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authorSilvino Silva <silvino@bk.ru>2017-02-25 20:17:55 +0000
committerSilvino Silva <silvino@bk.ru>2017-02-25 20:17:55 +0000
commit4cc6765e1332b7bbef89091a3a3d4f055a60cebf (patch)
treea01007b92a67c201f147644c1faa98849f1c4700 /core
parentd26a4e12deafade205d37a9fda748a6b78dfdb6a (diff)
downloaddoc-4cc6765e1332b7bbef89091a3a3d4f055a60cebf.tar.gz
core index correction
Diffstat (limited to 'core')
-rw-r--r--core/grsecurity.html6
-rw-r--r--core/hardening.html157
-rw-r--r--core/index.html8
-rw-r--r--core/linux.html608
-rw-r--r--core/scripts/backup-system.sh79
-rw-r--r--core/sysctl.html627
-rw-r--r--core/toolchain.html165
7 files changed, 868 insertions, 782 deletions
diff --git a/core/grsecurity.html b/core/grsecurity.html
index cda9bfb..adfd292 100644
--- a/core/grsecurity.html
+++ b/core/grsecurity.html
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
</head>
<body>
- <a href="index.html">Tools Index</a>
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<h1>Grsecurity</h1>
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@
# gradm -E
</pre>
- <a href="index.html">Tools Index</a>
- <p>This is part of the c9-doc Manual.
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
+ <p>This is part of the c9 Manual.
Copyright (C) 2017
c9 team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
diff --git a/core/hardening.html b/core/hardening.html
index 478c911..024c4c9 100644
--- a/core/hardening.html
+++ b/core/hardening.html
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>Hardening</title>
+ <title>2.2. Hardening</title>
</head>
<body>
- <a href="index.html">Tools Index</a>
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1>Hardening</h1>
+ <h1>2.2. Hardening</h1>
<p>Kernel in ports have upstream linux kernel and
grsecurity patch, it should break some functionality
for the user and pkgmk user if tpe protection is active.</p>
<pre>
- $ sudo prt-get depinst gradm paxtest paxd checksec lynis
+ $ sudo prt-get depinst gradm paxtest paxctld checksec lynis
</pre>
<p>Check <a href="grsecurity.html">grsecurity</a> on how to setup
@@ -40,154 +40,9 @@
<p>Add unnecessary tests to profile to have less noise.</p>
- <h2 id="toolchain">Rebuild Toolchain</h2>
- <p>Add flags to pkgmk configuration and change specific ports that
- don't build with hardening flags. More information about
- <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/DeveloperWiki:Security">arch security</a>,
- gentoo security,
- <a href="http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options">gcc</a> instrumentation-options
- and <a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Configuring-and-compiling.html">glibc</a>
- configuring and compiling. Edit /etc/pkgmk.conf;</p>
-
- <pre>
- export CPPFLAGS="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
- export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native -fstack-protector-strong --param=ssp-buffer-size=4"
- export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
- export LDFLAGS="-z relro"
- </pre>
-
- <h3>Core</h3>
-
- <p>Ports in core collection that need to be changed in order
- to build with pkgmk harden configuration.</p>
-
- <h4>Glibc</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/glibc.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/glibc">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <pre>
- export CPPFLAGS=""
- export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native"
- export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
- export LDFLAGS=""
- </pre>
-
- <pre>
- ../$name-${version:0:4}/configure --prefix=/usr \
- --libexecdir=/usr/lib \
- --with-headers=$PKG/usr/include \
- --enable-kernel=3.12 \
- --enable-add-ons \
- --enable-static-nss \
- --disable-profile \
- --disable-werror \
- --without-gd \
- --enable-obsolete-rpc \
- --enable-multi-arch \
- --enable-stackguard-randomization \
- --enable-stack-protector=strong
- </pre>
-
- <h4>Gcc</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/gcc.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/gcc">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <pre>
- export CPPFLAGS=""
- export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native"
- export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
- export LDFLAGS=""
- </pre>
-
- <h4>libcap</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/libcap.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/libcap">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h4>bzip2</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/bzip2.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/bzip2">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h4>hdparm</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/hdparm.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/hdparm">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h3>Opt</h3>
-
- <h4>lsof</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/lsof.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/lsof">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h4>python</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/python2.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/python2">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h4>zip</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/zip.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/zip">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h4>glew</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/glew">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h4>dmenu</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/dmenu">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h4>Boost</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/boost.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/boost">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <pre>
- export CPPFLAGS=""
- export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native"
- export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
- export LDFLAGS=""
- </pre>
-
- <h3>Contrib</h3>
-
- <h4>gsl</h4>
-
- <ul>
- <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/gsl.html">lfs</a></li>
- <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/gsl">arch</a></li>
- </ul>
-
-
- <a href="index.html">Tools Index</a>
- <p>This is part of the c9-doc Manual.
