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authorSilvino <silvino@bk.ru>2019-06-16 05:04:09 +0100
committerSilvino <silvino@bk.ru>2019-06-16 05:04:44 +0100
commit296be79a3b724db67a37244a67cfb3e4ef6b652f (patch)
tree6136b7fbe2082b018a6a06f897b7012177cce630 /core
parentfdc231661647d4ca15ddf312e85b210eabd23e50 (diff)
parent951a8a84411da6b71cee11d8c9feb993b984acf5 (diff)
downloaddoc-296be79a3b724db67a37244a67cfb3e4ef6b652f.tar.gz
doc release 0.5.3
Diffstat (limited to 'core')
-rw-r--r--core/apparmor.html82
-rw-r--r--core/conf/default/grub4
-rw-r--r--core/conf/distcc.conf3
-rw-r--r--core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh220
-rw-r--r--core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh7
-rw-r--r--core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh2
-rw-r--r--core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh47
-rw-r--r--core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh15
-rw-r--r--core/conf/iptables/open.v4210
-rw-r--r--core/conf/iptables/server.v4204
-rw-r--r--core/conf/pkg-get.conf15
-rw-r--r--core/conf/pkgmk.conf29
-rw-r--r--core/conf/ports/kde5.git7
-rw-r--r--core/conf/prt-get.conf16
-rwxr-xr-xcore/conf/rc.d/distccd33
-rw-r--r--core/conf/rc.d/iptables83
-rw-r--r--core/conf/sysctl.conf463
-rw-r--r--core/configure.html24
-rw-r--r--core/exim.html14
-rw-r--r--core/hardening.html144
-rw-r--r--core/index.html62
-rw-r--r--core/install.html108
-rw-r--r--core/network.html165
-rw-r--r--core/package.html30
-rw-r--r--core/ports.html101
-rw-r--r--core/samhain.html8
-rwxr-xr-xcore/scripts/setup-target.sh55
-rw-r--r--core/sysctl.html484
-rw-r--r--core/toolchain.html4
-rw-r--r--core/tty-terminal.html4
30 files changed, 1263 insertions, 1380 deletions
diff --git a/core/apparmor.html b/core/apparmor.html
index 9954593..8b7a30c 100644
--- a/core/apparmor.html
+++ b/core/apparmor.html
@@ -2,16 +2,16 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.2.1. AppArmor</title>
+ <title>2.6.1. AppArmor</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1>2.2.1. AppArmor</h1>
+ <h1>2.6.1. AppArmor</h1>
<p>Check <a href="linux.html#configure">kernel configuration</a> or
- use the provided with <a href="reboot.html#linux">linux-gnu</a> port
+ use the provided with <a href="reboot.html#linux">linux-gnu</a> port
to support apparmor. <a href="https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/wikis/home">AppArmor</a> enforce rules on applications based
on security policies. User space tools are provided by apparmor port
and its dependencies, install them;</p>
@@ -48,7 +48,20 @@
aa-decode aa-exec aa-remove-unknown
</pre>
- <p>apparmor_parser options;</p>
+ <h2 id="profiles">Profiles</h2>
+
+ <p>Profiles are located at /etc/apparmor.d/ and
+ /usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles contain profiles
+ that require testing;
+
+ <pre>
+ # cp -r /usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles/* /etc/apparmor.d/
+ # sudo rm /etc/apparmor.d/README
+ # bash /etc/rc.d/apparmor restart
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Profiles are parsed using
+ apparmor_parser;</p>
<pre>
Usage: apparmor_parser [options] [profile]
@@ -93,11 +106,68 @@
--skip-bad-cache-rebuild Do not try rebuilding the cache if it is rejected by the kernel
--warn n Enable warnings (see --help=warn)
</pre>
- #
+
+ <h3 id="auto_profiles">Create profile with audit</h3>
+
+ <p>Tools use log as a source to build profiles, it is
+ necessary to disable log rate limit;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # sysctl -w kernel.printk_ratelimit=0
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Start aa-genprof;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ sudo aa-genprof /usr/bin/lynx
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Execute application with all common application options
+ and parts;</p>
+
+ <P>After initial automatic configuration enable profile in
+ complain mode. Use aa-logprof when rules need to be adapted.</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # aa-logprof
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Once profile rules become well defined enable profile in
+ enforce mode with aa-enforce;</p>
+
+ <p>Monitor logs with aa-notify;</a>
+
+
+ <h3 id="man_profiles">Create profile manually</h3>
+
+ <p>To create a new profile, let's say for lynx,
+ first find where the application is;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ whereis lynx
+ lynx: /usr/bin/lynx /usr/etc/lynx.lss /usr/etc/lynx.cfg /usr/etc/lynx.cfg~ /usr/share/man/man1/lynx.1.gz
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Now create a file with path to executable in
+ /etc/apparmor.d;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # vim /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.lynx
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Create basic profile template;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ #include &lt;tunables/global&gt;
+
+ profile lynx /usr/bin/lynx {
+ #include &lt;abstractions/base&gt;
+ }
+ </pre>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/conf/default/grub b/core/conf/default/grub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1a4636
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/default/grub
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+GRUB_DISABLE_LINUX_UUID=false
+GRUB_ENABLE_LINUX_LABEL=false
+GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="rd.luks.uuid=luks-15f15024-e994-43e3-9de4-694ba94aaf7f rd.lvm.lv=vg_system/lv_root apparmor=1 security=apparmor"
+GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y
diff --git a/core/conf/distcc.conf b/core/conf/distcc.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..723338b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/distcc.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+DISTCC_ALLOW="10.0.0.0/8"
+DISTCC_USER="pkgmk"
+DISTCC_LOG_LEVEL="info"
diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh
index fa987a5..cd93687 100644
--- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh
+++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
#!/bin/bash
-
-echo "setting bridge ${BR_IF} network..."
-echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
+echo "setting bridge network..."
+source ipt-conf.sh
+source ipt-firewall.sh
+ipt_clear
+ipt_tables
# Unlimited on loopback
$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
@@ -9,174 +11,126 @@ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
-####### NAT Prerouting Chain ######
+######## NAT Prerouting Chain ######
#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.254:53
-#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.254:53
-$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.4:443
-#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: PREROUTING: "
-
-####### Forward Chain ######
-$IPT -A FORWARD -j blocker
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
-$IPT -A FORWARD -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
-
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-
-# Allow access from bridge to gateway wifi interface
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_http_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_https_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_ftp_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ftp_out
+##$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.254:53
+#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ${WIFI_IF} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -j DNAT --to 10.0.0.4:443
+##$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: PREROUTING: "
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_dns_in
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_https_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_https_out
-
-# allow output from BR_NET to external
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-
-# allow input from public bridged interface facing Internet
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_http_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_https_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_git_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_ftp_in
-
-######## Forward TAP2 ssh, http and https ######
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_ssh_in
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_ssh_out
+######## Forward Chain ######
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
#
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_http_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_http_out
-
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_https_in
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_https_out
+## Allow all for BR_NET
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
+## DHCP
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s 0.0.0.0 -d 255.255.255.255 -j srv_dhcp
-#Less noise
-$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -p udp --dport 519 --sport 520 -j DROP
+## Allow access from bridge to gateway wifi interface
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_http_in
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_https_in
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j cli_ftp_in
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ftp_out
+##$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_dns_in
+##$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${WIFI_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_https_in
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_https_out
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out tap2 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out tap1 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-#
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out tap3 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out tap1 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-#
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out tap2 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out tap3 -s ${BR_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
-#
-#
-# Tap1
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap1 -j cli_http_in
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_http_out
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap1 -j cli_https_in
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap1 -j cli_ftp_in
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap1 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ftp_out
-#
-#
-## Tap3
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_out
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap3 -j cli_git_in
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap3 -j cli_http_in
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_http_out
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap3 -j cli_https_in
-#
-#
-# Tap1, Tap2 and Tap3 can access external https
-
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out
-#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j cli_https_in
-
+## allow output from BR_NET to external
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -j ACCEPT
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -s ${DNS} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_dns_in
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_http_in
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_https_in
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_ssh_in
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_git_in
+$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -p tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
-#
-# #$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_rip
-#
-# $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_dhcp
-# $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_dhcp
+##Less noise
+#$IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -p udp --dport 519 --sport 520 -j DROP
-#
-####### Input Chain ######
+######## Input Chain ######
$IPT -A INPUT -j blocker
-#Less noise
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --sport 3030 --dport 1024:65535 -j DROP
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j DROP
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 138 --dport 138 -j DROP
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${WIFI_NET} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp
+##Less noise
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --sport 3030 --dport 1024:65535 -j DROP
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -s ${GW} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} -s ${GW} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -s ${BR_NET} -d 10.255.255.255 -p udp --sport 520 --dport 520 -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 137 --dport 137 -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -p udp --sport 138 --dport 138 -j ACCEPT
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_dns_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -s ${WIFI_NET} -d ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_in
-
$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -j srv_dhcp
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -s ${GW} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_dhcp
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_dns_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp
$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in
$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_in
$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_git_in
$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_ssh_in
$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap3 -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_in
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_in
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${WIFI_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_in
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -s ${GW} -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_dhcp
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_in
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_in
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_in
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_in
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_in
-# c2.ank /iso -> c9.ank /srv/qemu/iso
-$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 -d ${PUB_IP} -j srv_http_in
-# hyperbola servers
-$IPT -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 1024:65535 --sport 50100 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+## PXE server
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -p udp -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} --dport 69 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i ${BR_IF} -p udp -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} --dport 1024:65535 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
-####### Output Chain ######
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -j blocker
+######## Output Chain ######
-#Less noise
+##Less noise
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --dport 3030 --sport 1024:65535 -j DROP
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_dhcp
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_dns_out
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${WIFI_NET} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_icmp
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -j srv_icmp
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j srv_icmp
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_ssh_out
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_git_out
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j cli_http_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_dhcp
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_out
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_git_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_http_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${DNS} -j cli_dns_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -d ${WIFI_NET} -j srv_dns_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_dns_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_ssh_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_git_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_https_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j cli_http_out
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${WIFI_IF} -j srv_icmp
-# Hyperbola servers
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 50100 -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-# c2.ank /iso -> c9.ank /srv/qemu/iso
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d 10.0.0.4 -j srv_http_out
+## PXE Server
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${BR_NET} -p udp --dport 1024:65535 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
-####### PostRouting Chain ######
-#Less noise
-#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
-#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -p udp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
+######## PostRouting Chain ######
+##Less noise
+##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
+##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -p tcp --dport 443 --sport 1024:65535 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${BR_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${DNS} -p udp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${WIFI_IF} -j MASQUERADE
+##$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: POSTROUTING: "
-$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${WIFI_IF} -j MASQUERADE
+## log everything else and drop
+ipt_log
-#$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j LOG --log-level 7 --log-prefix "iptables: POSTROUTING: "
+iptables-save > bridge.v4
diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh
index 52669dc..c3dac16 100644
--- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh
+++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-conf.sh
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/bash
-TYPE=bridge
-#TYPE=server
+
+IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables"
SPAMLIST="blockedip"
SPAMDROPMSG="BLOCKED IP DROP"
@@ -19,4 +19,5 @@ PUB_IF="enp8s0"
# private interface for virtual/internal
WIFI_IF="wlp7s0"
-WIFI_NET="192.168.1.0/24"
+#WIFI_NET="192.168.1.0/24"
+WIFI_NET="10.0.0.0/8"
diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh
index 6ea613a..12c3834 100644
--- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh
+++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
-IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables"
-
ipt_clear () {
echo "clear all iptables tables"
diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ef1254
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-open.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+echo "setting client network..."
