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authorSilvino Silva <silvino@bk.ru>2017-02-20 09:06:21 +0000
committerSilvino Silva <silvino@bk.ru>2017-02-20 09:06:21 +0000
commit0e7880313b3a3e016c0d2e287802cc6ddff9edd1 (patch)
tree4ab03821ada4e4817dd58d161ae46041e24575b0 /core/conf
parentfd15c7a1ea378eaea467a741253483b2f5b31ea9 (diff)
downloaddoc-0e7880313b3a3e016c0d2e287802cc6ddff9edd1.tar.gz
core revision
Diffstat (limited to 'core/conf')
-rw-r--r--core/conf/fstab13
-rw-r--r--core/conf/pkgmk.conf4
-rw-r--r--core/conf/prt-get.conf4
-rwxr-xr-xcore/conf/rc.d/wlan7
-rw-r--r--core/conf/sysctl.conf538
5 files changed, 522 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/core/conf/fstab b/core/conf/fstab
index da3c9dd..d3fc878 100644
--- a/core/conf/fstab
+++ b/core/conf/fstab
@@ -13,9 +13,20 @@
#/dev/cdrom /cdrom iso9660 ro,user,noauto,unhide 0 0
#/dev/dvd /dvd udf ro,user,noauto,unhide 0 0
#/dev/floppy/0 /floppy vfat user,noauto,unhide 0 0
-devpts /dev/pts devpts noexec,nosuid,gid=tty,mode=0620 0 0
#tmp /tmp tmpfs defaults 0 0
#shm /dev/shm tmpfs defaults 0 0
#usb /proc/bus/usb usbfs defaults 0 0
# End of file
+#/dev/sda3 on / type ext4 (rw,relatime,data=ordered)
+#UUID=3bab76f8-e714-45f1-8e30-04cc8a09c3d1 / ext4 ro,relatime,data=ordered 0 1
+/dev/sda3 / ext4 defaults,noatime,ro 0 1
+devpts /dev/pts devpts noexec,nosuid,gid=tty,mode=0620 0 0
+UUID=3b408790-65e1-4638-9591-7ba61f266913 /boot ext4 defaults,ro,noatime 0 0
+UUID=962D-0DE1 /boot/efi vfat ro,noauto,umask=0077 0 0
+UUID=f2336a56-fbe6-444c-bdbf-f0e6c209c237 /var ext4 defaults,nodev,noexec,nosuid,errors=remount-ro 0 0
+UUID=20bd3948-0877-4192-af52-ad87d6f96db0 /usr ext4 defaults,ro,nodev,errors=remount-ro 0 0
+UUID=66c083d6-b8f2-4a98-ae55-9412f98cc089 /usr/ports ext4 defaults,ro,nodev,errors=remount-ro 0 0
+pkgmk /usr/ports/work tmpfs size=30G,gid=101,uid=100,defaults 0 0
+UUID=36e9e1d5-8356-451e-a301-81098b9a15ea /srv ext4 defaults,nodev,errors=remount-ro 0 0
+UUID=cd15196a-69f1-4fb4-9730-a384c62add91 /home ext4 defaults,nodev,nosuid,errors=remount-ro 0 0
diff --git a/core/conf/pkgmk.conf b/core/conf/pkgmk.conf
index 3533ba7..4ef372e 100644
--- a/core/conf/pkgmk.conf
+++ b/core/conf/pkgmk.conf
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# /etc/pkgmk.conf: pkgmk(8) configuration
#
-export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=x86-64"
+export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native"
export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
export MAKEFLAGS="-j4"
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ case ${PKGMK_ARCH} in
;;
esac
-PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(http://crux.nu/distfiles/)
+#PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(http://crux.nu/distfiles/)
PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="/usr/ports/distfiles"
PKGMK_PACKAGE_DIR="/usr/ports/packages"
PKGMK_WORK_DIR="/usr/ports/work/$name"
diff --git a/core/conf/prt-get.conf b/core/conf/prt-get.conf
index f6b6d16..0504d3e 100644
--- a/core/conf/prt-get.conf
+++ b/core/conf/prt-get.conf
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ logfile /usr/ports/pkgbuild/%n-%v-%r.log
readme verbose # (verbose|compact|disabled)
### prefer higher versions in sysup / diff
-preferhigher no # (yes|no)
+#preferhigher yes # (yes|no)
### use regexp search
# useregex no # (yes|no)
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ runscripts yes # (no|yes)
### EXPERT SECTION ###
### alternative commands
-makecommand sudo -H -u pkgmk fakeroot pkgmk
+makecommand sudo -H -u pkgmk -g pkgmk fakeroot pkgmk
addcommand sudo pkgadd
removecommand sudo pkgrm
runscriptcommand sudo sh
diff --git a/core/conf/rc.d/wlan b/core/conf/rc.d/wlan
index 8800148..86910bc 100755
--- a/core/conf/rc.d/wlan
+++ b/core/conf/rc.d/wlan
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ PID_WIFI=/var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid
OPTS_DHCP="--waitip -h $(/bin/hostname) -z $DEV"
OPTS_WIFI="-B -P $PID_WIFI -D nl80211,wext -c /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf -i $DEV"
-
print_status() {
$SSD --status --pidfile $2
case $? in
@@ -35,7 +34,13 @@ case $1 in
stop)
( $SSD --stop --retry 10 --pidfile $PID_DHCP
$SSD --stop --retry 10 --pidfile $PID_WIFI )
+
RETVAL=$?