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
+ <p>This is part of the c9 Manual.
Copyright (C) 2017
c9 team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
diff --git a/core/index.html b/core/index.html
index 97376f4..8274630 100644
--- a/core/index.html
+++ b/core/index.html
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
<title>c9 Core OS</title>
</head>
<body>
+
<a href="../index.html">Documentation Index</a>
<h1>c9 Core OS</h1>
@@ -76,13 +77,14 @@
<li><a href="linux.html#kinstall">2.1.2. Manual install</a></li>
<li><a href="linux.html#kuninstall">2.1.3. Manual remove</a></li>
<li><a href="linux.html#dracut">2.1.4. Dracut</a></li>
- <li><a href="linux.html#sysctl">2.1.5. Sysctl</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="hardening.html">2.2. Hardening</a>
<ul>
- <li><a href="grsecurity.html">2.2.1 Grsecurity</a></li>
- <li><a href="samhain.html">2.2.2 Samhain</a></li>
+ <li><a href="toolchain.html">2.2.1. Toolchain</a></li>
+ <li><a href="grsecurity.html">2.2.2. Grsecurity</a></li>
+ <li><a href="sysctl.html">2.2.3. Sysctl</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samhain.html">2.2.4. Samhain</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="network.html">2.3. Network</a>
diff --git a/core/linux.html b/core/linux.html
index 888b916..5138676 100644
--- a/core/linux.html
+++ b/core/linux.html
@@ -144,614 +144,6 @@
# dracut -v /boot/initramfs-4.9.11-blob.img 4.9.11-blob
</pre>
- <h2 id="sysctl">2.1.4. Sysctl</h2>
-
- <p>Sysctl references
- <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/sysctl#TCP.2FIP_stack_hardening">Arch TCP/IP stack hardening</a>,
- <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/linux-unix-bsd-nginx-webserver-security.html">Cyberciti Nginx Hardning</a>,
- <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-kernel-etcsysctl-conf-security-hardening/">Cyberciti Security Hardening</a>,
- <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Grsecurity/Appendix/Grsecurity_and_PaX_Configuration_Options">Grsecurity and PaX Configuration</a>.</p>
-
- <p>Since kernels on c9-ports have <a href="pax.grsecurity.net">PaX</a>
- and <a href="http://grsecurity.net/announce.php">grsecurity</a>,
- <a href="conf/sysctl.conf">/etc/sysctl.conf</a> can have follow
- values;</p>
-
- <pre>
- #
- # /etc/sysctl.conf: configuration for system variables, see sysctl.conf(5)
- #
-
- kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4
- kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
- # Shared Memory
- #kernel.shmmax = 500000000
- # Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated
- # fs.file-nr=
- vm.mmap_min_addr=65536
- # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
- kernel.pid_max = 65536
-
- #
- # Memory Protections
- #
-
- # If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
- # Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
- # Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
- # the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
- # remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time
- # clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure
- # that hwclock operates correctly.
- #
- # If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
- # you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
- # option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
- kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
- # daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
- # will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
- # or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
- # the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
- # fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
- # restart the daemon.
- # In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
- # existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
- # be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
- #
- # It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
- # section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
- # signal.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "deter_bruteforce" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
-
- #
- # Filesystem Protections
- #
-
- # Optimization for port usefor LBs
- # Increase system file descriptor limit
- fs.file-max = 65535
-
- # If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
- # will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
- # world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
- # symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
- # able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
- # enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 0
-
-
- # Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
- # that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache
- # verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
- # the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
- # to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
- # that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
- # symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete,
- # race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
- # will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
- # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 0
- #kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 33
-
- # if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
- # own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
- # the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
- # be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
- # will be protected in the following ways:
- # * No new writable mounts will be allowed
- # * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
- # * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
- # This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
- # it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
- # behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
- # filesystem.
- # Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
- # and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
- # config or at runtime.
