From a11f1bf8bbaa5d9d99f7597bf20a13595397ff8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runxi Yu Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 09:56:29 +0800 Subject: Use identity over time PDF instead --- article/identity-over-time.html | 224 ---------------------------------------- article/identity-over-time.pdf | Bin 0 -> 72460 bytes 2 files changed, 224 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 article/identity-over-time.html create mode 100755 article/identity-over-time.pdf (limited to 'article') diff --git a/article/identity-over-time.html b/article/identity-over-time.html deleted file mode 100644 index f5639d1..0000000 --- a/article/identity-over-time.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ - - - - In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten? - - - - - - -

In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten?

Article ID: 27

This essay was first submitted in the John Locke Institute's Global Essay Competition where it was shortlisted and given a high commendation.

When the Ship of Theseus has its all parts replaced one after another -until no original components remain, is it still the Ship of Theseus, or -is it a new ship altogether? Similarly, when most of my body cells are -constantly renewed, coupled with my mindset being continuously -transformed by new information and acquaintances, am I still the same -person as the ten-year-old “me”?

This essay explores the continued personal identity from two -perspectives. First is the concept of individuality, i.e. -whether there is a delimited, discrete, and cohesive existence of “me” -in the first place. An affirmative answer positing the delineated -boundary of individual existence is the prerequisite to the second -question of uniqueness, which makes each individual different -from others. Two layers of analysis are applied to uniqueness — the -identification of the uniqueness of personal identity at a set -time compared with other individual entities, and the -continuity of the person’s uniqueness over time.

The Individuality of “Me”

Aristotelianism portrays the “individual” as a distinct substance, -differentiated from accidents such as qualities, quantities, or -relations . -The substance of a human is the body. Each organ and system have their -own functions, yet they orchestrate to keep us alive. Unlike coral reef, -consisting of indistinct strands of polyps, the human body has a -generally clear physical boundary — the skin. Therefore, our body is a -discrete individual entity.

The concept of individuality expands beyond the biological dimension. - -ascribes personal identity to the continuity of consciousness, hinging -on memory. sees -the self as a ever-changing “bundle” of perceptions or experience. defines identity by -social relations, which change over time as we forge new connections and -networks.

Our memory, experience and social relations, which are applied to -define our identity by the above philosophers, can’t exist independently -but are rather supported by the substance of our body, through which we -interact with the world. Our individuality is therefore a unity of -plurality, which comprises of biological, empirical and social -parameters. The analysis of individuality on all its parameters is -beyond the length of this essay. But since they are dependents of our -physical existence that are clearly delineated, this essay will move -from discussing discrete individuality of our substance to the -exploration of the uniqueness of each individual, and the possible -continuity of this uniqueness.

The Uniqueness of “Me” -and its Continuity

Canned tuna on shelves are individual identities but they are -practically not unique to the consumer. As long as they are still in the -shelf life, no one cares to take one can instead of another. There is -nothing particular about an industrial product that makes it stand out -from others mass produced or assembled at the same factory.

Each person, however, is unique in their biological -identity, empirical identity, and social identity. This essay explores -people’s unique characteristics through these three lens, and how they -are continued with the passage of time. I hereby propose that the -uniqueness of a person is preserved over time if the person’s unique -characteristics are preserved over time.

Biological Identity and -Its Continuity

“On average, the cells in your body are replaced every 7 to 10 years” -. Despite the -tempting but inaccurate interpretation that human bodies are renewed -every decade or so, there is significant constancy inside our body. For -example, most neurons do not regenerate. But even if all cells do, the -regeneration of our body’s constituent parts does not entail -that our biological properties change over time. Many -biological properties that are perceived to be identifying for -individuals, such as DNA sequence and fingerprints, generally stay -constant throughout our life. The wide application of fingerprints in -identifying people in user authentication and criminal investigations -suggests that fingerprints are unique and enduring.

The uniqueness of our biological system and the continuity of the -uniqueness are reinforced by the “Self/Non-self” theory by virologist -Sir Frank Burnet . The distinction of “self” from most -other entities elicits defensive responses against pathogens, the -tolerance of a graft from itself, and the rejection against grafts from -a donor organism in transplantation with few exceptions such as -isografts (grafts between identical twins) . Adaptive immunological memory is -formed when specialized memory lymphocytes are produced, which would -trigger a more rapid and effective immune response on the next infection -by a pathogen with similar antigens. Adaptive immunity leaves a -long-term mark on our body; while COVID immunity lasts about 6 months, -smallpox immunity lasts for decades . Therefore, my special immunity spans -over time due to the existence of immunological memory.

In conclusion, although most cells in our body regenerate constantly, -our biological identity does not change since it consists not in the -collection of components but in the properties that emerge therefrom. -The fact that our identity makers such as our DNA sequence, -fingerprints, and immunity transcend over time warrants the conclusion -that our biological identity spans diachronically.

