| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Zero guarantees of compatibility at this point.
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I _think_ I don't need to gate other socket calls; you can't do anything
without bind() and connect(). And they should be good places to dump
more precise details later about the kind of server or client connection
being attempted.
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In the process we now also have a mechanism for Teliva to overlay errors
while apps run. Might make sense to make that available to apps as well.
But I'm starting to realize that any app access to the Teliva areas of
the screen is fraught with risk.
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Our sandboxing model is a blunt caricature, just two booleans. But let's
see how far this gets us.
Still doesn't persist, and definitely has no effect.
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Current plan:
- two booleans to gate file and network access, respectively
- false shows as green, true shows as orange
- if _both_ booleans are true, then both show as red to indicate that
there are no protections.
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It looks like attron doesn't actually enable colors near 256, even
though https://linux.die.net/man/3/attron suggests it does.
> COLOR_PAIR values can only be OR'd with attributes if the pair
> number is less than 256.
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Put stuff people messing with Teliva apps are likely to need above the C
interface.
The state of documentation for Teliva app creators is still quite poor.
All they really have to go on is the example apps.
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It should now be easier to diff against the Lua 5.1 sources upstream.
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This isn't necessarily for sandboxing, but they don't really work right
now in the presence of ncurses, and it seems better to not include
broken stuff. Maybe we can get them to coexist with ncurses down the
road.
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Again, too difficult to sandbox for now.
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Stop interpreting arbitrary Lua code when loading editor state. We don't
need that power or security risk.
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Too hard to sandbox. Maybe we'll get back to it if there's some use case
only it can satisfy.
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Was printing over passing tests for some reason.
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I should have documented that I'd never actually seen that code path
trigger before. Here's a minimal test that did it just now:
function test_foo()
return a+1
end
E2: [string "test_foo"]:2: attempt to perform arithmetic on global 'a' (a nil value)
A simple missing variable doesn't do it since it just evaluates to nil.
Without this commit, the above test was silently continuing to the main
app after failing tests.
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I can't believe I didn't notice this until now.
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Turns out arrow keys are considered `isprint()` on Mac.
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Let's see how much we need to tweak this solution.
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In each session, Teliva has to bootstrap a trusted channel with the
computer owner while running arbitrarily untrusted code. So let's get
really, really precise about what the trusted channel consists of:
- the bottom-most row of screen containing the menu
- the keystrokes the owner types in
- ncurses COLOR_PAIR slots 254 (menu) and 255 (error)
One reason the menu colors are important: we don't want people to get
used to apps that hide the menu colors by setting default
foreground/background to invisible and then drawing their own menu one
row up.
The error COLOR_PAIR I don't see any reason to carve out right now, but
it seems like a good idea for Teliva the framework to not get into the
habit of apps doing some things for it.
I'm not sure how realistic all this is (I feel quite ill-equipped to
think about security), but it seems worthwhile to err on the side of
paranoia. Teliva will be paranoid so people don't have to be.
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Kind of a subtle idea. Teliva the framework is intended to be
trustworthy software that people install on their computers. The apps
people run using Teliva may be less trustworthy. The whole point of
Teliva is to provide a sandbox for running code before you trust it.
One way (of many) apps can be malicious is by subtly getting between
what people see and reality. Imagine, for example, an app that draws a
fake menu bar and offers a different hotkey to edit source code. When
someone presses that hotkey they think they're using the standard Teliva
editor but they're really using an editor within the app, which the app
uses to hide its most malicious bits from view.
Down the road Teliva will have more bits of UI, such as for asking for
permission to read sensitive data. It's important that people understand
what they're granting permission to, that apps can't tamper with the
communications channel between them and Teliva.
This is likely just one of many ways for an app to break out of its
sandbox. Teliva isn't sandboxed yet. I'm just taking my first steps on
this journey. In particular, there are other mechanisms for asking for
user input besides `getch()`. I don't yet have a big-picture view of the
Teliva sandbox.
It seems clear that I need to educate people on the difference between
different parts of screen. Depending on the app you install, most of the
screen may be a dark forest. It'll be important to know where the safe
path is, where you can speak to trusted advisors while in the forest.
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It's still just in app control; I'm resisting the urge to introduce
"smarts".
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Accidentally added at some point. It's a useful debugging aide, but I
don't want to require the additional dependencies on a first run.
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Follows https://github.com/akkartik/wart, https://github.com/akkartik/mu0,
https://github.com/akkartik/mu1 and https://github.com/akkartik/mu.
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Examples:
- you try to write file but disk is full
- you have two Teliva files being edited at the same time
Both are situations where it's impossible to avoid some data loss.
However, we should now at least have some valid state of the .tlv file
saved to disk where we'd previously end up with a zero-size file or
garbage.
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This fixes a segfault when scanning through a long history of recent
changes (say > 20 changes)
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Teliva emits timestamps in multi-line format end in a newline. As a
result, notes get rendered on the next line and are then immediately
overwritten by the contents of the definition.
This bug was masked by my hacky 'original' timestamps which don't use
multi-line format.
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An empty stack is too rigorous a line to hold. Instead we'll just ensure
we leave the stack the way we found it.
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This reverts commit 7c1b9d0b91295323b5ed5ec3e09b46566288bc75.
The 'big hammer' isn't good enough. The recent changes view seems to
need state on the stack across invocations of the editor.
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..even if at the expense of leaking on the heap. Because the Lua stack
has very limited space (~20 slots). When it overflows, we segfault.
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We were missing functions in some larger programs.
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