- # This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
- #kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 0
-
- # if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
- # chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
- # system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
- # files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
- # This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
- # if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
- # tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "chroot_caps" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1
-
- #kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
- # or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
- # against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
- # again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
- # out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
- # to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
- # outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
- # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
- # mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
- # would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
- # as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
- # anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
- # they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
- # that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
- # mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
- # a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
- # works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
- # function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
- # of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
- # to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
- # It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
- # a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
- # write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
- # interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
- # connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
- # domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
- # that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
- # applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
- # The man page on chroot(2) states:
- # Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working
- # directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
- # `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
- # `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
- #
- # It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
- # any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
- # kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid,
- # getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
- # the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
- # processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
- # removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
- # is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1
-
- #
- # Kernel Auditing
- #
-
- # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
- # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
- # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
- # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "audit_group" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
- # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
- # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
- # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "audit_group" is created.
- #kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 201
-
- # If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
- # other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
- # will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
- # of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
- # name "exec_logging" is created.
- # WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
- # on an active system.
- kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
- # be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
- # limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
- # created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
- kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
- # to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
- # applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
- # is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
- # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
- # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
- # SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
- # occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "signal_logging" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
- # This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
- # their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
- #kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
- kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "timechange_logging" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1
-
- # if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
- # usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
- # denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also
- # log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
- # is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the
- # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
- # is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1
-
- #
- # Executable Protections
- #
-
-
- # if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
- # to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
- # The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
- # identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
- # system for a targeted exploit.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1
-
- # Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
- #kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
-
- # If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
- # programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you
- # have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
- # enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
- # fine-grained exceptions.
- #
- # This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
- # processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
- # This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
- # but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl
- # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
- # created.
- kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
- # binaries. This option is useful in environments that
- # remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
- # prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds
- # consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
- # be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
- #
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
- # is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
- # in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
- # gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
- # to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most
- # cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
- # on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the
- # same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
- # running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled,
- # a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
- # memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
- # given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
- # 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
- # that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
- # 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
- # match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
- # It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
- # with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
- # privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to
- # research by Tim Brown:
- # http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
- # who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with
- # CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "harden_ipc" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 0
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
- # supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
- # These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
- # root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
- # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 4
-
- # If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
- # decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
- # option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
- # users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
- # entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 1
-
- # If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
- # a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
- # the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
- # "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
- # Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
- # execute files in directories they own that are not group or
- # world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
- # root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
- # "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1
-
-
- kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1
-
- #
- # Network Protections
- #
-
- # Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits
- # min, default, and max number of bytes to use
- # set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths
- # Tcp Windows etc
- net.core.rmem_max = 8388608
- net.core.wmem_max = 8388608
- net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 5000
- net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 1
-
- # Both ports linux-blob and linux-libre don't build with ipv6
- # Disable ipv6
- net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
- net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
- net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1
-
- # Tuen IPv6
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 0
-
- # Avoid a smurf attack, ping scanning
- net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
-
- # Turn on protection for bad icmp error messages
- net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
-
- # Turn on syncookies for SYN flood attack protection
- net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
-
- ## protect against tcp time-wait assassination hazards
- ## drop RST packets for sockets in the time-wait state
- ## (not widely supported outside of linux, but conforms to RFC)
- net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1
-
- ## tcp timestamps
- ## + protect against wrapping sequence numbers (at gigabit speeds)
- ## + round trip time calculation implemented in TCP
- ## - causes extra overhead and allows uptime detection by scanners like nmap
- ## enable @ gigabit speeds
- net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 0
- #net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 1
-
- # Turn on and log spoofed, source routed, and redirect packets
- net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
- net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
-
- ## ignore echo broadcast requests to prevent being part of smurf attacks (default)
- net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
-
- ## sets the kernels reverse path filtering mechanism to value 1(on)
- ## will do source validation of the packet's recieved from all the interfaces on the machine
- ## protects from attackers that are using ip spoofing methods to do harm
- net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
- net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
- #net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
- #net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
-
-
- # Make sure no one can alter the routing tables
- # Act as a router, necessary for Access Point
- net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
- net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
- net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
- net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
- # No source routed packets here
- # Discard packets with source routes, ip spoofing
- net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
- net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
-
-
- net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
- net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
-
- net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
-
- # Increase system IP port limits
- net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 2000 65000
-
- # Increase TCP max buffer size setable using setsockopt()
- net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 8388608
- net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 87380 8388608
-
- # Disable proxy_arp
- net.ipv4.conf.default.proxy_arp = 0
- net.ipv4.conf.all.proxy_arp = 0
-
- # Disable bootp_relay
- net.ipv4.conf.default.bootp_relay = 0
- net.ipv4.conf.all.bootp_relay = 0
-
- # Decrease TCP fin timeout
- net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 30
- # Decrease TCP keep alive time
- net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1800
- # Sen SynAck retries to 3
- net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3
-
- # If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
- # destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
- # sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
- # This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
- # loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
- # makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
- # visibility against scanners.