+source ipt-conf.sh
+source ipt-firewall.sh
+ipt_clear
+ipt_tables
+
+# Unlimited on loopback
+$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
+
+####### Input Chain ######
+$IPT -A INPUT -j blocker
+
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_dns_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_http_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ssh_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j srv_icmp
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_pops_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_smtps_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_irc_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ftp_in
+$IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -j cli_gpg_in
+
+
+####### Output Chain ######
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -j blocker
+
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_dns_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ssh_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_git_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j srv_icmp
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_pops_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_smtps_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_irc_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_ftp_out
+$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -j cli_gpg_out
+
+## log everything else and drop
+ipt_log
+
+iptables-save > open.v4
diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh
index 225fd31..370db60 100644
--- a/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh
+++ b/core/conf/iptables/ipt-server.sh
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
-echo "setting server network..."
+echo "setting server iptables ..."
+source ipt-conf.sh
+source ipt-firewall.sh
+ipt_clear
+ipt_tables
# Unlimited on loopback
$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
-$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
-$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A INPUT -i lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
+#$IPT -A OUTPUT -o lo -s ${PUB_IP} -d ${PUB_IP} -j ACCEPT
####### Input Chain ######
$IPT -A INPUT -j blocker
@@ -35,3 +39,8 @@ $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_out
$IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_out
+
+## log everything else and drop
+ipt_log
+
+iptables-save > server.v4
diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/open.v4 b/core/conf/iptables/open.v4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30e476d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/iptables/open.v4
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+*security
+:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+*raw
+:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+*nat
+:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+*mangle
+:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
+*filter
+:INPUT DROP [0:0]
+:FORWARD DROP [0:0]
+:OUTPUT DROP [0:0]
+:blocker - [0:0]
+:cli_dns_in - [0:0]
+:cli_dns_out - [0:0]
+:cli_ftp_in - [0:0]
+:cli_ftp_out - [0:0]
+:cli_git_in - [0:0]
+:cli_git_out - [0:0]
+:cli_gpg_in - [0:0]
+:cli_gpg_out - [0:0]
+:cli_http_in - [0:0]
+:cli_http_out - [0:0]
+:cli_https_in - [0:0]
+:cli_https_out - [0:0]
+:cli_irc_in - [0:0]
+:cli_irc_out - [0:0]
+:cli_pops_in - [0:0]
+:cli_pops_out - [0:0]
+:cli_smtps_in - [0:0]
+:cli_smtps_out - [0:0]
+:cli_ssh_in - [0:0]
+:cli_ssh_out - [0:0]
+:srv_db_in - [0:0]
+:srv_db_out - [0:0]
+:srv_dhcp - [0:0]
+:srv_dns_in - [0:0]
+:srv_dns_out - [0:0]
+:srv_git_in - [0:0]
+:srv_git_out - [0:0]
+:srv_http_in - [0:0]
+:srv_http_out - [0:0]
+:srv_https_in - [0:0]
+:srv_https_out - [0:0]
+:srv_icmp - [0:0]
+:srv_rip - [0:0]
+:srv_ssh_in - [0:0]
+:srv_ssh_out - [0:0]
+-A INPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -i lo -j ACCEPT
+-A INPUT -j blocker
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_dns_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_http_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_https_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_git_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_ssh_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j srv_icmp
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_pops_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_smtps_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_irc_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_ftp_in
+-A INPUT -i wlp9s0 -j cli_gpg_in
+-A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: INPUT: " --log-level 7
+-A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: FORWARD: " --log-level 7
+-A OUTPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -o lo -j ACCEPT
+-A OUTPUT -j blocker
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_dns_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_https_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_ssh_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_git_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_git_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j srv_icmp
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_pops_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_smtps_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_irc_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_ftp_out
+-A OUTPUT -o wlp9s0 -j cli_gpg_out
+-A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: OUTPUT: " --log-level 7
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop sync: " --log-level 7
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -j DROP
+-A blocker -f -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop frag: "
+-A blocker -f -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,PSH,URG -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop null: "
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop syn rst syn rs"
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop xmas: "
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop fin scan: "
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,ACK,URG -j DROP
+-A blocker -j RETURN
+-A cli_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_dns_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_dns_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 21 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 20 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 21 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 20 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_git_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_git_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_gpg_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 11371 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_gpg_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_gpg_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 11371 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_gpg_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_in -p udp -m udp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_in -p udp -m udp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_irc_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 6667 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_irc_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_irc_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 6667 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_irc_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_pops_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 995 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_pops_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_pops_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 995 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_pops_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_smtps_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 465 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_smtps_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_smtps_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 465 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_smtps_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_db_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 5432 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_db_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_db_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 5432 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_db_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 68 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dhcp -j RETURN
+-A srv_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_git_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_git_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_http_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_http_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_https_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_https_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_icmp -p icmp -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_icmp -j RETURN
+-A srv_rip -p udp -m udp --sport 520 --dport 520 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_rip -j RETURN
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH"
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH"
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_out -j RETURN
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 23:05:15 2019
diff --git a/core/conf/iptables/server.v4 b/core/conf/iptables/server.v4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed202ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/iptables/server.v4
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+*security
+:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+*raw
+:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+*nat
+:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+*mangle
+:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
+:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
+:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+# Generated by iptables-save v1.8.2 on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
+*filter
+:INPUT DROP [0:0]
+:FORWARD DROP [0:0]
+:OUTPUT DROP [0:0]
+:blocker - [0:0]
+:cli_dns_in - [0:0]
+:cli_dns_out - [0:0]
+:cli_ftp_in - [0:0]
+:cli_ftp_out - [0:0]
+:cli_git_in - [0:0]
+:cli_git_out - [0:0]
+:cli_gpg_in - [0:0]
+:cli_gpg_out - [0:0]
+:cli_http_in - [0:0]
+:cli_http_out - [0:0]
+:cli_https_in - [0:0]
+:cli_https_out - [0:0]
+:cli_irc_in - [0:0]
+:cli_irc_out - [0:0]
+:cli_pops_in - [0:0]
+:cli_pops_out - [0:0]
+:cli_smtps_in - [0:0]
+:cli_smtps_out - [0:0]
+:cli_ssh_in - [0:0]
+:cli_ssh_out - [0:0]
+:srv_db_in - [0:0]
+:srv_db_out - [0:0]
+:srv_dhcp - [0:0]
+:srv_dns_in - [0:0]
+:srv_dns_out - [0:0]
+:srv_git_in - [0:0]
+:srv_git_out - [0:0]
+:srv_http_in - [0:0]
+:srv_http_out - [0:0]
+:srv_https_in - [0:0]
+:srv_https_out - [0:0]
+:srv_icmp - [0:0]
+:srv_rip - [0:0]
+:srv_ssh_in - [0:0]
+:srv_ssh_out - [0:0]
+-A INPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -i lo -j ACCEPT
+-A INPUT -j blocker
+-A INPUT -s 212.55.154.174/32 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j cli_dns_in
+-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_https_in
+-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_in
+-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_git_in
+-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_https_in
+-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j cli_https_in
+-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_in
+-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.254/32 -i enp8s0 -j srv_git_in
+-A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: INPUT: " --log-level 7
+-A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: FORWARD: " --log-level 7
+-A OUTPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -o lo -j ACCEPT
+-A OUTPUT -j blocker
+-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 212.55.154.174/32 -o enp8s0 -j cli_dns_out
+-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_https_out
+-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_out
+-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_git_out
+-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -o enp8s0 -j cli_https_out
+-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.254/32 -o enp8s0 -j srv_https_out
+-A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_ssh_out
+-A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -o enp8s0 -j srv_git_out
+-A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: OUTPUT: " --log-level 7
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop sync: " --log-level 7
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -m state --state NEW -j DROP
+-A blocker -f -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop frag: "
+-A blocker -f -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,PSH,URG -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop null: "
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG NONE -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop syn rst syn rs"
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop xmas: "
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN FIN,SYN -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -m limit --limit 5/min --limit-burst 7 -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables: drop fin scan: "
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,ACK FIN -j DROP
+-A blocker -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,PSH,ACK,URG FIN,SYN,RST,ACK,URG -j DROP
+-A blocker -j RETURN
+-A cli_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_dns_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_dns_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 21 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 20 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 21 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 20 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ftp_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_git_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_git_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_gpg_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 11371 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_gpg_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_gpg_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 11371 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_gpg_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_in -p udp -m udp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_http_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_in -p udp -m udp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_out -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_https_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_irc_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 6667 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_irc_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_irc_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 6667 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_irc_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_pops_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 995 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_pops_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_pops_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 995 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_pops_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_smtps_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 465 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_smtps_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_smtps_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 465 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_smtps_out -j RETURN
+-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_in -j RETURN
+-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A cli_ssh_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_db_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 5432 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_db_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_db_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 5432 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_db_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 68 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dhcp -p udp -m udp --sport 67 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dhcp -j RETURN
+-A srv_dns_in -p udp -m udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_dns_out -p udp -m udp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 53 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_dns_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_git_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 9418 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_git_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_git_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 9418 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_git_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_http_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_http_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_http_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 80 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_http_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_https_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_https_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_https_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 443 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_https_out -j RETURN
+-A srv_icmp -p icmp -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_icmp -j RETURN
+-A srv_rip -p udp -m udp --sport 520 --dport 520 -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_rip -j RETURN
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH"
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2222 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 2222 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j LOG --log-prefix "BLOCKED IP DROP SSH"
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 4 --rttl --name SSH --mask 255.255.255.255 --rsource -j DROP
+-A srv_ssh_in -p tcp -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_in -j RETURN
+-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 2222 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_out -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 --dport 1024:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
+-A srv_ssh_out -j RETURN
+COMMIT
+# Completed on Sat Jun 8 19:50:25 2019
diff --git a/core/conf/pkg-get.conf b/core/conf/pkg-get.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4825657
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/pkg-get.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+##
+# /etc/pkg-get.conf
+# pkg-get configuration file
+
+# package repositories (remote)
+# The first two are remote repoistories, the last is a local one
+pkgdir /usr/ports/server|https://hive.gnu.systems/mirror-3.4/packages
+#pkgdir /usr/packages/java|http://www.foobar.com/java
+#pkgdir /usr/packages/games
+
+# runscripts: if "yes" pre-post install scripts are
+# automatically executed. Handle with care.
