From cb441177abe9bc621956238f9d785cefa17794a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runxi Yu Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 09:50:05 +0800 Subject: Identity over time - John Locke Essay --- article/identity-over-time.html | 224 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ index.html | 7 +- 2 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 article/identity-over-time.html diff --git a/article/identity-over-time.html b/article/identity-over-time.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5577f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/article/identity-over-time.html @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ + + + + In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten? + + + + + + +

In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten?

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Article ID: 27

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This essay was first submitted in the John Locke Institute's Global Essay Competition where it was shortlisted and given a high commendation.

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When the Ship of Theseus has its all parts replaced one after another +until no original components remain, is it still the Ship of Theseus, or +is it a new ship altogether? Similarly, when most of my body cells are +constantly renewed, coupled with my mindset being continuously +transformed by new information and acquaintances, am I still the same +person as the ten-year-old “me”?

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This essay explores the continued personal identity from two +perspectives. First is the concept of individuality, i.e. +whether there is a delimited, discrete, and cohesive existence of “me” +in the first place. An affirmative answer positing the delineated +boundary of individual existence is the prerequisite to the second +question of uniqueness, which makes each individual different +from others. Two layers of analysis are applied to uniqueness — the +identification of the uniqueness of personal identity at a set +time compared with other individual entities, and the +continuity of the person’s uniqueness over time.

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The Individuality of “Me”

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Aristotelianism portrays the “individual” as a distinct substance, +differentiated from accidents such as qualities, quantities, or +relations . +The substance of a human is the body. Each organ and system have their +own functions, yet they orchestrate to keep us alive. Unlike coral reef, +consisting of indistinct strands of polyps, the human body has a +generally clear physical boundary — the skin. Therefore, our body is a +discrete individual entity.

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The concept of individuality expands beyond the biological dimension. + +ascribes personal identity to the continuity of consciousness, hinging +on memory. sees +the self as a ever-changing “bundle” of perceptions or experience. defines identity by +social relations, which change over time as we forge new connections and +networks.

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Our memory, experience and social relations, which are applied to +define our identity by the above philosophers, can’t exist independently +but are rather supported by the substance of our body, through which we +interact with the world. Our individuality is therefore a unity of +plurality, which comprises of biological, empirical and social +parameters. The analysis of individuality on all its parameters is +beyond the length of this essay. But since they are dependents of our +physical existence that are clearly delineated, this essay will move +from discussing discrete individuality of our substance to the +exploration of the uniqueness of each individual, and the possible +continuity of this uniqueness.

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The Uniqueness of “Me” +and its Continuity

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Canned tuna on shelves are individual identities but they are +practically not unique to the consumer. As long as they are still in the +shelf life, no one cares to take one can instead of another. There is +nothing particular about an industrial product that makes it stand out +from others mass produced or assembled at the same factory.

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Each person, however, is unique in their biological +identity, empirical identity, and social identity. This essay explores +people’s unique characteristics through these three lens, and how they +are continued with the passage of time. I hereby propose that the +uniqueness of a person is preserved over time if the person’s unique +characteristics are preserved over time.

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Biological Identity and +Its Continuity

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“On average, the cells in your body are replaced every 7 to 10 years” +. Despite the +tempting but inaccurate interpretation that human bodies are renewed +every decade or so, there is significant constancy inside our body. For +example, most neurons do not regenerate. But even if all cells do, the +regeneration of our body’s constituent parts does not entail +that our biological properties change over time. Many +biological properties that are perceived to be identifying for +individuals, such as DNA sequence and fingerprints, generally stay +constant throughout our life. The wide application of fingerprints in +identifying people in user authentication and criminal investigations +suggests that fingerprints are unique and enduring.

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The uniqueness of our biological system and the continuity of the +uniqueness are reinforced by the “Self/Non-self” theory by virologist +Sir Frank Burnet . The distinction of “self” from most +other entities elicits defensive responses against pathogens, the +tolerance of a graft from itself, and the rejection against grafts from +a donor organism in transplantation with few exceptions such as +isografts (grafts between identical twins) . Adaptive immunological memory is +formed when specialized memory lymphocytes are produced, which would +trigger a more rapid and effective immune response on the next infection +by a pathogen with similar antigens. Adaptive immunity leaves a +long-term mark on our body; while COVID immunity lasts about 6 months, +smallpox immunity lasts for decades . Therefore, my special immunity spans +over time due to the existence of immunological memory.

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In conclusion, although most cells in our body regenerate constantly, +our biological identity does not change since it consists not in the +collection of components but in the properties that emerge therefrom. +The fact that our identity makers such as our DNA sequence, +fingerprints, and immunity transcend over time warrants the conclusion +that our biological identity spans diachronically.

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Empirical identity +and Its Continuity: Memory

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+postulates the memory theory of identity. A person’s identity is tied to +their memory, i.e. their ability to recognize their past experiences as +their own, and to connect them to their present consciousness. Endel +Tulving further analyzes the concept of memory by distinguishing between +procedural memory (skills, e.g. muscle memory), semantic memory (factual +information) and episodic memory (personal experiences) .