- #
- # The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
- # blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
- # just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
- # problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
- # connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
- # end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
- # side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
- # feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
- # The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
- # can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
- # all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
- # disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
- #
- # If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
- # "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
- # While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
- # toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
- # "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4
- # prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
- # state.
- kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
- kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
- # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
- # applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 0
-
- # Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
- # add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
- # specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
- # with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
- #kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 202
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
- # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
- # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
- # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
- # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1
-
- # Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
- # Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
- # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
- # option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 15
-
- # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
- # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
- # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
- # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
- # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
- # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1
-
- # Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
- # Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
- # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
- # option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
- kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99
-
- #
- # Physical Protections
- #
-
- # If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
- # will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
- # USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB
- # device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be
- # used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
- # in various USB device drivers.
- #
- # For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
- # relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros
- # as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
- kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0
-
- #
- # Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
- #
- kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0
-
- # End of file
- </pre>
-
-
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the c9-doc Manual.
Copyright (C) 2017
diff --git a/core/scripts/backup-system.sh b/core/scripts/backup-system.sh
index 854a221..379e449 100644
--- a/core/scripts/backup-system.sh
+++ b/core/scripts/backup-system.sh
@@ -6,20 +6,65 @@ read ROOT_DIR
echo -n "where you want to save (/home/user): "
read DEST_DIR
-echo $DES_DIR
-echo $ROOT_DIR
-
-tar --xattrs -zcpf $DEST_DIR/system-backup-`date '+%Y-%j-%H-%M-%S'`.tar.gz \
- --directory=$ROOT_DIR \
- --exclude=usr/ports \
- --exclude=usr/src \
- --exclude=var/run \
- --exclude=var/lock \
- --exclude=srv \
- --exclude=mnt \
- --exclude=home \
- --exclude=dev \
- --exclude=run \
- --exclude=tmp \
- --exclude=proc \
- --exclude=sys .
+bk_coll() {
+ col=$1
+ # make copy of packages
+ mkdir ${BKDIR}/${col}
+ while read line; do
+ if [ ! -f /usr/ports/packages/${line} ]; then
+ echo "Building package: ${line};\n"
+ name=$(echo ${line} | cut -d "#" -f 1)
+ sudo prt-get update -fr ${name}
+ fi
+
+ if [ -f /usr/ports/packages/${line} ]; then
+ echo "Backing up package: ${line}"
+ echo ${line} >> ${BKDIR}/backup.pkg
+ cp /usr/ports/packages/${line} ${BKDIR}/${col}/
+ else
+ echo "Package not found: ${line}"
+ echo ${line} >> ${BKDIR}/${col}-notfound.pkg
+ fi
+ done < $BKDIR/${col}.pkg
+}
+
+# Temporary directory
+BKDIR=$(pwd)/bkdir
+mkdir -p ${BKDIR}
+
+# must be using gwak instead of sed, xargs and echo
+prt-get listinst -v | sed -s s/" "/#/g | xargs -i echo {}.pkg.tar.gz > ${BKDIR}/installed.pkg
+
+# make list and copy installed core packages
+prt-get printf "%i %p %n#%v-%r.pkg.tar.gz\n" | grep "yes /usr/ports/core" | cut -d " " -f 3 > ${BKDIR}/core.pkg
+bk_coll "core"
+
+
+prt-get printf "%i %p %n#%v-%r.pkg.tar.gz\n" | grep "yes /usr/ports/opt" | cut -d " " -f 3 > $BKDIR/opt.pkg
+bk_coll "opt"
+
+prt-get printf "%i %p %n#%v-%r.pkg.tar.gz\n" | grep "yes /usr/ports/contrib" | cut -d " " -f 3 > $BKDIR/contrib.pkg
+bk_coll "contrib"
+
+prt-get printf "%i %p %n#%v-%r.pkg.tar.gz\n" | grep "yes /usr/ports/xorg" | cut -d " " -f 3 > $BKDIR/xorg.pkg
+bk_coll "xorg"
+
+prt-get printf "%i %p %n#%v-%r.pkg.tar.gz\n" | grep -v "yes /usr/ports/core" | grep -v "yes /usr/ports/opt" | grep -v "yes /usr/ports/contrib" | grep -v "yes /usr/ports/xorg" | grep "yes " | cut -d " " -f 3 > $BKDIR/other.pkg
+
+#echo $DES_DIR
+#echo $ROOT_DIR
+#
+#tar --xattrs -zcpf $DEST_DIR/system-backup-`date '+%Y-%j-%H-%M-%S'`.tar.gz \
+# --directory=$ROOT_DIR \
+# --exclude=usr/ports \
+# --exclude=usr/src \
+# --exclude=var/run \
+# --exclude=var/lock \
+# --exclude=srv \
+# --exclude=mnt \
+# --exclude=home \
+# --exclude=dev \
+# --exclude=run \
+# --exclude=tmp \
+# --exclude=proc \
+# --exclude=sys .