+runscripts yes
+
+preferhigher yes # (yes|no)
diff --git a/core/conf/pkgmk.conf b/core/conf/pkgmk.conf
index 4085a38..4d689ec 100644
--- a/core/conf/pkgmk.conf
+++ b/core/conf/pkgmk.conf
@@ -2,10 +2,32 @@
# /etc/pkgmk.conf: pkgmk(8) configuration
#
-export CFLAGS="-O2 -g -march=x86-64 -pipe"
+export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=x86-64"
export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
-# export MAKEFLAGS="-j2"
+## ccache settings
+#export PATH="/usr/lib/ccache/:$PATH"
+#export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/ccache"
+#export CCACHE_PREFIX="distcc"
+#export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
+#
+## compile using ccache and distcc
+#export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4 xborg/4"
+#
+### compile using distcc without ccache
+##export PATH="/usr/lib/distcc/:$PATH"
+##export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4,lzo,cpp xborg/4,lzo,cpp"
+##export PUMP_BUILD=yes
+#
+## distcc settings
+#export JOBS=$(/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null)
+#export DISTCC_DIR="/usr/ports/distcc"
+#export MAKEFLAGS="-j ${JOBS}"
+#export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS"
+
+# local compile only
+export JOBS=$(nproc)
+export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS"
case ${PKGMK_ARCH} in
"64"|"")
@@ -22,7 +44,7 @@ case ${PKGMK_ARCH} in
;;
esac
-#PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(http://machine.example.org/ports/distfiles/)
+PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(https://hive.gnu.systems/mirror-3.4/distfiles/)
# PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="$PWD"
PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="/usr/ports/distfiles"
# PKGMK_PACKAGE_DIR="$PWD"
@@ -37,5 +59,6 @@ PKGMK_WORK_DIR="/usr/ports/work/$name"
# PKGMK_WGET_OPTS=""
# PKGMK_CURL_OPTS=""
# PKGMK_COMPRESSION_MODE="gz"
+# PKGMK_UP_TO_DATE=yes
# End of file
diff --git a/core/conf/ports/kde5.git b/core/conf/ports/kde5.git
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37b5764
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/ports/kde5.git
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Collection core
+#
+NAME=kde5
+URL=git://hive.gnu.systems/kde5.git
+BRANCH=stable-3.4
+destination=/usr/ports/kde5
+PORTS_DIR="/usr/ports"
diff --git a/core/conf/prt-get.conf b/core/conf/prt-get.conf
index 1f7a39e..8e88333 100644
--- a/core/conf/prt-get.conf
+++ b/core/conf/prt-get.conf
@@ -5,19 +5,16 @@
# note: the order matters: the package found first is used
prtdir /usr/ports/core
prtdir /usr/ports/opt
-prtdir /usr/ports/contrib
-prtdir /usr/ports/machine-ports
prtdir /usr/ports/xorg
-# 6c37 team provides a collection with freetype-iu, fontconfig-iu
-# and cairo-iu ports.
-
# the following line enables the multilib compat-32 collection
#prtdir /usr/ports/compat-32
# the following line enables the user maintained contrib collection
-# prtdir /usr/ports/6c37-dropin
-# prtdir /usr/ports/6c37
+prtdir /usr/ports/contrib
+prtdir /usr/ports/ports
+prtdir /usr/ports/mate
+prtdir /usr/ports/kde5
### use mypackage form local directory
# prtdir /home/packages/build:mypackage
@@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ prtdir /usr/ports/xorg
writelog enabled # (enabled|disabled)
logmode overwrite # (append|overwrite)
rmlog_on_success yes # (no|yes)
-logfile /usr/ports/pkgbuild/%n-%v-%r.log
+logfile /usr/ports/pkgbuild/%n.log
# path, %p=path to port dir, %n=port name
# %v=version, %r=release
@@ -37,7 +34,7 @@ logfile /usr/ports/pkgbuild/%n-%v-%r.log
readme verbose # (verbose|compact|disabled)
### prefer higher versions in sysup / diff
-preferhigher no # (yes|no)
+preferhigher yes # (yes|no)
### use regexp search
# useregex no # (yes|no)
@@ -46,7 +43,6 @@ preferhigher no # (yes|no)
### --install-scripts option
runscripts yes # (no|yes)
-
### EXPERT SECTION ###
### alternative commands
diff --git a/core/conf/rc.d/distccd b/core/conf/rc.d/distccd
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..65a166d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/conf/rc.d/distccd
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# /etc/rc.d/distccd: start/stop distcc daemon
+#
+
+. /etc/distcc.conf
+if [ -z "$DISTCC_ALLOW" ]; then
+ echo "Please define a range of IPs allowed to connect to this distccd"
+ echo "host in DISTCC_ALLOW in /etc/rc.conf. More detailed information"
+ echo "can be found in the distcc's README package."
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+DISTCC_USER="${DISTCC_USER:=nobody}"
+DISTCC_LOG_LEVEL="${DISTCC_LOG_LEVEL:=notice}"
+
+case $1 in
+start)
+ /usr/sbin/distccd --daemon --user "$DISTCC_USER" --allow "$DISTCC_ALLOW" --log-level "$DISTCC_LOG_LEVEL"
+ ;;
+stop)
+ killall -q /usr/sbin/distccd
+ ;;
+restart)
+ $0 stop
+ $0 start
+ ;;
+*)
+ echo "usage: $0 [start|stop|restart]"
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# End of file
diff --git a/core/conf/rc.d/iptables b/core/conf/rc.d/iptables
index 9471f99..cc7c765 100644
--- a/core/conf/rc.d/iptables
+++ b/core/conf/rc.d/iptables
@@ -1,39 +1,62 @@
-source /etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh
-source /etc/iptables/ipt-firewall.sh
+IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables"
+TYPE=bridge
+#TYPE=server
+#TYPE=open
+
+echo "clear all iptables tables"
+
+${IPT} -F
+${IPT} -X
+${IPT} -t nat -F
+${IPT} -t nat -X
+${IPT} -t mangle -F
+${IPT} -t mangle -X
+${IPT} -t raw -F
+${IPT} -t raw -X
+${IPT} -t security -F
+${IPT} -t security -X
+
+# Set Default Rules
+${IPT} -P INPUT DROP
+${IPT} -P FORWARD DROP
+${IPT} -P OUTPUT DROP
+
+${IPT} -A INPUT -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
+${IPT} -A OUTPUT -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
case $1 in
start)
- ipt_clear
- ipt_tables
- case $TYPE in
- bridge)
- source /etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh
-
- ## log everything else and drop
- ipt_log
-
- iptables-save > /etc/iptables/bridge.v4
- ;;
- server)
- source /etc/iptables/iptables-conf.sh
-
- ## log everything else and drop
- ipt_log
-
- iptables-save > /etc/iptables/net.v4
- ;;
- esac
- ;;
- stop)
+ case $TYPE in
+ bridge)
+
+ echo "setting bridge network..."
+ echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
+
+ ## load bridge configuration
+ iptables-restore /etc/iptables/bridge.v4
+
+ ;;
+ server)
+
+ echo "setting server network..."
+ ## load server configuration
+ iptables-restore /etc/iptables/server.v4
- ipt_clear
;;
- restart)
- $0 stop
- $0 start
+ open)
+
+ echo "setting client network..."
+ ## load client configuration
+ iptables-restore /etc/iptables/open.v4
+
;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ stop)
+
+ ;;
*)
- echo "Usage: $0 [start|stop|restart]"
- ;;
+ echo "Usage: $0 [start|stop]"
+ ;;
esac
diff --git a/core/conf/sysctl.conf b/core/conf/sysctl.conf
index 4606791..771112a 100644
--- a/core/conf/sysctl.conf
+++ b/core/conf/sysctl.conf
@@ -3,51 +3,19 @@
#
kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4
+
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
+
# Shared Memory
#kernel.shmmax = 500000000
# Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated
# fs.file-nr=
vm.mmap_min_addr=65536
+
# Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
kernel.pid_max = 65536
#
-# Memory Protections
-#
-
-# If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
-# Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
-# Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
-# the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
-# remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time
-# clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure
-# that hwclock operates correctly.
-#
-# If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
-# you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
-# option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
-kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
-# daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
-# will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
-# or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
-# the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
-# fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
-# restart the daemon.
-# In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
-# existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
-# be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
-#
-# It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
-# section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
-# signal.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "deter_bruteforce" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
-
-#
# Filesystem Protections
#
@@ -55,341 +23,9 @@ kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
# Increase system file descriptor limit
fs.file-max = 65535
-# If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
-# will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
-# world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
-# symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
-# able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
-# enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1
-
-
-# Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
-# that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache
-# verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
-# the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
-# to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
-# that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
-# symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete,
-# race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
-# will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
-# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1
-kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15
-
-# if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
-# own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
-# the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
-# be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
-# will be protected in the following ways:
-# * No new writable mounts will be allowed
-# * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
-# * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
-# This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
-# it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
-# behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
-# filesystem.
-# Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-# and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
-# config or at runtime.
-# This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
-#kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1
-
-# if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
-# chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
-# system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
-# files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
-# This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
-# if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
-# tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "chroot_caps" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1
-
-#kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
-# or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
-# against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
-# again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
-# out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
-# to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
-# outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
-# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
-# mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
-# would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
-# as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
-# anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
-# they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
-# that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
-# mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
-# a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
-# works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
-# function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
-# of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
-# to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
-# It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
-# a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
-# write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
-# interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
-# connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
-# domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
-# that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
-# applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
-# The man page on chroot(2) states:
-# Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working
-# directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
-# `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
-# `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
-#
-# It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
-# any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
-# kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid,
-# getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
-# the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
-# processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
-# removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
-# is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1
-
-#
-# Kernel Auditing
-#
-
-# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
-# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
-# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
-# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "audit_group" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
-# on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
-# watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
-# entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "audit_group" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99
-
-# If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
-# other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
-# will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
-# of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
-# name "exec_logging" is created.
-# WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
-# on an active system.
-kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
-# be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
-# limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
-# created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
-kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
-# to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
-# applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
-# is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
-# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
-#kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
-# will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
-# SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
-# occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "signal_logging" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
-# This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
-# their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "timechange_logging" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1
-
-# if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
-# usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
-# denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also
-# log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
-# is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the
-# sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
-# is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1
-
-#
-# Executable Protections
-#
-
-
-# if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
-# to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
-# The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
-# identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
-# system for a targeted exploit.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1
-
# Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
-# If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
-# programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you
-# have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
-# enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
-# fine-grained exceptions.
-#
-# This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
-# processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
-# This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
-# but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl
-# option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
-# created.
-kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
-# binaries. This option is useful in environments that
-# remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
-# prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds
-# consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
-# be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
-#
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
-# is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
-# in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
-# gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
-# to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most
-# cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
-# on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the
-# same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
-# running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled,
-# a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
-# memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
-# given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
-# 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
-# that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
-# 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
-# match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
-# It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
-# with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
-# privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to
-# research by Tim Brown:
-# http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
-# who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with
-# CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "harden_ipc" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
-# supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
-# These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
-# root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
-# is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100
-
-# If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
-# decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
-# option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
-# users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
-# entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 0
-
-# If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
-# a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
-# the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
-# "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
-# Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
-# execute files in directories they own that are not group or
-# world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
-# root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-# "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1
-
-
-kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1
-
#
# Network Protections
#
@@ -455,7 +91,6 @@ net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
#net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
#net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
-
# Make sure no one can alter the routing tables
# Act as a router, necessary for Access Point
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
@@ -495,96 +130,4 @@ net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1800
# Sen SynAck retries to 3
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3
-# If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
-# destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
-# sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
-# This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
-# loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
-# makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
-# visibility against scanners.
-#
-# The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
-# blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
-# just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
-# problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
-# connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
-# end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
-# side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
-# feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
-# The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
-# can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
-# all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
-# disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
-#
-# If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
-# "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
-# While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
-# toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
-# "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4
-# prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
-# state.
-kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
-kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
-# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
-# applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1
-
-# Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
-# add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
-# specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-# with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
-# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
-# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
-# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
-# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1
-
-# Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
-# Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
-# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
-# option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201
-
-# If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
-# be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
-# able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
-# you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
-# from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
-# sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1
-
-# Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
-# Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
-# the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
-# option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
-kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99
-
-#
-# Physical Protections
-#
-
-# If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
-# will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
-# USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB
-# device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be
-# used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
-# in various USB device drivers.
-#
-# For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
-# relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros
-# as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
-kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0
-
-#
-# Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
-#
-kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0
-
# End of file
diff --git a/core/configure.html b/core/configure.html
index 90c97ea..cdb51a4 100644
--- a/core/configure.html
+++ b/core/configure.html
@@ -18,22 +18,26 @@
</pre>
<pre>
- $ export BLK_EFI=/dev/sda1
- $ export BLK_BOOT=/dev/sda2
- $ export BLK_ROOT=/dev/sda3
- $ export BLK_VAR=/dev/sda5
- $ export BLK_USR=/dev/sda7
+ $ export BLK_EFI=/dev/sda2
+ $ export BLK_BOOT=/dev/sda3
+ $ export BLK_ROOT=/dev/vg_system/lv_root
+ $ export BLK_VAR=/dev/vg_system/lv_var
- $ export BLK_HOME=/dev/sda8
+ $ export BLK_HOME=/dev/vg_system/lv_home
$ sudo mount $BLK_BOOT $CHROOT/boot
$ sudo mount $BLK_EFI $CHROOT/boot/efi
$ sudo mount $BLK_VAR $CHROOT/var
- $ sudo mount $BLK_USR $CHROOT/usr
-
$ sudo mount $BLK_HOME $CHROOT/home
</pre>
+ <p>If using separate /usr partition;</p>
+ <pre>
+ $ export BLK_USR=/dev/vg_system/lv_usr
+ $ sudo mount $BLK_USR $CHROOT/usr
+ </pre>
+
+
<p>Now you can chroot;</p>
<pre>
@@ -186,7 +190,7 @@
<pre>
# useradd -U -m -k /etc/skel -s /bin/bash username
- # usermod -G adm,wheel,audio,video username
+ # usermod -G adm,wheel,audio,input,video,users username
# passwd username
</pre>
@@ -271,7 +275,7 @@
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/exim.html b/core/exim.html
index 7e1fd28..3b86bb7 100644
--- a/core/exim.html
+++ b/core/exim.html
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.6. Exim</title>
+ <title>2.5. Exim</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1>2.6. Exim</h1>
+ <h1>2.5. Exim</h1>
- <h2 id="conf">2.6.1. Exim Configuration</h2>
+ <h2 id="conf">2.5.1. Exim Configuration</h2>
<p>Exim come with default configuration we will change to mach system settings
<a href="conf/etc/exim/exim.conf">/etc/exim/exim.conf</a>.</p>
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
$ sudo prt-get depinst mailx
</pre>
- <h2 id="cert">2.6.2. Certificates</h2>
+ <h2 id="cert">2.5.2. Certificates</h2>
<p>Exim creates a key for you if you just copy exim.conf and start daemon;</p>
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
# chmod 644 /etc/ssl/certs/exim.cert
</pre>
- <h2 id="alias">2.6.3. Aliases</h2>
+ <h2 id="alias">2.5.3. Aliases</h2>
<p>Exim come with default aliases we will change to mach system settings
<a href="conf/etc/exim/aliases">/etc/exim/aliases;</a></p>
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
####
</pre>
- <h2 id="smarthost">2.6.4. Smarthost</h2>
+ <h2 id="smarthost">2.5.4. Smarthost</h2>
<p>Tony Finch publish a nice
<a href="http://www-uxsup.csx.cam.ac.uk/~fanf2/hermes/conf/exim/etc/etc.cam/configure">configuration reference</a>.
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
# exim -bt bob@remote.com
</pre>
- <h2 id="fetchmail">2.6. Fetchmail</h2>
+ <h2 id="fetchmail">2.5. Fetchmail</h2>
<pre>
$ prt-get depinst fetchmail
diff --git a/core/hardening.html b/core/hardening.html
index 1455398..d94cda6 100644
--- a/core/hardening.html
+++ b/core/hardening.html
@@ -2,30 +2,146 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.2. Hardening</title>
+ <title>2.6. Hardening</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1>2.2. Hardening</h1>
+ <h1>2.6. Hardening</h1>
- <p>Check <a href="apparmor.html">apparmor</a>,
- <a href="sysctl.html">sysctl</a>,
- <a href="toolchain.html">toolchain</a> and
- <a href="samhain.html">samhain</a> before running tests.</p>
+ <h2>2.6.0.2 System security</h2>
- <p>Mount some filesystems in read only</p>
- <p>Check processes running as root</p>
- <p>Check processes users premissions</p>
+ <dl>
+ <dt>File systems</dt>
+ <dd>Check <a href="install.html#fstab">fstab</a> and current mount options. Mount filesystems in read only, only strict necessary in rw.</dd>
+ <dt>Sys</dt>
+ <dd>Check kernel settings with <a href="sysctl.html">sysctl</a>.</dd>
+ <dd>kernel.yama.ptrace_scope breaks gdb, strace, perf trace and reptyr.</dd>
+ <dt>Iptables</dt>
+ <dd>Check if <a href="network.html#iptables">iptables</a> rules are loaded and are correctly logging.(firewald works as API to iptables).</dd>
+ <dt>Apparmor</dt>
+ <dd>Check if <a href="apparmor.html">apparmor</a> is active and enforcing policies.</dd>
+ <dt>Samhain</dt>
+ <dd>Check if <a href="samhain.html">samhain</a> is running.</dd>
+ <dt>Toolchain</dt>
+ <dd>Build ports using hardened <a href="toolchain.html">toolchain</a> settings.</dd>
+ </dl>
+
+
+ <pre>
+ $ sudo prt-get depinst checksec
+ </pre>
+
+ <h2>2.6.0.1 System configuration</h2>
+
+ <h3>1.1 - Users groups, passwords and sudo.</h3>
+
+ <p>Check "normal" users groups, make sure they are not admin or wheel group; ps -U root -u root u, ps axl | awk '$7 != 0 &amp;&amp; $10 !~ "Z"', process permission; ps -o gid,rdig,supgid -p "$pid"</p>
+
+ <p>Maintain, secure with hash, and enforce secure passwords with pam-cracklib.</p>
+
+
+ <h3>1.2 - Linux PAM</h3>
+
+ <p>Cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth. Check pam modules, test on virtual machine, user can lockout during tests.</p>
+
+ <p>Check files (processes) set uid and set gid;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # find / -perm -4000 >> /root/setuid_files
+ # find / -perm 2000 >> /root/setguid_files
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>To setuid (4744);</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # chmod u+s filename
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>To remove (0664) from su and Xorg (user must be part of input and video for xorg to run);</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # chmod u-s /usr/bin/su
+ # chmod u-s /usr/bin/X
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>To set gid (2744)</p>
+ <pre>
+ # chmod g+s filename
+ </pre>
+ <p>To remove (0774);</p>
+ <pre>
+ # chmod g-s filename
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Check files (processes); getfacl filename.</p>
+ , disable admins and root from sshd.</p>
+
+ <h3>1.3. Capabilities</h3>
+
+ <p>Check capabilities;</p>
+ <pre>
+ # getcap filename
+ </pre>
+
+ <dd>1.9 - Limit number of processes.</dd>
+ <dd>1.10 - Lock user after 3 failed loggins.</dd>
+ <dd>1.8 - Block host ip based on iptable and services
+ abuse.</dd>
+ </dl>
+
+ <h3>1.4 Sudo</h3>
+
+ <p>Check sudo, sudoers and sudo replay.</p>
+
+ <p>Don't run editor as root, instead run sudoedit filename or sudo --edit filename. Editor can be set as a environment variable;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ export SUDO_EDITOR=vim
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Set rvim as default on sudo config;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # visudo
+
+ Defaults editor=/usr/bin/rvim
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Once sudo is correctly configured, disable root login;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # passwd --lock root
+ </pre>
+
+ <h3>1.5 Auditd</h3>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ prt-get depinst audit
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Example audit when file /etc/passwd get modified;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ auditctl -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k passwd_changes
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Audit when a module get's loaded;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # auditctl -w /sbin/insmod -p x -k module_insertion
+ </pre>
+
+ <h2>2.6.0.2 Lynis</h2>
<pre>
- $ sudo prt-get depinst checksec lynis
+ $ sudo prt-get depinst lynis
</pre>
- <p>Lynis gives a view of system overall configuration, without changing
- default profile it runs irrelevant tests. Create a lynis profile by
- coping default one and run lynis;</p>
+ <p>Lynis gives a view of system overall configuration,
+ without changing default profile it runs irrelevant tests.