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Semantic memory as a whole rather than individual piece of factual +information contributes to identity. Many people can retrieve the +knowledge that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, and this does not +grant them identity because this piece of knowledge lacks uniqueness +that tells one person apart from another. However the assembly of +semantic memory of each person is still an idiosyncratic feature, since +one person may share some semantic memories with people of similar +educational background but it is unlikely that the entire knowledge +system of each person is identical. Though semantic memories are +constantly renewed by newly accumulated knowledge or attrition as time +goes by, the changing process is gradual. Moreover, the cognitive +structure underlying the acquired information, the critical thinking +cultivated by the analysis of those information, and the mindset of each +individual are relatively stable, as well as uniquely forged by each +person’s idiosyncratic assembly of semantic memories.

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Locke’s theory appeals to episodic memories as a necessary condition +for uniqueness of individuals as well as sameness over time. “As far as +this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or +Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self +now it was then; and ’tis by the same self with this present one that +now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Book II.xxvii.9).

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This theory might be challenged from two perspectives. Firstly, +multiple people could have gone through the same events, and the shared +experience lacks uniqueness to individuals, hence absence of identity +since it is based on the premise of uniqueness as previously explained. +However, although different people may share the same episodes, they +were different agents in those moments and engaged from their own angles +respectively. Therefore, one’s memory of these episodes is still +distinct from that of others’.

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The second and more common challenge to Locke’s memory theory is that +I may remember episodes of five years ago, and me of five years ago can +recall events of ten years ago, but the current me cannot recall most of +the life of ten years ago when I was a ignorant and happy kindergartner. +Am I still the same person of ten years ago? I would tackle this +question by the transitivity principle: if a = b and b = c, then a = c. If I share the +identity of me from five years ago, and me of five years ago was still +the same person as the one of ten years ago, I and the one of ten years +ago still have the same identity on the principle of transitivity.

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An exception would be rare cases of memory loss due to pathological +conditions in the brain. The loss of memory is a rupture in one’s life. +If that loss is significant enough to affect one’s personality, I argue +that they are not the same person.

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Procedural memories are typically diachronically enduring — if we +have learned how to perform a skill in our childhood, the procedural +memory is carried on throughout our life. For example, even if we have +not touched bikes for ten years, once we get onto one, we can still ride +on like we have not stopped riding all these years. As in the case of +semantic memory, the assembly of procedural memories are also +idiosyncratic to each individual. These unique procedural memories stay, +without us being aware of it.

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Therefore, the above analysis of semantic, episodic and procedural +memories suggests that what makes people unique and also identical with +themselves along the temporal axis is their remembering or being able to +remember the knowledge assembly, the episodes to which they were witness +or agent, and also the skills they acquire and stay. Personal identity +consists in memory.

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Social identity

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Our identity is not only biologically and empirically determined, it +is also socially constructed.

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According to , the self emerges from social +interactions. He divides the self into two components: the “me” and the +“I”. The “me” represents the organized set of attitudes of others that +the individual assumes. It’s the social self, the part of us that is +formed through interaction with others and with the social environment. +It embodies the expectations and norms of the community, allowing us to +predict how others will react to us. The “I” is the immediate response +of an individual to others. It is the spontaneous, unpredictable, and +creative part of the self. The “I” reacts to the “me”, and it’s through +this dialogue that we create meaning, make decisions, and ultimately +take action. So, for Mead, identity is continually created and recreated +through the social interactions we have, the roles we take on, and the +dialogue between the “I” and the “me”. Since social interactions are +dynamic, our identity is fluid rather than fixed.

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However, the existence of the “me”, which embodies the attitudes, +roles, and rules assimilated from the social environment, provides a +consistent framework that guides behavior and thought. It ensures the +stability and continuity of our identity. Meanwhile, the elasticity of +social interactions allows us to grow inside the parameters of the +continuity of identity.

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The impact of this continuity is huge. Its absence would translate +into lack of accountability for our own behavior and decision-making, +since we would not bear responsibility for our mistakes or crimes if we +could legitimately renew our identity every few years or months. +Property rights would be bygone and personal relationships chaotic since +filial, marital relationships vanished together with the continuity of +social identity.

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Conclusion

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My identity emerges from my unique biological, empirical and social +properties. In my case, all three of these properties have continuously +developed since I was ten, but always with some constancy, be it the +preservation of the uniquely identifying biological characteristics, my +unique memory, or my our social identity shaped through social +interactions. I maintain my sense of self through time due to the +constancy in these properties. I am therefore intrinsically linked to +the ten-year-old child I was, biologically, empirically, and +socially.

+ + + diff --git a/index.html b/index.html index bae6058..bbef2a4 100644 --- a/index.html +++ b/index.html @@ -6,19 +6,17 @@ - - +

Runxi Yu

- School is starting. I'll be quite inactive. +

I am Runxi Yu, a 15-year-old student in Shanghai, China, currently studying at YK Pao School. I am interested in philosophy, computer science, mathematics, and physics.

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Probably a Classical Liberal

Pronouns: they/it/他

Also known as: Adeline/Harriet/Andrew

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