diff --git a/core/sysctl.html b/core/sysctl.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e13209
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/sysctl.html
@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
+ <head>
+ <meta charset='utf-8'>
+ <title>2.2.3. Sysctl</title>
+ </head>
+ <body>
+
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
+
+ <h1 id="sysctl">2.2.3. Sysctl</h1>
+
+ <p>Sysctl references
+ <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/sysctl#TCP.2FIP_stack_hardening">Arch TCP/IP stack hardening</a>,
+ <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/linux-unix-bsd-nginx-webserver-security.html">Cyberciti Nginx Hardning</a>,
+ <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-kernel-etcsysctl-conf-security-hardening/">Cyberciti Security Hardening</a>,
+ <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Grsecurity/Appendix/Grsecurity_and_PaX_Configuration_Options">Grsecurity and PaX Configuration</a>.</p>
+
+ <p>Since kernels on c9-ports have <a href="pax.grsecurity.net">PaX</a>
+ and <a href="http://grsecurity.net/announce.php">grsecurity</a>,
+ <a href="conf/sysctl.conf">/etc/sysctl.conf</a> can have follow
+ values;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ #
+ # /etc/sysctl.conf: configuration for system variables, see sysctl.conf(5)
+ #
+
+ kernel.printk = 7 1 1 4
+ kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
+ # Shared Memory
+ #kernel.shmmax = 500000000
+ # Total allocated file handlers that can be allocated
+ # fs.file-nr=
+ vm.mmap_min_addr=65536
+ # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
+ kernel.pid_max = 65536
+
+ #
+ # Memory Protections
+ #
+
+ # If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
+ # Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
+ # Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
+ # the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
+ # remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time
+ # clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure
+ # that hwclock operates correctly.
+ #
+ # If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
+ # you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
+ # option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
+ kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
+ # daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
+ # will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
+ # or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
+ # the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
+ # fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
+ # restart the daemon.
+ # In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
+ # existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
+ # be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
+ #
+ # It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
+ # section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
+ # signal.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "deter_bruteforce" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
+
+ #
+ # Filesystem Protections
+ #
+
+ # Optimization for port usefor LBs
+ # Increase system file descriptor limit
+ fs.file-max = 65535
+
+ # If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
+ # will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
+ # world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
+ # symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
+ # able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
+ # enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 0
+
+
+ # Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
+ # that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache
+ # verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
+ # the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
+ # to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
+ # that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
+ # symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete,
+ # race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
+ # will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
+ # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 0
+ #kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 33
+
+ # if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
+ # own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
+ # the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
+ # be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
+ # will be protected in the following ways:
+ # * No new writable mounts will be allowed
+ # * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
+ # * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
+ # This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
+ # it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
+ # behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
+ # filesystem.
+ # Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
+ # and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
+ # config or at runtime.
