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diff --git a/core/linux.html b/core/linux.html
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--- a/core/linux.html
+++ b/core/linux.html
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
<html dir="ltr" lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
- <title>2.3. Kernel Linux</title>
+ <title>2.1. Kernel Linux</title>
</head>
<body>
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
- <h1 id="kernel">2.3. Kernel Linux</h1>
+ <h1 id="kernel">2.1. Kernel Linux</h1>
<p>Linux is a monolith kernel, a big one ! Visit
<a href="http://www.fsfla.org/ikiwiki/selibre/linux-libre/">Linux Libre</a>
@@ -15,58 +15,41 @@
<a href="https://www.kernel.org/">Linux Non-Libre</a> pages for more links
and information.</p>
- <h2 id="#linuxlibre">2.3.1. Port Linux Libre</h2>
+ <h2 id="#linuxlibre">2.1.1. Port Linux Libre</h2>
- <p>Collection c9-ports have linux-libre port with default crux
- configuration, this port depends on dracut and grub but is not
- required to install them. To build and install this port using
- prt-get;</p>
+ <p>Default crux configuration can be obtained from iso, this port depends
+ on dracut and grub but is not required to install them. To build and install
+ this port using prt-get;</p>
<pre>
$ prt-get depinst linux-libre
</pre>
- <h2 id="kinstall">2.3.2. Manual Install</h2>
+ <h2 id="kinstall">2.1.2. Manual Install</h2>
<p>Download Linux Source from
<a href="http://linux-libre.fsfla.org/pub/linux-libre/releases/">linux libre</a>,
or using the port system;</p>
- <pre>
- $ cd /usr/ports/c9-ports/linux-libre
- $ sudo -u pkgmk pkgmk -do
- </pre>
-
- <p>Crux iso comes with config that is used in this port, is
- a good starting point to personalize according to your needs;</p>
+ <p>Crux iso comes with config that is more generic than used on linux-libre
+ port, crux default is a good starting point to personalize according to your
+ needs (build default, detect modules needed);</p>
<pre>
$ mkdir ~/kernel
$ cd ~/kernel
- $ cp /usr/ports/c9-ports/linux-libre/linux-4.1.32.defconfig .
- $ cp /usr/ports/distfiles/linux-libre-4.1.32-gnu.tar.xz .
- $ tar xf linux-libre-4.1.32-gnu.tar.xz
- $ cp linux-4.1.32.defconfig linux-4.1.32/.config
+ $ cp /usr/ports/distfiles/linux-libre-4.9.11-gnu.tar.xz .
+ $ tar xf linux-libre-4.9.11-gnu.tar.xz
+ $ cd linux-4.9.11/
</pre>
- <p>If you like <a href="https://github.com/graysky2/kernel_gcc_patch/">graysky2</a> kernel_gcc_patch (<a href="https://github.com/graysky2/kernel_gcc_patch/archive/master.zip">download master</a>) that adds more cpu options (FLAGS native)</p>
-
- <pre>
- $ cp /usr/ports/distfiles/enable_additional_cpu_optimizations_for_gcc_v4.9%2B_kernel_v3.15%2B.patch cpu_optimizations.patch
- </pre>
-
- <pre>
- $ cd ~/linux-4.1.32/
- $ patch -p1 &lt; ../cpu_optimizations.patch
- patching file arch/x86/include/asm/module.h
- patching file arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu
- patching file arch/x86/Makefile
- Hunk #1 succeeded at 85 with fuzz 1 (offset -9 lines).
- patching file arch/x86/Makefile_32.cpu
- $
- </pre>
-
- <p>Read <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Grsecurity/Configuring_and_Installing_grsecurity#Patching_Your_Kernel_with_grsecurity">Gresecurity</a>.</p>
+ <p><a href="grsecurity.net">Grsecurity</a> patch for
+ <a href="https://grsecurity.net/test/grsecurity-3.1-4.9.9-201702122044.patch">4.9.11</a>.
+ Gcc <a href="https://github.com/graysky2/kernel_gcc_patch/">graysky2</a> kernel_gcc_patch (<a href="https://github.com/graysky2/kernel_gcc_patch/archive/master.zip">master.zip</a>)
+ that adds more cpu options (FLAGS native).