Empirical identity -and Its Continuity: Memory

-postulates the memory theory of identity. A person’s identity is tied to -their memory, i.e. their ability to recognize their past experiences as -their own, and to connect them to their present consciousness. Endel -Tulving further analyzes the concept of memory by distinguishing between -procedural memory (skills, e.g. muscle memory), semantic memory (factual -information) and episodic memory (personal experiences) .

Semantic memory as a whole rather than individual piece of factual -information contributes to identity. Many people can retrieve the -knowledge that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, and this does not -grant them identity because this piece of knowledge lacks uniqueness -that tells one person apart from another. However the assembly of -semantic memory of each person is still an idiosyncratic feature, since -one person may share some semantic memories with people of similar -educational background but it is unlikely that the entire knowledge -system of each person is identical. Though semantic memories are -constantly renewed by newly accumulated knowledge or attrition as time -goes by, the changing process is gradual. Moreover, the cognitive -structure underlying the acquired information, the critical thinking -cultivated by the analysis of those information, and the mindset of each -individual are relatively stable, as well as uniquely forged by each -person’s idiosyncratic assembly of semantic memories.

Locke’s theory appeals to episodic memories as a necessary condition -for uniqueness of individuals as well as sameness over time. “As far as -this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or -Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self -now it was then; and ’tis by the same self with this present one that -now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Book II.xxvii.9).

This theory might be challenged from two perspectives. Firstly, -multiple people could have gone through the same events, and the shared -experience lacks uniqueness to individuals, hence absence of identity -since it is based on the premise of uniqueness as previously explained. -However, although different people may share the same episodes, they -were different agents in those moments and engaged from their own angles -respectively. Therefore, one’s memory of these episodes is still -distinct from that of others’.

The second and more common challenge to Locke’s memory theory is that -I may remember episodes of five years ago, and me of five years ago can -recall events of ten years ago, but the current me cannot recall most of -the life of ten years ago when I was a ignorant and happy kindergartner. -Am I still the same person of ten years ago? I would tackle this -question by the transitivity principle: if a = b and b = c, then a = c. If I share the -identity of me from five years ago, and me of five years ago was still -the same person as the one of ten years ago, I and the one of ten years -ago still have the same identity on the principle of transitivity.

An exception would be rare cases of memory loss due to pathological -conditions in the brain. The loss of memory is a rupture in one’s life. -If that loss is significant enough to affect one’s personality, I argue -that they are not the same person.

Procedural memories are typically diachronically enduring — if we -have learned how to perform a skill in our childhood, the procedural -memory is carried on throughout our life. For example, even if we have -not touched bikes for ten years, once we get onto one, we can still ride -on like we have not stopped riding all these years. As in the case of -semantic memory, the assembly of procedural memories are also -idiosyncratic to each individual. These unique procedural memories stay, -without us being aware of it.

Therefore, the above analysis of semantic, episodic and procedural -memories suggests that what makes people unique and also identical with -themselves along the temporal axis is their remembering or being able to -remember the knowledge assembly, the episodes to which they were witness -or agent, and also the skills they acquire and stay. Personal identity -consists in memory.

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Our identity is not only biologically and empirically determined, it -is also socially constructed.

According to , the self emerges from social -interactions. He divides the self into two components: the “me” and the -“I”. The “me” represents the organized set of attitudes of others that -the individual assumes. It’s the social self, the part of us that is -formed through interaction with others and with the social environment. -It embodies the expectations and norms of the community, allowing us to -predict how others will react to us. The “I” is the immediate response -of an individual to others. It is the spontaneous, unpredictable, and -creative part of the self. The “I” reacts to the “me”, and it’s through -this dialogue that we create meaning, make decisions, and ultimately -take action. So, for Mead, identity is continually created and recreated -through the social interactions we have, the roles we take on, and the -dialogue between the “I” and the “me”. Since social interactions are -dynamic, our identity is fluid rather than fixed.

However, the existence of the “me”, which embodies the attitudes, -roles, and rules assimilated from the social environment, provides a -consistent framework that guides behavior and thought. It ensures the -stability and continuity of our identity. Meanwhile, the elasticity of -social interactions allows us to grow inside the parameters of the -continuity of identity.

The impact of this continuity is huge. Its absence would translate -into lack of accountability for our own behavior and decision-making, -since we would not bear responsibility for our mistakes or crimes if we -could legitimately renew our identity every few years or months. -Property rights would be bygone and personal relationships chaotic since -filial, marital relationships vanished together with the continuity of -social identity.

Conclusion

My identity emerges from my unique biological, empirical and social -properties. In my case, all three of these properties have continuously -developed since I was ten, but always with some constancy, be it the -preservation of the uniquely identifying biological characteristics, my -unique memory, or my our social identity shaped through social -interactions. I maintain my sense of self through time due to the -constancy in these properties. I am therefore intrinsically linked to -the ten-year-old child I was, biologically, empirically, and -socially.