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authorSilvino <silvino@bk.ru>2019-06-09 02:19:01 +0100
committerSilvino <silvino@bk.ru>2019-06-09 02:19:01 +0100
commit44ee76746ec6f23f3e67602770e4a04ab8471e95 (patch)
tree683431688f592c1fb87b03e1e7d7e1e985fd2045 /core/conf
parentf905c797c8f2ec87a8aa641a44c49fc1d0a23ebe (diff)
downloaddoc-44ee76746ec6f23f3e67602770e4a04ab8471e95.tar.gz
core index re-ordering and tools storage revision
Diffstat (limited to 'core/conf')
-rw-r--r--core/conf/sysctl.conf463
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 460 deletions
diff --git a/core/conf/sysctl.conf b/core/conf/sysctl.conf
index 4606791..771112a 100644
--- a/core/conf/sysctl.conf
+++ b/core/conf/sysctl.conf
@@ -3,51 +3,19 @@
#
kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4
+
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
+
# Shared Memory
#kernel.shmmax = 500000000
# Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated
# fs.file-nr=
vm.mmap_min_addr=65536
+
# Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
kernel.pid_max = 65536
#
-# Memory Protections
-#
-
-# If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
-# Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
-# Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
-# the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
-# remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time
-# clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure
-# that hwclock operates correctly.
-#
-# If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
-# you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
-# option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
-kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
-# daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
-# will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
-# or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
-# the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
-# fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
-# restart the daemon.
-# In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
-# existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
-# be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
-#
-# It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
-# section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
-# signal.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "deter_bruteforce" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
-
-#
# Filesystem Protections
#
@@ -55,341 +23,9 @@ kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
# Increase system file descriptor limit
fs.file-max = 65535
-# If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
-# will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
-# world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
-# symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
-# able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
-# enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1
-
-
-# Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
-# that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache
-# verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
-# the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
-# to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
-# that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
-# symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete,
-# race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
-# will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
-# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1
-kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15
-
-# if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
-# own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
-# the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
-# be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
-# will be protected in the following ways:
-# * No new writable mounts will be allowed
-# * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
-# * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
-# This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
-# it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
-# behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
-# filesystem.
-# Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-# and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
-# config or at runtime.
-# This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
-#kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1
-
-# if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
-# chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
-# system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
-# files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
-# This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
-# if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
-# tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "chroot_caps" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1
-
-#kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
-# or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
-# against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
-# again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
-# out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
-# to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
-# outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
-# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
-# mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
-# would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
-# as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
-# anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
-# they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
-# that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
-# mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
-# a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
-# works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
-# function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
-# of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
-# to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
-# It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
-# a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
-# write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
-# interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
-# connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
-# domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
-# that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
-# applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
-# The man page on chroot(2) states:
-# Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working
-# directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
-# `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
-# `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
-#
-# It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
-# any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
-# kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid,
-# getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
-# the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
-# processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
-# removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
-# is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1
-
-#
-# Kernel Auditing
-#
-
-# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
-# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
-# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
-# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "audit_group" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
-# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
-# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
-# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "audit_group" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99
-
-# If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
-# other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
-# will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
-# of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "exec_logging" is created.
-# WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
-# on an active system.
-kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
-# be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
-# limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
-# created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
-kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
-# to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
-# applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
-# is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
-# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
-#kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
-# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
-# SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
-# occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "signal_logging" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
-# This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
-# their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "timechange_logging" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1
-
-# if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
-# usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
-# denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also
-# log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
-# is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
-# is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1
-
-#
-# Executable Protections
-#
-
-
-# if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
-# to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
-# The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
-# identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
-# system for a targeted exploit.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1
-
# Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
-# If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
-# programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you
-# have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
-# enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
-# fine-grained exceptions.
-#
-# This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
-# processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
-# This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
-# but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
-# binaries. This option is useful in environments that
-# remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
-# prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds
-# consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
-# be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
-#
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
-# is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
-# in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
-# gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
-# to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most
-# cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
-# on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the
-# same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
-# running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled,
-# a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
-# memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
-# given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
-# 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
-# that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
-# 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
-# match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
-# It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
-# with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
-# privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to
-# research by Tim Brown:
-# http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
-# who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with
-# CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "harden_ipc" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
-# supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
-# These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
-# root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
-# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100
-
-# If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
-# decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
-# option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
-# users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
-# entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
-# a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
-# the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
-# "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
-# Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
-# execute files in directories they own that are not group or
-# world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
-# root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1
-
-
-kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1
-
#
# Network Protections
#
@@ -455,7 +91,6 @@ net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
#net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
#net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
-
# Make sure no one can alter the routing tables
# Act as a router, necessary for Access Point
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
@@ -495,96 +130,4 @@ net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1800
# Sen SynAck retries to 3
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3
-# If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
-# destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
-# sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
-# This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
-# loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
-# makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
-# visibility against scanners.
-#
-# The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
-# blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
-# just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
-# problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
-# connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
-# end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
-# side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
-# feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
-# The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
-# can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
-# all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
-# disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
-#
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
-# "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
-# While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
-# toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
-# "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4
-# prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
-# state.
-kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
-kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
-# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
-# applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1
-
-# Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
-# add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
-# specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
-# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
-# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
-# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
-# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1
-
-# Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
-# Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
-# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
-# option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
-# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
-# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
-# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
-# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1
-
-# Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
-# Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
-# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
-# option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99
-
-#
-# Physical Protections
-#
-
-# If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
-# will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
-# USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB
-# device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be
-# used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
-# in various USB device drivers.
-#
-# For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
-# relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros
-# as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
-kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0
-
-#
-# Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
-#
-kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0
-
# End of file