a utility to find
-incompletenesses in our understanding of particles.” I think that I’ve
+incompletenesses in our understanding of particles.'' I think that I’ve
 heard (but cannot recall at the moment) two cases where conceptual
-analysis in “pure math” perfectly corresponds to the phenomenon in
+analysis in ``pure math'' perfectly corresponds to the phenomenon in
 physics discovered later which again makes me question whether math
 played some role in the experiment-phenomenon-discovery cycle of
 physics. I guess I need more examples.</p>
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ physics. I guess I need more examples.</p>
 and its leading into rational thought and reason. To me this sounds like
 the development of math, but in some sense this could also apply to
 physics, though I still believe that physics theories even if reasoned
-require experimental “testing” (not “verification”) for it to be
+require experimental ``testing'' (not ``verification'') for it to be
 acceptable in terms of physics. THis leaves me in a situation where none
 of the ways of knowing that I can understand, even if used together,
 could bring about an absolutely correct[tm] theory of physics. See,
@@ -194,9 +194,9 @@ messey real world (and if we do simulations that’s just falling back to
 our existing understanding of logical analysis). So now we have no
 single way, or combination of methods, to accurately verify the
 correctness of a physics theory, which by definition of physical is
-representative of the real world, basically saying that “we will never
-know how things work in the real world”. That feels uncanny. Also, how
-do I even make sense of a physics theory to be “correct”? It’s arguable
+representative of the real world, basically saying that ``we will never
+know how things work in the real world''. That feels uncanny. Also, how
+do I even make sense of a physics theory to be ``correct''? It’s arguable
 whether any physics theory could be correct in the first place. If Kant
 is correct then all our theories of physics is ultimately perception and
 having biology in the form of human observations in the absolute and
@@ -225,9 +225,9 @@ class="math inline"><i>A</i></span> (i. e. physics is squishy) is both
 true and false. Thus, <span class="math inline"><i>A</i> = 1</span>
 and <span class="math inline"><i>A</i> = 0</span> are both true. Then,
 take a random statement <span class="math inline"><i>B</i></span>
-(let’s say “Z likes humanities”). Thus we have <span
+(let’s say ``Z likes humanities''). Thus we have <span
 class="math inline"><i>A</i> + <i>B</i> = 1</span> where <span
-class="math inline">+</span> is a boolean “or” operator because <span
+class="math inline">+</span> is a boolean ``or'' operator because <span
 class="math inline"><i>A</i> = 1</span> and <span
 class="math inline">1 + <i>x</i> = 1</span> (<span
 class="math inline"><i>x</i></span> is any statement). But then
@@ -236,10 +236,10 @@ class="math inline">0 + <i>B</i> = 1</span>, which means that <span
 class="math inline"><i>B</i></span> must be 1 (if <span
 class="math inline"><i>B</i></span> is zero, then <span
 class="math inline">0 + 0 = 0</span>). Thus, if we can prove that
-“physics is squishy” and “physics is not squishy” (without differences
-in definition), then we can literally prove that “Z likes
-humanities”. Other from not defining subjective things like “squishy”
-and “is” (in terms of psychology), we can’t get around this easily, and
+``physics is squishy'' and ``physics is not squishy'' (without differences
+in definition), then we can literally prove that ``Z likes
+humanities''. Other from not defining subjective things like ``squishy''
+and ``is'' (in terms of psychology), we can’t get around this easily, and
 everything would be provable, which would not be fun for
 physics.</p></li>
 </ul>