+ Create a lynis profile by coping default one and run lynis;</p>
<pre>
$ sudo cp /etc/lynis/default.prf /etc/lynis/custom.prf
@@ -44,7 +160,7 @@
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/index.html b/core/index.html
index 87330b1..20e50af 100644
--- a/core/index.html
+++ b/core/index.html
@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
<li><a href="configure.html#locale">1.2.3. Set lacale</a></li>
<li><a href="configure.html#user">1.2.4. Users</a></li>
<li><a href="configure.html#fstab">1.2.5. File system table</a></li>
- <li><a href="configure.html#rcconf">1.2.6. Initialization Scripts</a></li>
+ <li><a href="configure.html#rcconf">1.2.6. Initialization scripts</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="ports.html">1.3. Ports</a>
<ul>
- <li><a href="ports.html#filesystem">1.3.1. Ports Layout</a></li>
+ <li><a href="ports.html#filesystem">1.3.1. Ports layout</a></li>
<li><a href="ports.html#fakeroot">1.3.2. Build as user</a></li>
<li><a href="ports.html#pkgmk">1.3.3. Configure pkgmk</a></li>
<li><a href="ports.html#prtget">1.3.4. Configure prt-get</a></li>
+ <li><a href="ports.html#distcc">1.3.5. Ccache and distcc</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
@@ -103,48 +104,47 @@
<li><a href="linux.html#remove">2.1.6. Remove</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
- <li><a href="hardening.html">2.2. Hardening</a>
+ <li><a href="network.html">2.2. Network</a>
<ul>
- <li><a href="apparmor.html">2.2.1. AppArmor</a></li>
- <li><a href="sysctl.html">2.2.2. Sysctl</a></li>
- <li><a href="toolchain.html">2.2.3. Toolchain</a></li>
- <li><a href="samhain.html">2.2.4. Samhain</a></li>
+ <li><a href="network.html#resolv">2.2.1. Resolver</a></li>
+ <li><a href="network.html#static">2.2.2. Static ip</a></li>
+ <li><a href="network.html#iptables">2.2.3. Iptables</a></li>
+ <li><a href="network.html#wpa">2.2.4. Wpa and dhcpd</a></li>
+ <li><a href="network.html#nm">2.2.5. NetworkManager</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
- <li><a href="network.html">2.3. Network</a>
+ <li><a href="package.html">2.3. Package Management</a>
<ul>
- <li><a href="network.html#resolv">2.3.1. Resolver</a></li>
- <li><a href="network.html#static">2.3.2. Static ip</a></li>
- <li><a href="network.html#iptables">2.3.3. Iptables</a></li>
- <li><a href="network.html#wpa">2.3.4. Wpa and dhcpd</a></li>
+ <li><a href="package.html#sysup">2.3.1. Update system</a></li>
+ <li><a href="package.html#depinst">2.3.2. Install ports and dependencies</a></li>
+ <li><a href="package.html#ports">2.3.3. Ports collections</a></li>
+ <li><a href="package.html#info">2.3.3. Show port information</a></li>
+ <li><a href="package.html#depends">2.3.4. Show port dependencies</a></li>
+ <li><a href="package.html#printf">2.3.5. Print information</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
-
- <li><a href="package.html">2.4. Package Management</a>
+ <li><a href="tty-terminal.html">2.4. Terminals and shells</a>
<ul>
- <li><a href="package.html#sysup">2.4.1. Update system</a></li>
- <li><a href="package.html#depinst">2.4.2. Install ports and dependencies</a></li>
- <li><a href="package.html#ports">2.4.3. Ports collections</a></li>
- <li><a href="package.html#info">2.4.3. Show port information</a></li>
- <li><a href="package.html#depends">2.4.4. Show port dependencies</a></li>
- <li><a href="package.html#printf">2.4.5. Print information</a></li>
+ <li><a href="dash.html">2.4.1. Dash</a></li>
+ <li><a href="bash.html">2.4.2. Bash</a></li>
+ <li><a href="tmux.html">2.4.3. Tmux</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
-
- <li><a href="tty-terminal.html">2.5. Terminals and shells</a>
+ <li><a href="exim.html">2.5. Exim</a>
<ul>
- <li><a href="dash.html">2.5.1. Dash</a></li>
- <li><a href="bash.html">2.5.2. Bash</a></li>
- <li><a href="tmux.html">2.5.3. Tmux</a></li>
+ <li><a href="exim.html#conf">2.5.1. Exim configuration</a></li>
+ <li><a href="exim.html#cert">2.5.2. Certificates</a></li>
+ <li><a href="exim.html#alias">2.5.3. Aliases</a></li>
+ <li><a href="exim.html#smarthost">2.5.4. Smarthost</a></li>
+ <li><a href="exim.html#fetchmail">2.5.5. Fetchmail</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
- <li><a href="exim.html">2.6. Exim</a>
+ <li><a href="hardening.html">2.6. Hardening</a>
<ul>
- <li><a href="exim.html#conf">2.6.1. Exim configuration</a></li>
- <li><a href="exim.html#cert">2.6.2. Certificates</a></li>
- <li><a href="exim.html#alias">2.6.3. Aliases</a></li>
- <li><a href="exim.html#smarthost">2.6.4. Smarthost</a></li>
- <li><a href="exim.html#fetchmail">2.6.5. Fetchmail</a></li>
+ <li><a href="apparmor.html">2.6.1. AppArmor</a></li>
+ <li><a href="sysctl.html">2.6.2. Sysctl</a></li>
+ <li><a href="toolchain.html">2.6.3. Toolchain</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samhain.html">2.6.4. Samhain</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
diff --git a/core/install.html b/core/install.html
index 69a82cf..1526c12 100644
--- a/core/install.html
+++ b/core/install.html
@@ -43,13 +43,14 @@
<h2 id="step2">1.1.2. Prepare target</h2>
<p>Prepare disk or target location where new system will
- be installed. Follow steps describe how to create efi and
- separate partitions such as;
- bios grub, EFI, boot, root, var, usr, swap and home.
+ be installed. Follow steps describe how to create efi system,
+ for bios_boot systems is only needed the boot partition in
+ the beginning of the disk and can use ext4 file system for example.
For more information about gpt partitions table read
- <a href="http://devil-detail.blogspot.com/2013/07/install-grub2-on-gpt-disk-dedicated-partition.html">devil-detail grub2 on gpt</a>.
- Script <a href="scripts/setup-target.sh">setup-target.sh</a>
- creates follow partitions;</p>
+ <a href="http://devil-detail.blogspot.com/2013/07/install-grub2-on-gpt-disk-dedicated-partition.html">devil-detail grub2 on gpt</a>. Script <a href="scripts/setup-target.sh">setup-target.sh</a> help to create partitions
+ scripts.</p>
+
+ </p>
<p>Create gpt label and set unit size to use;</p>
@@ -93,14 +94,40 @@
<h3>/</h3>
+ <p>There are different ways to achieve disk encryption,
+ the method described uses cryptosetup to create cryptodevice
+ with <a href="../tools/lvm.html">lvm</a> inside containing
+ root and other partitions such as;
+ var, usr, swap and home.
+
+ <pre>
+ (parted) mkpart primary 1132 100%
+ (parted) set 4 lvm on
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Create encrypted block for lvm;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # modprobe dm-crypt
+ # cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda4
+ # cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sda4 cryptlvm
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Create physical group and volume group;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
+ # vgcreate vg_system /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
+ </pre>
+
<p>Core collection installation on root partition uses
approximately 2G. Partition with 8G-20G is recommended
for a server or desktop with dedicated ports partition
or using only compiled packages. Partition size 20G;</p>
+
<pre>
- (parted) mkpart primary ext4 1132 21132
- (parted) name 4 root
+ # lvcreate -L 20G -n lv_root vg_system
</pre>
<h3>/var</h3>
@@ -109,8 +136,7 @@
system is configured. Partition size 2G;</p>
<pre>
- (parted) mkpart primary ext4 21132 23132
- (parted) name 5 var
+ # lvcreate -L 2G -n lv_var vg_system
</pre>
<h3>Swap (ram)</h3>
@@ -119,27 +145,19 @@
memory ram, ports system will be configured to build on ram.
To build firefox is necessary at least 34G. Partition size 4G;</p>
- <p>Is better to create swap partition later using
- <a href="../tools/lvm.html">lvm</a>.</p>
-
<pre>
- (parted) mkpart primary linux-swap 23132 27132
- (parted) name 6 swap
+ # lvcreate -L 4G -n lv_swap vg_system
</pre>
<h3>/home</h3>
- <p>Home partition on desktop fill the rest of disk
- space while on server this partition can be unnecessary.
+ <p>On desktop fill the rest of disk space while on server
+ this partition can be replaced with /srv.