+ Check <a href="ports/linux-libre/Pkgfile">Pkgfile</a> for instructions and
+ more patches used on linux-libre port. Read patching your kernel with
+ <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Grsecurity/Configuring_and_Installing_grsecurity#Patching_Your_Kernel_with_grsecurity">gresecurity</a>.</p>
<p>Configure kernel according to your current kernel
hardware support;</p>
@@ -77,11 +60,10 @@
<p>This will disable all unloaded modules,
you can use localyesconfig mark all loaded
- to be built in the kernel.</p>
-
- <p>To get information about your hardware,
- for example information about which graphic
- module (driver) is in use as root run;</p>
+ to be built in the kernel. To get information
+ about your hardware, for example information
+ about which graphic module (driver) is in use
+ as root run;</p>
<pre>
# lspci -nnk | grep -i vga -A3 | grep 'in use'
@@ -95,16 +77,16 @@
</pre>
<pre>
- $ make -j $(nproc) all
+ $ make -j $(nproc) bzImage modules
$ sudo make modules_install
- $ sudo cp arch/x86/boot/bzImage /boot/vmlinuz-4.1.32-gnu_crux
- $ sudo cp System.map /boot/System.map-4.1.32-gnu_crux
+ $ sudo cp arch/x86/boot/bzImage /boot/vmlinuz-4.9.11-gnu
+ $ sudo cp System.map /boot/System.map-4.9.11-gnu
</pre>
<p>Create dracut initramfs;</p>
<pre>
- $sudo dracut --fstab /boot/initramfs-4.1.32-gnu_crux.img 4.1.32-gnu_crux
+ $sudo dracut --fstab /boot/initramfs-4.9.11-gnu.img 4.9.11-gnu
</pre>
<p>Update grub;</p>
@@ -113,17 +95,609 @@
# grub-mkconfig -o /boot/grub/grub.cfg
</pre>
- <h2 id="kuninstall">2.3.3. Manual Remove</h2>
+ <h2 id="kuninstall">2.1.3. Manual Remove</h2>
<pre>
- $ sudo rm -r /lib/modules/4.1.12-gnu_crux
- $ sudo rm /boot/vmlinuz-4.1.12-gnu_crux
- $ sudo rm /boot/System.map-4.1.12-gnu_crux
+ $ sudo rm -r /lib/modules/4.9.11-gnu
+ $ sudo rm /boot/vmlinuz-4.9.11-gnu
+ $ sudo rm /boot/System.map-4.9.11-gnu
</pre>
+ <h2 id="sysctl">2.1.4. Sysctl</h2>
+
+ <p>Sysctl references
+ <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/sysctl#TCP.2FIP_stack_hardening">Arch TCP/IP stack hardening</a>,
+ <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/linux-unix-bsd-nginx-webserver-security.html">Cyberciti Nginx Hardning</a>,
+ <a href="http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-kernel-etcsysctl-conf-security-hardening/">Cyberciti Security Hardening</a>,
+ <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Grsecurity/Appendix/Grsecurity_and_PaX_Configuration_Options">Grsecurity and PaX Configuration</a>.</p>
+
+ <p>Since kernels on c9-ports have <a href="pax.grsecurity.net">PaX</a>
+ and <a href="http://grsecurity.net/announce.php">grsecurity</a>,
+ <a href="conf/sysctl.conf">/etc/sysctl.conf</a> can have follow
+ values;</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ #
+ # /etc/sysctl.conf: configuration for system variables, see sysctl.conf(5)
+ #
+
+ kernel.printk = 15 1 1 4
+ kernel.randomize_va_space = 1
+ kernel.shmmax = 500000000
+ # Allow for more PIDs (to reduce rollover problems); may break some programs 32768
+ kernel.pid_max = 65536
+
+ #
+ # Memory Protections
+ #
+
+ # If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
+ # Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
+ # Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
+ # the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
+ # remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so real-time
+ # clock support is enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure
+ # that hwclock operates correctly.
+ #
+ # If you're using XFree86 or a version of Xorg from 2012 or earlier,
+ # you may not be able to boot into a graphical environment with this
+ # option enabled. In this case, you should use the RBAC system instead.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.disable_priv_io = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
+ # daemons such as apache or sshd, as well as against suid/sgid binaries
+ # will be deterred. When a child of a forking daemon is killed by PaX
+ # or crashes due to an illegal instruction or other suspicious signal,
+ # the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every subsequent
+ # fork until the administrator is able to assess the situation and
+ # restart the daemon.
+ # In the suid/sgid case, the attempt is logged, the user has all their
+ # existing instances of the suid/sgid binary terminated and will
+ # be unable to execute any suid/sgid binaries for 15 minutes.
