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authorbptato <nincsnevem662@gmail.com>2024-09-14 14:58:39 +0200
committerbptato <nincsnevem662@gmail.com>2024-09-14 15:05:53 +0200
commitdfa1a4bc5ece3b8c333b9a47bab038ff6a162f5b (patch)
tree2ba91e88804e9251345b165970348d0bd891586b /src/utils
parent2f04fdcd9eace846a1c40940e3511d070c8d4621 (diff)
downloadchawan-dfa1a4bc5ece3b8c333b9a47bab038ff6a162f5b.tar.gz
sandbox: stricter fcntl policy
fcntl has some cursed commands that we really don't want to allow
Diffstat (limited to 'src/utils')
-rw-r--r--src/utils/sandbox.nim21
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/utils/sandbox.nim b/src/utils/sandbox.nim
index 1e3558e0..6f63139f 100644
--- a/src/utils/sandbox.nim
+++ b/src/utils/sandbox.nim
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ elif SandboxMode == stLibSeccomp:
let syscall = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name("mprotect")
let arg2 = scmp_arg_cmp(
arg: 2, # attr
- op: SCMP_CMP_LE, # less or equals
+ op: SCMP_CMP_LE, # less than or equals
datum_a: 3 # PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE
)
# Note that libseccomp can't really express multiple comparisons.
@@ -148,6 +148,19 @@ elif SandboxMode == stLibSeccomp:
let syscall = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(it)
doAssert seccomp_rule_add(ctx, err, syscall, 0) == 0
+ proc allowFcntl(ctx: scmp_filter_ctx) =
+ # only allow F_DUPFD, F_GETFD, F_SETFD, F_GETFL, F_SETFL
+ # (F_SETFL is 4, the other ones are 0-3)
+ let syscall = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name("fcntl")
+ let syscall2 = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name("fcntl64")
+ let arg1 = scmp_arg_cmp(
+ arg: 1, # cmd
+ op: SCMP_CMP_LE, # less than or equals
+ datum_a: 4 # F_SETFL (includes the above mentioned ones)
+ )
+ doAssert seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall, 1, arg1) == 0
+ doAssert seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall2, 1, arg1) == 0
+
proc enterBufferSandbox*(sockPath: string) =
onSignal SIGSYS:
discard sig
@@ -166,7 +179,6 @@ elif SandboxMode == stLibSeccomp:
"epoll_create", "epoll_create1", "epoll_ctl", "epoll_wait", # epoll stuff
"eventfd", # used by Nim selectors
"exit_group", # for quit
- "fcntl", "fcntl64", # for changing blocking status
"fork", # for when fork is really fork
"futex", # bionic libc & WSL both need it
"getpid", # for determining current PID after we fork
@@ -205,6 +217,7 @@ elif SandboxMode == stLibSeccomp:
datum_a: 1 # PF_LOCAL == PF_UNIX == AF_UNIX
)
doAssert seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall, 1, arg0) == 0
+ ctx.allowFcntl()
ctx.blockStat()
when defined(android):
ctx.allowBionic()
@@ -215,13 +228,12 @@ elif SandboxMode == stLibSeccomp:
onSignal SIGSYS:
discard sig
raise newException(Defect, "Sandbox violation in network process")
- let ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_TRAP)
+ let ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS)
doAssert pointer(ctx) != nil
const allowList = [
cstring"close", "exit_group", # duh
"read", "write", "recv", "send", "recvfrom", "sendto", # socket i/o
"lseek", # glibc calls lseek on open files at exit
- "fcntl", "fcntl64", # so we can set nonblock etc.
"mmap", "mmap2", "mremap", "munmap", "brk", # memory allocation
"poll", # curl needs poll
"getpid", # used indirectly by OpenSSL EVP_RAND_CTX_new (through drbg)
@@ -233,6 +245,7 @@ elif SandboxMode == stLibSeccomp:
for it in allowList:
doAssert seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW,
seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(it), 0) == 0
+ ctx.allowFcntl()
ctx.blockStat()
when defined(android):
ctx.allowBionic()