+ /sbin/ip route del default dev ${DEV}
+ /sbin/ip route flush dev ${DEV}
+ /sbin/ip link set ${DEV} down
+ /sbin/ip addr flush dev ${DEV}
+
;;
restart)
$0 stop
diff --git a/core/conf/sysctl.conf b/core/conf/sysctl.conf
index b419628..b60d3e6 100644
--- a/core/conf/sysctl.conf
+++ b/core/conf/sysctl.conf
@@ -3,20 +3,420 @@
#
kernel.printk = 15 1 1 4
+kernel.randomize_va_space = 1
+kernel.shmmax = 500000000
+# Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
+kernel.pid_max = 65536
+
+#
+# Memory Protections
+#
+
+# If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
+# Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
+# Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
+# the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
+# remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time
+# clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure
+# that hwclock operates correctly.
+#
+# If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
+# you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
+# option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
+#kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1
+kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
+# daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
+# will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
+# or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
+# the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
+# fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
+# restart the daemon.
+# In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
+# existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
+# be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
+#
+# It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
+# section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
+# signal.
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "deter_bruteforce" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
+
+#
+# Filesystem Protections
+#
+
+# Optimization for port usefor LBs
+# Increase system file descriptor limit
+fs.file-max = 65535
+
+# If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
+# will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
+# world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
+# symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
+# able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
+# enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1
+
+
+# Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
+# that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache
+# verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
+# the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
+# to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
+# that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
+# symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete,
+# race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
+# will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
+# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
+# created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1
+#kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 33
+
+# if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
+# own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
+# the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
+# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
+# created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
+# be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
+# will be protected in the following ways:
+# * No new writable mounts will be allowed
+# * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
+# * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
+# This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
+# it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
+# behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
+# filesystem.
+# Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
+# and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
+# config or at runtime.
+# This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
+#kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 0
+
+# if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
+# chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
+# system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
+# files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
+# This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
+# if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
+# tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+# name "chroot_caps" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1
+
+#kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
+# or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
+# against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
+# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
+# created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
+# again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
+# out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
+# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
+# to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
+# outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
+# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
+# mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
+# would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
+# as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
+# anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
+# they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
+# that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+# mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+# sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
+# a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
+# works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
+# function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
+# of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
+# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
+# created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
+# to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
+# It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
+# a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
+# write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
+# interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
+# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+# connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
+# domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
+# that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+# with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
+# applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
+# The man page on chroot(2) states:
+# Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working
+# directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
+# `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
+# `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
+#
+# It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
+# any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+# name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+# kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid,
+# getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
+# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
+# created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
+# the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
+# processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
+# removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
+# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
+# is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1
+
+#
+# Kernel Auditing
+#
+
+# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
+# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
+# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
+# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+# name "audit_group" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
+# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
+# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
+# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+# name "audit_group" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 201
+
+# If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
+# other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
+# will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
+# of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+# name "exec_logging" is created.
+# WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
+# on an active system.
+kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
+# be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
+# limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl
+# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
+# created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
+#kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1
+kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
+# to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
+# applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
+# is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+# sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
+# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+# with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1
+kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
+# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+# with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
+# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
+# created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1
+kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
+# SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
+# occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "signal_logging" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
+# This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
+# their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+# with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
+kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 0
+
+# If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "timechange_logging" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1
+
+# if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
+# usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
+# denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also
+# log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
+# is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the
+# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
+# is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1
+
+#
+# Executable Protections
+#
+
+# if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
+# to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
+# The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
+# identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
+# system for a targeted exploit.
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
+# created.
+kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1
+
+# Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
+kernel.kptr_restrict = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
+# programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you
+# have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
+# enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
+# fine-grained exceptions.
+#
+# This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
+# processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
+# This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
+# but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl
+# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
+# created.
+kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
+# binaries. This option is useful in environments that
+# remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
+# prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds
+# consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
+# be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
+#
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
+# is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
+# in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
+# gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
+# to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most
+# cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
+# on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the
+# same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
+# running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled,
+# a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
+# memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
+# given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
+# 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
+# that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
+# 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
+# match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
+# It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
+# with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
+# privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to
+# research by Tim Brown:
+# http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
+# who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with
+# CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "harden_ipc" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
+# supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
+# These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
+# root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
+# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
+kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 101
+
+# If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
+# decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
+# option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
+# users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+# with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
+# entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
+kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 1
+
+# If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
+# a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
+# the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
+# "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
+# Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
+# execute files in directories they own that are not group or
+# world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
+# root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+# "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
+kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 0
+
+
+#kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1
+#
+# Network Protections
+#
+
+# Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits
+# min, default, and max number of bytes to use
+# set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths
+# Tcp Windows etc
+net.core.rmem_max = 8388608
+net.core.wmem_max = 8388608
+net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 5000
+net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 1
+
+# Both ports linux-blob and linux-libre don't build with ipv6
# Disable ipv6
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1
# Tuen IPv6
-net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0
-net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
-net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
-net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
-net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0
-net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0
-net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 0
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 0
# Avoid a smurf attack
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
@@ -56,8 +456,8 @@ net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
## protects from attackers that are using ip spoofing methods to do harm
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
-net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
-net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
+#net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
+#net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
# Make sure no one can alter the routing tables
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
@@ -70,18 +470,6 @@ net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 1
-kernel.shmmax = 500000000
-# Turn on execshild
-kernel.exec-shield = 1
-kernel.randomize_va_space = 1
-
-# Optimization for port usefor LBs
-# Increase system file descriptor limit
-fs.file-max = 65535
-
-# Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
-kernel.pid_max = 65536
-
# Increase system IP port limits
net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 2000 65000
@@ -89,25 +477,99 @@ net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 2000 65000
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 8388608
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 87380 8388608
-# Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits
-# min, default, and max number of bytes to use
-# set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths
-# Tcp Windows etc
-net.core.rmem_max = 8388608
-net.core.wmem_max = 8388608
-net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 5000
-net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 1
-# Grsecurity stuff
+# If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
+# destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
+# sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
+# This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
+# loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
+# makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
+# visibility against scanners.
+#
+# The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
+# blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
+# just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
+# problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
+# connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
+# end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
+# side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
+# feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
+# The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
+# can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
+# all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
+# disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
+#
+# If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
+# "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
+# While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
+# toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
+# "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4
+# prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
+# state.
+#kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
+#kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4
+
+# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
+# applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+# sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1
+
+# Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
+# add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
+# specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+# with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 202
+
+# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
+# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
+# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
+# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1
+
+# Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
+# Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
+# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
+# option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 203
+
+# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
+# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
+# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
+# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1
+
+# Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
+# Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
+# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
+# option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
+#kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 204
+
+#
+# Physical Protections
+#
+
+# If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
+# will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
+# USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB
+# device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be
+# used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
+# in various USB device drivers.
+#
+# For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
+# relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros
+# as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
+#kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0
+
+#
+# Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
+#
+#kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 1
-# cant chroot to outside chroot used to break chroot
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
-# function related to filesystems used to exploit
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
-# enforce current directory to chroot
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
-# cant chmod inside chroot used to break chroot
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 0
# End of file