+ # This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 0
+
+ # if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
+ # chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
+ # system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
+ # files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
+ # This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
+ # if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
+ # tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "chroot_caps" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1
+
+ #kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
+ # or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
+ # against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
+ # again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
+ # out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
+ # to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
+ # outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
+ # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
+ # mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
+ # would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
+ # as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
+ # anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
+ # they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
+ # that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+ # mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
+ # a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
+ # works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
+ # function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
+ # of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
+ # to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
+ # It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
+ # a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
+ # write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
+ # interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+ # connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
+ # domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
+ # that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
+ # applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
+ # The man page on chroot(2) states:
+ # Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working
+ # directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
+ # `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
+ # `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
+ #
+ # It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
+ # any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+ # kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid,
+ # getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
+ # the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
+ # processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
+ # removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
+ # is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1
+
+ #
+ # Kernel Auditing
+ #
+
+ # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
+ # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
+ # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
+ # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "audit_group" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
+ # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
+ # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
+ # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "audit_group" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 201
+
+ # If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
+ # other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
+ # will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
+ # of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "exec_logging" is created.
+ # WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
+ # on an active system.
+ kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
+ # be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
+ # limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
+ # created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
+ kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
+ # to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
+ # applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
+ # is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
+ # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
+ # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
+ # SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
+ # occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "signal_logging" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
+ # This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
+ # their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "timechange_logging" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1
+
+ # if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
+ # usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
+ # denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also
+ # log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
+ # is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
+ # is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1
+
+ #
+ # Executable Protections
+ #
+
+
+ # if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
+ # to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
+ # The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
+ # identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
+ # system for a targeted exploit.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1
+
+ # Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
+ #kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
+
+ # If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
+ # programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you
+ # have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
+ # enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
+ # fine-grained exceptions.
+ #
+ # This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
+ # processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
+ # This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
+ # but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
+ # binaries. This option is useful in environments that
+ # remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
+ # prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds
+ # consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
+ # be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
+ #
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
+ # is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
+ # in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
+ # gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
+ # to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most
+ # cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
+ # on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the
+ # same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
+ # running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled,
+ # a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
+ # memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
+ # given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
+ # 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
+ # that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
+ # 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
+ # match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
+ # It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
+ # with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
+ # privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to
+ # research by Tim Brown:
+ # http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
+ # who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with
+ # CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "harden_ipc" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
+ # supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
+ # These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
+ # root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
+ # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 4
+
+ # If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
+ # decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
+ # option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
+ # users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
+ # entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
+ # a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
+ # the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
+ # "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
+ # Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
+ # execute files in directories they own that are not group or
+ # world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
+ # root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 1
+
+
+ kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1
+
+ #
+ # Network Protections
+ #
+
+ # Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits
+ # min, default, and max number of bytes to use
+ # set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths
+ # Tcp Windows etc
+ net.core.rmem_max = 8388608
+ net.core.wmem_max = 8388608
+ net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 5000
+ net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 1
+
+ # Both ports linux-blob and linux-libre don't build with ipv6
+ # Disable ipv6
+ net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
+ net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
+ net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1
+
+ # Tuen IPv6
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 0
+
+ # Avoid a smurf attack, ping scanning
+ net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
+
+ # Turn on protection for bad icmp error messages
+ net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
+
+ # Turn on syncookies for SYN flood attack protection
+ net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
+
+ ## protect against tcp time-wait assassination hazards
+ ## drop RST packets for sockets in the time-wait state
+ ## (not widely supported outside of linux, but conforms to RFC)
+ net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1
+
+ ## tcp timestamps
+ ## + protect against wrapping sequence numbers (at gigabit speeds)
+ ## + round trip time calculation implemented in TCP
+ ## - causes extra overhead and allows uptime detection by scanners like nmap
+ ## enable @ gigabit speeds
+ net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 0
+ #net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 1
+
+ # Turn on and log spoofed, source routed, and redirect packets
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
+
+ ## ignore echo broadcast requests to prevent being part of smurf attacks (default)
+ net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
+
+ ## sets the kernels reverse path filtering mechanism to value 1(on)
+ ## will do source validation of the packet's recieved from all the interfaces on the machine
+ ## protects from attackers that are using ip spoofing methods to do harm
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
+ #net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
+
+
+ # Make sure no one can alter the routing tables
+ # Act as a router, necessary for Access Point
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
+ # No source routed packets here
+ # Discard packets with source routes, ip spoofing
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
+
+
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
+
+ net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
+
+ # Increase system IP port limits
+ net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 2000 65000
+
+ # Increase TCP max buffer size setable using setsockopt()
+ net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 8388608
+ net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 87380 8388608
+
+ # Disable proxy_arp
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.proxy_arp = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.proxy_arp = 0
+
+ # Disable bootp_relay
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.bootp_relay = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.bootp_relay = 0
+
+ # Decrease TCP fin timeout
+ net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 30
+ # Decrease TCP keep alive time
+ net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1800
+ # Sen SynAck retries to 3
+ net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3
+
+ # If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
+ # destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
+ # sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
+ # This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
+ # loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
+ # makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
+ # visibility against scanners.