Fill the rest of disk space;</p>
- <p>Is better to create home partition later using
- <a href="../tools/lvm.html">lvm</a>.</p>
-
<pre>
- (parted) mkpart primary ext4 27132 100%
- (parted) name 7 home
+ # lvcreate -L 120G -n lv_home vg_system
</pre>
<h3>Create filesystems</h3>
@@ -147,32 +165,33 @@
<pre>
$ sudo mkfs.fat -F 32 /dev/sda2
$ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda3
- $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda4
- $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda5
- $ sudo mkswap /dev/sda6
- $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda7
+ $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/vg_system/lv_root
+ $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/vg_system/lv_var
+ $ sudo mkswap /dev/vg_system/lv_swap
+ $ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/vg_system/lv_home
</pre>
<h2 id="step3">1.1.3. Prepare Install</h2>
<p>From now on script
- <a href="scripts/setup-install.sh">setup-install.sh</a>
- create file systems, install packages, configure host
- metadata and setup ports;</p>
+ <a href="scripts/setup-target.sh">setup-target.sh</a>
+ create file systems, <a href="scripts/install-core.sh">install-core.sh</a> install core packages and
+ <a href="scripts/setup-core.sh">setup-core.sh</a>
+ configure host metadata and setup ports;</p>
- <p>Export target root partition;</p>
+ <p>Export target root partition;</p>
- <pre>
- $ export BLK_ROOT=/dev/sda
- </pre>
+ <pre>
+ $ export BLK_ROOT=/dev/vg_system/lv_root
+ </pre>
- <p>Export target root directory you want to install;</p>
+ <p>Export target root directory you want to install;</p>
<pre>
$ export CHROOT=/mnt
</pre>
- <p>If you are installing to a directory and not partitions you don't need to mount;</p>
+ <p>If you are installing to a directory and not partitions you don't need to mount;</p>
<pre>
$ sudo mount $BLK_ROOT $CHROOT
@@ -191,11 +210,11 @@
$ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/tmp
$ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/proc
$ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/sys
- </pre>
+ </pre>
- <p>If partition layout is different or target is a directory is not necessary to mount, create only the directories;</p>
+ <p>If partition layout is different or target is a directory is not necessary to mount, create only the directories;</p>
- <pre>
+ <pre>
$ sudo mount $BLK_BOOT $CHROOT/boot
$ sudo mkdir -p $CHROOT/boot/efi
$ sudo mount $BLK_EFI $CHROOT/boot/efi
@@ -296,6 +315,17 @@
pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/efivar#*
pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/efibootmgr#*
pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/dosfstools#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/ported#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libgcrypt#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/cryptsetup#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/popt#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libgpg-error#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libevent#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/libtirpc#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/git#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/tmux#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/prt-utils#*
+ pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/elfutils#*
</pre>
<pre>
@@ -343,7 +373,7 @@
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/network.html b/core/network.html
index 5913845..4a412ad 100644
--- a/core/network.html
+++ b/core/network.html
@@ -2,14 +2,15 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.3. Network</title>
+ <title>2.2. Network</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1>2.3. Network</h1>
+ <h1>2.2. Network</h1>
- <p>Operation of the network can be handle with init scripts;</p>
+ <p>Operation of the network can be handle with init scripts or with
+ <a href="#nm">network manager</a>;</p>
<dl>
<dt><a href="conf/rc.d/iptables">/etc/rc.d/iptables</a></dt>
@@ -24,11 +25,13 @@
<dd>Configure Wireless interface, launch wpa_supplicant to handle
wireless authenticationand dynamic (dhcp)
connection to router and add as default gateway.</dd>
+ <dt><a href="conf/rc.d/wlan">/etc/rc.d/networkmanager</a></dt>
+ <dd>Use network manager to handle connections.</dd>
</dl>
- <p>Choose wireless or net as connection to outside world and configure
- <a href="conf/rc.conf">/etc/rc.conf</a> to run at startup, example
- connecting using wireless interface;</p>
+ <p>Choose wireless (wlan), cable network (net) or network manager in
+ <a href="conf/rc.conf">/etc/rc.conf</a> to handle configuration of the
+ network at startup, example using network manager;</p>
<pre>
#
@@ -40,7 +43,7 @@
TIMEZONE="Europe/Lisbon"
HOSTNAME=machine
SYSLOG=sysklogd
- SERVICES=(lo iptables wlan crond)
+ SERVICES=(lo iptables networkmanager crond)
# End of file
</pre>
@@ -49,7 +52,7 @@
described scripts then proceed to
<a href="package.html#sysup">update system.</a></p>
- <h2 id="resolv">2.3.1. Resolver</h2>
+ <h2 id="resolv">2.2.1. Resolver</h2>
<p>This example will use
<a href="http://www.chaoscomputerclub.de/en/censorship/dns-howto">Chaos Computer Club</a>
@@ -57,7 +60,7 @@
<pre>
# /etc/resolv.conf.head can replace this line
- nameserver 213.73.91.35
+ nameserver 2.2.73.91.35
# /etc/resolv.conf.tail can replace this line
</pre>
@@ -65,7 +68,7 @@
# chattr +i /etc/resolv.conf
</pre>
- <h2 id="static">2.3.2. Static IP</h2>
+ <h2 id="static">2.2.2. Static IP</h2>
<p>Current example of <a href="conf/rc.d/net">/etc/rc.d/net</a>;</p>
@@ -112,37 +115,11 @@
# ip route add default via ${GW}
</pre>
- <h2 id="iptables">2.3.3. Iptables</h2>
+ <h2 id="iptables">2.2.3. Iptables</h2>
<p>For more information about firewall systems read arch wiki
<a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Iptables">iptables</a>
- an <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/nftables">nftables</a>.</p>
-
- <p>To setup iptables rules a set of scripts is used, init script
- <a href="conf/rc.d/iptables">/etc/rc.d/iptables</a>
- loads set of rules from file /etc/iptables/net.v4 at boot time.
- Start option "open" option allows everything to outside
- and blocks everything from outside, "stop" will block and log
- everything. Setup init script and rules ;</p>
-
- <pre>
- # mkdir /etc/iptables
- # cp core/conf/iptables/net.v4 /etc/iptables/
- # cp core/conf/rc.d/iptables /etc/rc.d/
- # chmod +x /etc/rc.d/iptables
- </pre>
-
- <p>Change /etc/rc.conf and add iptables;</p>
-
- <pre>
- SERVICES=(iptables lo net crond)
- </pre>
-
- <p>See current rules and packets counts;</p>
-
- <pre>
- # iptables -L -n -v | less
- </pre>
+ and <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/nftables">nftables</a>.</p>
<p>Diagram of a package route throw iptables;</p>
@@ -286,74 +263,44 @@
-c, --set-counters packets bytes
</pre>
- <h3 id="ipt_server">2.3.3.1. Server iptables</h3>
-
- <p>Adjust <a href="scripts/iptables.sh">iptables.sh</a> with
- your network configuration then run it;</p>
-
- <p>Default configuration;</p>
+ <p>See current rules and packets counts;</p>
<pre>
- server)
-
- echo "Setting server network..."
- ####### Input Chain ######
- $IPT -A INPUT -j blocker
-
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${DNS} -j cli_dns_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_https_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -s ${BR_NET} -j srv_git_in
- $IPT -A INPUT -i ${PUB_IF} -d ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_in
-
- ####### Output Chain ######
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -j blocker
-
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${DNS} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_dns_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_https_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_ssh_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -d ${BR_NET} -s ${PUB_IP} -j srv_git_out
- $IPT -A OUTPUT -o ${PUB_IF} -s ${PUB_IP} -j cli_https_out
+ # iptables -L -n -v | less
+ </pre>
- ## log everything else and drop
- iptables_log
+ <h3 id="ipt_scripts">2.2.3.1. Iptable scripts</h3>
- iptables-save > /etc/iptables/net.v4
- exit 0
+ <p>Scripts help to setup iptables rules so they can be saved using iptables-save
+ and later restored using iptables-restore utilities. Init script
+ <a href="conf/rc.d/iptables">/etc/rc.d/iptables</a>
+ loads set of rules from /etc/iptables folder at boot time.
+ Start option "open" option allows everything to outside
+ and blocks new connections from outside, "stop" will block and log
+ everything.</p>
- ;;
- </pre>
+ <p>Setup init script and rules;</p>
<pre>
- # bash core/scripts/iptables.sh
+ # mkdir /etc/iptables
+ # cp core/conf/iptables/net.v4 /etc/iptables/
+ # cp core/conf/rc.d/iptables /etc/rc.d/
+ # chmod +x /etc/rc.d/iptables
</pre>
- <h3 id="ipt_client">2.3.3.2. Client iptables </h3>
-
- <p></p>
- <h3 id="ipt_client">2.3.3.3. Bridge iptables</h3>
+ <p>Change /etc/rc.conf and add iptables;</p>
<pre>
- $IPT -A FORWARD -j blocker
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
- $IPT -A FORWARD -o lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
-
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -d ${BR_NET} -j srv_ssh_in
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_ssh_out
-
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_https_in
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_https_out
-
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_rip
+ SERVICES=(iptables lo net crond)
+ </pre>
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j srv_dhcp
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j srv_dhcp
+ <p>Change <a href="conf/rc.d/iptables">/etc/rc.d/iptables</a> and define type; server, bridge or open.</p>
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in tap2 --physdev-out ${PUB_IF} -j cli_https_out
- $IPT -A FORWARD -i ${BR_IF} -o ${BR_IF} -m physdev --physdev-in ${PUB_IF} --physdev-out tap2 -j cli_https_in
- <pre>
+ <p>Adjust <a href="conf/ipt-conf.sh">/etc/iptables/ipt-conf.sh</a>
+ with your network configuration, and adjust
+ <a href="conf/ipt-server.sh">/etc/iptables/ipt-server.sh</a>, <a href="conf/ipt-bridge.sh">/etc/iptables/ipt-bridge.sh</a>, <a href="conf/ipt-open.sh">/etc/iptables/ipt-open.sh</a> according with host necessities.</p>
- <h2 id="wpa">2.3.4. Wpa and dhcpd</h2>
+ <h2 id="wpa">2.2.4. Wpa and dhcpd</h2>
<p>There is more information on
<a href="http://crux.nu/Wiki/WifiStartScripts">Wiki Wifi Start Scripts</a> and
@@ -371,7 +318,7 @@
# iwconfig wlp2s0 essid NAME key s:ABCDE12345
</pre>
- <h3>2.3.4.1. Wpa Supplicant</h3>
+ <h3>2.2.4.1. Wpa Supplicant</h3>
<p>Configure wpa supplicant edit;</p>
@@ -401,7 +348,7 @@
init script to auto load wpa configuration and dhcp
client.</p>
- <h3>2.3.4.2. Wpa Cli</h3>
+ <h3>2.2.4.2. Wpa Cli</h3>
<pre>
# wpa_cli
@@ -440,11 +387,39 @@
&gt; save_config
</pre>
+ <h2 id="nm">2.2.5. Network Manager</h2>
+
+ <p>Wifi status;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ nmcli radio wifi
+ $ nmcli radio wifi on
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>List wifi networks;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ nmcli device wifi rescan
+ $ nmcli device wifi list
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Connect to a wifi network;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ nmcli device wifi connect "network name" password "network password"
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Edit and save network configuration;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ $ nmcli connection edit "network name"
+ nmcli> save persistent
+ </pre>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>
This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/package.html b/core/package.html
index e0f8eae..974ead2 100644
--- a/core/package.html
+++ b/core/package.html
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.4. Package Management</title>
+ <title>2.3. Package Management</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1>2.4. Package Management</h1>
+ <h1>2.3. Package Management</h1>
<p>For more information read crux handbook Package management
front-end:
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
$ prt-get depinst prt-utils prt-get-bashcompletion
</pre>
- <h2 id="sysup">2.4.1. Update System</h2>
+ <h2 id="sysup">2.3.1. Update System</h2>
<p>Before build software get latest version of port collections;</p>
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
$ prt-get update -fr $(revdep)