+ #
+ # The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
+ # blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
+ # just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
+ # problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
+ # connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
+ # end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
+ # side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
+ # feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
+ # The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
+ # can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
+ # all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
+ # disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
+ #
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
+ # "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
+ # While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
+ # toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
+ # "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4
+ # prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
+ # state.
+ kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+ # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
+ # applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 0
+
+ # Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
+ # add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
+ # specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 202
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+ # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
+ # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
+ # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
+ # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1
+
+ # Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
+ # Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
+ # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
+ # option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 15
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+ # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
+ # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
+ # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
+ # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1
+
+ # Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
+ # Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
+ # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
+ # option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 99
+
+ #
+ # Physical Protections
+ #
+
+ # If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
+ # will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
+ # USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB
+ # device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be
+ # used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
+ # in various USB device drivers.
+ #
+ # For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
+ # relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros
+ # as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
+ kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0
+
+ #
+ # Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
+ #
+ kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 0
+
+ # End of file
+ </pre>
+
+
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
+ <p>This is part of the c9 Manual.
+ Copyright (C) 2017
+ c9 team.
+ See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
+ for copying conditions.</p>
+
+ </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/core/toolchain.html b/core/toolchain.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4a8f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/toolchain.html
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
+ <head>
+ <meta charset='utf-8'>
+ <title>2.2.1. Toolchain</title>
+ </head>
+ <body>
+
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
+
+ <h1 id="toolchain">2.2.1. Toolchain</h1>
+
+ <p>Add flags to pkgmk configuration and change specific ports that
+ don't build with hardening flags. More information about
+ <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/DeveloperWiki:Security">arch security</a>,
+ gentoo security,
+ <a href="http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options">gcc</a> instrumentation-options
+ and <a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Configuring-and-compiling.html">glibc</a>
+ configuring and compiling. Edit /etc/pkgmk.conf;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ export CPPFLAGS="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
+ export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native -fstack-protector-strong --param=ssp-buffer-size=4"
+ export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
+ export LDFLAGS="-z relro"
+ </pre>
+
+ <h3>Core</h3>
+
+ <p>Ports in core collection that need to be changed in order
+ to build with pkgmk harden configuration.</p>
+
+ <h4>Glibc</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/glibc.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/glibc">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <pre>
+ export CPPFLAGS=""
+ export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native"
+ export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
+ export LDFLAGS=""
+ </pre>
+
+ <pre>
+ ../$name-${version:0:4}/configure --prefix=/usr \
+ --libexecdir=/usr/lib \
+ --with-headers=$PKG/usr/include \
+ --enable-kernel=3.12 \
+ --enable-add-ons \
+ --enable-static-nss \
+ --disable-profile \
+ --disable-werror \
+ --without-gd \
+ --enable-obsolete-rpc \
+ --enable-multi-arch \
+ --enable-stackguard-randomization \
+ --enable-stack-protector=strong
+ </pre>
+
+ <h4>Gcc</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/gcc.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/gcc">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <pre>
+ export CPPFLAGS=""
+ export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native"
+ export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
+ export LDFLAGS=""
+ </pre>
+
+ <h4>libcap</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/libcap.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/libcap">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h4>bzip2</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/lfs/view/development/chapter06/bzip2.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/bzip2">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h4>hdparm</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/hdparm.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/hdparm">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h3>Opt</h3>
+
+ <h4>lsof</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/lsof.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/lsof">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h4>python</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/python2.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/python2">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h4>zip</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/zip.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/zip">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h4>glew</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/glew">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h4>dmenu</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/dmenu">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h4>Boost</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/boost.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/boost">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <pre>
+ export CPPFLAGS=""
+ export CFLAGS="-O2 -march=native -mtune=native"
+ export CXXFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
+ export LDFLAGS=""
+ </pre>
+
+ <h3>Contrib</h3>
+
+ <h4>gsl</h4>
+
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/svn/general/gsl.html">lfs</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/gsl">arch</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+
+ <a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
+ <p>This is part of the c9 Manual.
+ Copyright (C) 2017
+ c9 team.
+ See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
+ for copying conditions.</p>
+
+ </body>
+</html>