</pre>
- <h2 id="depinst">2.4.2. Install port and dependencies</h2>
+ <h2 id="depinst">2.3.2. Install port and dependencies</h2>
<p>Installing using prt-get tool;</p>
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@
$ sudo pkgadd /usr/ports/packages/git#2.9.3-1.pkg.tar.gz
</pre>
- <p>If you user pkgmk and pkgadd allways check if README, pre and post
+ <p>If you user pkgmk and pkgadd allways check if README, pre and post
instal files exist.</p>
- <h3 id="ports">2.4.3. Ports collections</h3>
+ <h3 id="ports">2.3.3. Ports collections</h3>
<p>Clone this documentation;</p>
@@ -132,23 +132,21 @@
prtdir /usr/ports/contrib
# ports described on this documentation
- prtdir /usr/ports/machine-ports
+ prtdir /usr/ports/ports
# 6c37 team provides a collection with freetype-iu, fontconfig-iu
# and cairo-iu ports.
- prtdir /usr/ports/6c37-dropin
- prtdir /usr/ports/6c37
+ # prtdir /usr/ports/6c37-dropin
+ # prtdir /usr/ports/6c37
</pre>
<p>Get new ports;</p>
<pre>
- $ sudo ports -u machine-ports
- $ sudo ports -u 6c37-dropin
- $ sudo ports -u 6c37
+ $ sudo ports -u ports
</pre>
- <h2 id="info">2.4.4. Show port information</h2>
+ <h2 id="info">2.3.4. Show port information</h2>
<pre>
$ prt-get info port_name
@@ -166,13 +164,13 @@
$ pkginfo -o filename
</pre>
- <h2 id="depends">2.4.5. Show port dependencies</h2>
+ <h2 id="depends">2.3.5. Show port dependencies</h2>
<pre>
$ prt-get depends port_name
</pre>
- <h2 id="printf">2.4.6. Print information</h2>
+ <h2 id="printf">2.3.6. Print information</h2>
<p>Example how to get ports installed from contrib. Maybe there is
a "cleaner" way to this, for now is ok;</p>
@@ -183,7 +181,7 @@
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/ports.html b/core/ports.html
index e921351..9d2f989 100644
--- a/core/ports.html
+++ b/core/ports.html
@@ -76,10 +76,11 @@
# /etc/pkgmk.conf: pkgmk(8) configuration
#
- export CFLAGS="-O2 -g -march=x86-64 -pipe"
+ export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=x86-64"
export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
- # export MAKEFLAGS="-j2"
+ export JOBS=$(nproc)
+ export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS"
case ${PKGMK_ARCH} in
"64"|"")
@@ -96,14 +97,16 @@
;;
esac
- #PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(http://machine.example.org/ports/distfiles/)
+ PKGMK_SOURCE_MIRRORS=(https://hive.gnu.systems/mirror-3.4/distfiles/)
# PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="$PWD"
PKGMK_SOURCE_DIR="/usr/ports/distfiles"
# PKGMK_PACKAGE_DIR="$PWD"
PKGMK_PACKAGE_DIR="/usr/ports/packages"
# PKGMK_WORK_DIR="$PWD/work"
- PKGMK_WORK_DIR="/usr/ports/work/$name"
+ PKGMK_WORK_DIR="/usr/ports/work/${name}"
# PKGMK_DOWNLOAD="no"
+ # PKGMK_IGNORE_SIGNATURE="no"
+ # PKGMK_IGNORE_MD5SUM="no"
# PKGMK_IGNORE_FOOTPRINT="no"
# PKGMK_IGNORE_NEW="no"
# PKGMK_NO_STRIP="no"
@@ -136,19 +139,16 @@
# note: the order matters: the package found first is used
prtdir /usr/ports/core
prtdir /usr/ports/opt
- prtdir /usr/ports/contrib
- prtdir /usr/ports/ports
prtdir /usr/ports/xorg
- # 6c37 team provides a collection with freetype-iu, fontconfig-iu
- # and cairo-iu ports.
-
# the following line enables the multilib compat-32 collection
#prtdir /usr/ports/compat-32
# the following line enables the user maintained contrib collection
- # prtdir /usr/ports/6c37-dropin
- # prtdir /usr/ports/6c37
+ prtdir /usr/ports/contrib
+ prtdir /usr/ports/ports
+ prtdir /usr/ports/mate
+ prtdir /usr/ports/kde5
### use mypackage form local directory
# prtdir /home/packages/build:mypackage
@@ -157,18 +157,18 @@
writelog enabled # (enabled|disabled)
logmode overwrite # (append|overwrite)
rmlog_on_success yes # (no|yes)
- logfile /usr/ports/pkgbuild/%n-%v-%r.log
+ logfile /usr/ports/pkgbuild/%n.log
# path, %p=path to port dir, %n=port name
# %v=version, %r=release
### use alternate cache file (default: /var/lib/pkg/prt-get.cache
# cachefile /mnt/nfs/cache
- ### print readme information:
+ ### print README information:
readme verbose # (verbose|compact|disabled)
### prefer higher versions in sysup / diff
- preferhigher no # (yes|no)
+ preferhigher yes # (yes|no)
### use regexp search
# useregex no # (yes|no)
@@ -177,20 +177,87 @@
### --install-scripts option
runscripts yes # (no|yes)
-
### expert section ###
### alternative commands
- makecommand sudo -h -u pkgmk fakeroot pkgmk
+ makecommand sudo -H -u pkgmk fakeroot pkgmk
addcommand sudo pkgadd
removecommand sudo pkgrm
runscriptcommand sudo sh
</pre>
+ <h2 id="distcc">1.3.5. Ccache and distcc</h2>
+
+ <p>Ccache avoids same code to be compiled by saving
+ the output from compilers and identifying same
+ input by using hashes and distcc distributes
+ compiling process across machines.</p>
+
+ <p>Don't set native or generic on /etc/pkgmk.conf.</p>
+ <pre>
+ $ prt-get depinst ccache distcc
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Configure pkgmk and define number of cores available,
+ in this example get dynamically Edit
+ <a href="conf/pkgmk.conf">/etc/pkgmk.conf</a> and
+ set ccaching directory and instructs to use distcc
+ backend;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # ccache settings
+ export PATH="/usr/lib/ccache/:$PATH"
+ export CCACHE_DIR="/usr/ports/ccache"
+ export CCACHE_PREFIX="distcc"
+ export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK="%compiler% -dumpversion; crux"
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Set distcc hosts and respective number of
+ cpu cores to send work, hosts names, exp; "worker" must
+ be configured on /etc/hosts.</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ ### compile using distcc without ccache
+ ##export PATH="/usr/lib/distcc/:$PATH"
+ ##export DISTCC_HOSTS="localhost/4,lzo,cpp xborg/4,lzo,cpp"
+ ##export PUMP_BUILD=yes
+
+ # distcc settings
+ export JOBS=$(/usr/bin/distcc -j 2> /dev/null)
+ export DISTCC_DIR="/usr/ports/distcc"
+ export MAKEFLAGS="-j ${JOBS}"
+ export SCONSFLAGS="$MAKEFLAGS"
+
+ # local compile only
+ #export JOBS=$(nproc)
+ #export MAKEFLAGS="-j $JOBS"
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Configure distcc daemon, edit
+ /etc/rc.d/distccd;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ #!/usr/bin/env bash
+ #
+ # /etc/rc.d/distccd: start/stop distcc daemon
+ #
+
+ . /etc/distcc.conf
+ if [ -z "$DISTCC_ALLOW" ]; then
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Create /etc/distcc.conf;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ DISTCC_ALLOW="10.0.0.0/8"
+ DISTCC_USER="pkgmk"
+ DISTCC_LOG_LEVEL="info"
+ </pre>
+
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>
This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/samhain.html b/core/samhain.html
index d28a6d2..a209864 100644
--- a/core/samhain.html
+++ b/core/samhain.html
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.2.4. Samhain</title>
+ <title>2.6.4. Samhain</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1 id="samhain">2.2.4. Samhain</h1>
+ <h1 id="samhain">2.6.4. Samhain</h1>
<p>Read
<a href="http://www.la-samhna.de/samhain/manual/">Samhain Manual</a>,
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
<dd>log file</dd>
</dl>
- <h2 id="conf">2.2.4.1. Configure</h2>
+ <h2 id="conf">2.6.4.1. Configure</h2>
<p>For more information on configuration check
<a href="http://www.la-samhna.de/samhain/manual/filedef.htm">Monitoring Policies</a>.
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@
# samhain status
</pre>
- <h2 id="updatedb">2.2.4.2. Update database</h2>
+ <h2 id="updatedb">2.6.4.2. Update database</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.la-samhna.de/samhain/manual/updating-the-file-signature-database.html">Manual</a>,
You can update the database while the daemon is running, as long
diff --git a/core/scripts/setup-target.sh b/core/scripts/setup-target.sh
index ecbe018..69b8640 100755
--- a/core/scripts/setup-target.sh
+++ b/core/scripts/setup-target.sh
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh
-DEV=/dev
+DEV=/dev/sda
+VG=vg_system
SETUP_TARGET="print"
CHROOT="/mnt"
@@ -13,22 +14,21 @@ SCRIPTPATH=$(dirname "$SCRIPT")
DIR=$(dirname "$SCRIPTPATH");
DIR_LOCAL="$(dirname $(dirname ${DIR}))/local";
-ISO_FILE="${DIR_LOCAL}/crux-3.4.iso"
-
##read BLK_EFI
BLK_EFI="${DEV}2"
##read BLK_BOOT
BLK_BOOT="${DEV}3"
##read BLK_ROOT
-BLK_ROOT="${DEV}4"
+BLK_CRYPT="${DEV}4"
+BLK_ROOT="/dev/$VG/lv_root"
##read BLK_VAR
-BLK_VAR="${DEV}5"
+BLK_VAR="/dev/${VG}/lv_var"
##read BLK_USR
-BLK_USR="${DEV}6"
+#BLK_USR="${DEV}6"
##read BLK_SWP
-BLK_SWP="${DEV}7"
+BLK_SWP="/dev/${VG}/lv_swap"
##read BLK_HOME
-BLK_HOME="${DEV}8"
+BLK_HOME="/dev/${VG}/lv_home"
# First we define the function
@@ -64,16 +64,21 @@ partition_target () {
set 2 boot on \
mkpart primary ext4 125 1128 \
name 3 boot \
- mkpart primary ext4 1128 5128 \
- name 4 root \
- mkpart primary ext4 5128 6128 \
- name 5 var \
- mkpart primary ext4 6128 14128 \
- name 6 usr \
- mkpart primary linux-swap 14128 18128 \
- name 7 swap \
- mkpart primary ext4 18128 100% \
- name 8 home
+ mkpart primary 1128 100% \
+ set 4 lvm on
+
+ modprobe dm-crypt
+ cryptsetup luksFormat ${BLK_CRYPT}
+ cryptsetup luksOpen ${BLK_CRYPT} cryptlvm
+
+ pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
+ vgcreate ${VG} /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
+
+ lvcreate -L 20G -n lv_root ${VG}
+ lvcreate -L 4G -n lv_var ${VG}
+ lvcreate -L 8G -n lv_swap ${VG}
+ lvcreate -L 120G -n lv_home ${VG}
+
}
mount_target () {
@@ -85,8 +90,8 @@ mount_target () {
mkfs.ext4 $BLK_ROOT
echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_VAR with ext4:"
mkfs.ext4 $BLK_VAR
- echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_USR with ext4:"
- mkfs.ext4 $BLK_USR
+ #echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_USR with ext4:"
+ #mkfs.ext4 $BLK_USR
echo "1.1.2 Creating Swap File System on $BLK_SWP:"
mkswap $BLK_SWP
echo "1.1.2 Creating File System on $BLK_HOME with ext4:"
@@ -104,8 +109,8 @@ mount_target () {
mkdir -p $CHROOT/var
mount $BLK_VAR $CHROOT/var
- mkdir -p $CHROOT/usr
- mount $BLK_USR $CHROOT/usr
+ #mkdir -p $CHROOT/usr
+ #mount $BLK_USR $CHROOT/usr
mkdir -p $CHROOT/home
mount $BLK_HOME $CHROOT/home
@@ -152,16 +157,16 @@ enable_target () {
print_target() {
echo "Device: $DEV"
echo "CHROOT: $CHROOT"
- echo "ISO_FILE: $ISO_FILE"
- echo "Option Selected: $SETUP_TARGET\n"
+ echo "Option Selected: $SETUP_TARGET"
echo "1.1.2 EFI block; ($BLK_EFI)"
echo "1.1.2 boot block; ($BLK_BOOT)"
+ echo "1.1.2 cryptlvm block; ($BLK_CRYPT)"
echo "1.1.2 root block; ($BLK_ROOT)"
echo "1.1.2 var block; ($BLK_VAR)"
echo "1.1.2 usr block; ($BLK_USR)"
echo "1.1.2 swap block; ($BLK_SWP)"
- echo "1.1.2 home block; ($BLK_HOME)\n"
+ echo "1.1.2 home block; ($BLK_HOME)"
}
diff --git a/core/sysctl.html b/core/sysctl.html
index d06afde..afee463 100644
--- a/core/sysctl.html
+++ b/core/sysctl.html
@@ -2,24 +2,18 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.2.2. Sysctl</title>
+ <title>2.6.2. Sysctl</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1 id="sysctl">2.2.2. Sysctl</h1>
+ <h1 id="sysctl">2.6.2. Sysctl</h1>
<p>Sysctl references
<a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/sysctl#TCP.2FIP_stack_hardening">Arch TCP/IP stack hardening</a>,
<a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/linux-unix-bsd-nginx-webserver-security.html">Cyberciti Nginx Hardning</a>,
- <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-kernel-etcsysctl-conf-security-hardening/">Cyberciti Security Hardening</a>,
- <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Grsecurity/Appendix/Grsecurity_and_PaX_Configuration_Options">Grsecurity and PaX Configuration</a>.</p>
-
- <p>Since kernels on machine-ports have <a href="pax.grsecurity.net">PaX</a>
- and <a href="http://grsecurity.net/announce.php">grsecurity</a>,
- <a href="conf/sysctl.conf">/etc/sysctl.conf</a> can have follow
- values;</p>
+ <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-kernel-etcsysctl-conf-security-hardening/">Cyberciti Security Hardening</a>.</p>
<pre>
#
@@ -27,49 +21,20 @@
#
kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4
+
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
+
# Shared Memory
#kernel.shmmax = 500000000
# Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated
# fs.file-nr=
vm.mmap_min_addr=65536
+
# Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
kernel.pid_max = 65536
- #
- # Memory Protections
- #
-
- # If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
- # Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
- # Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
- # the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
- # remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time
- # clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure
- # that hwclock operates correctly.
- #
- # If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
- # you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
- # option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
- kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
- # daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
- # will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
- # or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
- # the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
- # fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
- # restart the daemon.
- # In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
- # existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
- # be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
- #
- # It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
- # section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
- # signal.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "deter_bruteforce" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
+ #Yama LSM by default
+ kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
#
# Filesystem Protections
@@ -79,345 +44,15 @@
# Increase system file descriptor limit
fs.file-max = 65535
- # If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
- # will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
- # world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
- # symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
- # able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
- # enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1
-
-
- # Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
- # that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache
- # verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
- # the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
- # to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
- # that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
- # symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete,
- # race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
- # will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
- # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1
- kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 15
-
- # if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
- # own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
- # the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
- # be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
- # will be protected in the following ways:
- # * No new writable mounts will be allowed
- # * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
- # * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
- # This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
- # it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
- # behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
- # filesystem.
- # Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
- # and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
- # config or at runtime.
- # This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
- #kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 1
-
- # if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
- # chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
- # system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
- # files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
- # This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
- # if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
- # tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "chroot_caps" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1
-
- #kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
- # or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
- # against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
- # again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
- # out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
- # to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
- # outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
- # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
- # mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
- # would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
- # as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
- # anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
- # they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
- # that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
- # mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
- # a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
- # works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
- # function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
- # of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
- # to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
- # It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
- # a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
- # write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
- # interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
- # connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
- # domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
- # that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
- # applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
- # The man page on chroot(2) states:
- # Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working
- # directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
- # `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
- # `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
- #
- # It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
- # any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
- # kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid,
- # getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
- # the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
- # processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
- # removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
- # is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1
-
- #
- # Kernel Auditing
- #
-
- # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
- # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
- # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
- # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "audit_group" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
- # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
- # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
- # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "audit_group" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 99
-
- # If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
- # other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
- # will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
- # of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "exec_logging" is created.
- # WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
- # on an active system.
- kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
- # be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
- # limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
- # created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
- kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
- # to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
- # applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
- # is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
- # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
- #kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
- # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
- # SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
- # occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "signal_logging" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
- # This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
- # their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "timechange_logging" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1
-
- # if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
- # usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
- # denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also
- # log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
- # is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
- # is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1
-
- #
- # Executable Protections
- #
-
-
- # if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
- # to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
- # The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
- # identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
- # system for a targeted exploit.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1
-
# Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
- # If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
- # programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you
- # have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
- # enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
- # fine-grained exceptions.
- #
- # This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
- # processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
- # This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
- # but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
- # binaries. This option is useful in environments that
- # remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
- # prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds
- # consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
- # be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
- #
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
- # is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
- # in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
- # gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
- # to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most
- # cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
- # on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the
- # same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
- # running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled,
- # a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
- # memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
- # given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
- # 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
- # that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
- # 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
- # match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
- # It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
- # with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
- # privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to
- # research by Tim Brown:
- # http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
- # who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with
- # CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "harden_ipc" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
- # supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
- # These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
- # root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
- # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 100
-
- # If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
- # decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
- # option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
- # users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
- # entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
- # a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
- # the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
- # "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
- # Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
- # execute files in directories they own that are not group or
- # world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
- # root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1
-
-
- kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1
-
#
# Network Protections
#
+ net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 0
+
# Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits
# min, default, and max number of bytes to use
# set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths
@@ -519,105 +154,18 @@
# Sen SynAck retries to 3
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3
- # If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
- # destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
- # sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
- # This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
- # loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
- # makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
- # visibility against scanners.
- #
- # The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
- # blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
- # just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
- # problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
- # connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
- # end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
- # side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
- # feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
- # The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
- # can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
- # all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
- # disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
- #
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
- # "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
- # While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
- # toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
- # "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4
- # prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
- # state.
- kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
- kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
- # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
- # applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1
-
- # Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
- # add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
- # specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 200
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
- # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
- # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
- # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
- # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1
-
- # Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
- # Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
- # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
- # option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 201
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
- # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
- # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
- # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
- # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1
-
- # Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
- # Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
- # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
- # option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99
-
- #
- # Physical Protections
- #
-
- # If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
- # will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
- # USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB
- # device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be
- # used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
- # in various USB device drivers.
- #
- # For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
- # relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros
- # as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
- kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0
-
- #
- # Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
- #
- kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0
-
# End of file
</pre>
+ <p>Reload sysctl settings;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ # sysctl --system
+ </pre>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the Hive System Documentation.
- Copyright (C) 2018
+ Copyright (C) 2019
Hive Team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>
diff --git a/core/toolchain.html b/core/toolchain.html
index 57113fd..9662217 100644
--- a/core/toolchain.html
+++ b/core/toolchain.html
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.2.3. Toolchain</title>
+ <title>2.6.3. Toolchain</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1 id="toolchain">2.2.3. Toolchain</h1>
+ <h1 id="toolchain">2.6.3. Toolchain</h1>
<p>Add flags to pkgmk configuration and change specific ports that
don't build with hardening flags. More information about
diff --git a/core/tty-terminal.html b/core/tty-terminal.html
index 6eb08d3..d033ec2 100644
--- a/core/tty-terminal.html
+++ b/core/tty-terminal.html
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.5. Consoles, terminals and shells</title>
+ <title>2.4. Consoles, terminals and shells</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1>2.5. Consoles, terminals and shells</h1>
+ <h1>2.4. Consoles, terminals and shells</h1>
<dl>
<dt>Consoles</dt>