+ #
+ # It is recommended that you also enable signal logging in the auditing
+ # section so that logs are generated when a process triggers a suspicious
+ # signal.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "deter_bruteforce" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.deter_bruteforce = 1
+
+ #
+ # Filesystem Protections
+ #
+
+ # Optimization for port usefor LBs
+ # Increase system file descriptor limit
+ fs.file-max = 65535
+
+ # If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
+ # will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
+ # world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the
+ # symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
+ # able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
+ # enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.linking_restrictions = 1
+
+
+ # Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition
+ # that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache
+ # verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of
+ # the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink
+ # to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one
+ # that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the
+ # symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete,
+ # race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option
+ # will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option
+ # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is
+ # created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.enforce_symlinksifowner = 1
+ #kernel.grsecurity.symlinkown_gid = 33
+
+ # if you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
+ # own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
+ # the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
+ # created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.fifo_restrictions = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, a sysctl option with name "romount_protect" will
+ # be created. By setting this option to 1 at runtime, filesystems
+ # will be protected in the following ways:
+ # * No new writable mounts will be allowed
+ # * Existing read-only mounts won't be able to be remounted read/write
+ # * Write operations will be denied on all block devices
+ # This option acts independently of grsec_lock: once it is set to 1,
+ # it cannot be turned off. Therefore, please be mindful of the resulting
+ # behavior if this option is enabled in an init script on a read-only
+ # filesystem.
+ # Also be aware that as with other root-focused features, GRKERNSEC_KMEM
+ # and GRKERNSEC_IO should be enabled and module loading disabled via
+ # config or at runtime.
+ # This feature is mainly intended for secure embedded systems.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.romount_protect = 0
+
+ # if you say Y here, the capabilities on all processes within a
+ # chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
+ # system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
+ # files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
+ # This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
+ # if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
+ # tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "chroot_caps" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_caps = 1
+
+ #kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_bad_rename = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
+ # or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
+ # against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chmod = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
+ # again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
+ # out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_chroot = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
+ # to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
+ # outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
+ # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_fchdir = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
+ # mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
+ # would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
+ # as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
+ # anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
+ # they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
+ # that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mknod = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+ # mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_mount = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
+ # a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
+ # works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
+ # function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
+ # of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_pivot = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
+ # to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
+ # It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
+ # a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_shmat = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
+ # write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
+ # interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_sysctl = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+ # connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
+ # domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
+ # that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_deny_unix = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
+ # applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
+ # The man page on chroot(2) states:
+ # Note that usually chhroot does not change the current working
+ # directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
+ # `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
+ # `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
+ #
+ # It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
+ # any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_enforce_chdir = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
+ # kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, setpgid,
+ # getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_findtask = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
+ # the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
+ # processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
+ # removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
+ # is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_restrict_nice = 1
+
+ #
+ # Kernel Auditing
+ #
+
+ # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
+ # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
+ # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
+ # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "audit_group" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_group = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, the exec and chdir logging features will only operate
+ # on a group you specify. This option is recommended if you only want to
+ # watch certain users instead of having a large amount of logs from the
+ # entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "audit_group" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.audit_gid = 201
+
+ # If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
+ # other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
+ # will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
+ # of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
+ # name "exec_logging" is created.
+ # WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
+ # on an active system.
+ kernel.grsecurity.exec_logging = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
+ # be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
+ # limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
+ # created. If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.resource_logging = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
+ # to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
+ # applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
+ # is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.chroot_execlog = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
+ # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_ptrace = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all attempts to attach to a process via ptrace
+ # will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "audit_ptrace" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_chdir = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
+ # created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.audit_mount = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
+ # SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
+ # occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "signal_logging" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.signal_logging = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
+ # This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
+ # their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.forkfail_logging = 0
+
+ # If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "timechange_logging" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.timechange_logging = 1
+
+ # if you say Y here, calls to mmap() and mprotect() with explicit
+ # usage of PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC together will be logged when
+ # denied by the PAX_MPROTECT feature. This feature will also
+ # log other problematic scenarios that can occur when PAX_MPROTECT
+ # is enabled on a binary, like textrels and PT_GNU_STACK. If the
+ # sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rwxmap_logging"
+ # is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.rwxmap_logging = 1
+
+ #
+ # Executable Protections
+ #
+
+
+ # if you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
+ # to view the contents of the kernel's circular log buffer.
+ # The kernel's log buffer often contains kernel addresses and other
+ # identifying information useful to an attacker in fingerprinting a
+ # system for a targeted exploit.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.dmesg = 1
+
+ # Hide symbol addresses in /proc/kallsyms
+ kernel.kptr_restrict = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, TTY sniffers and other malicious monitoring
+ # programs implemented through ptrace will be defeated. If you
+ # have been using the RBAC system, this option has already been
+ # enabled for several years for all users, with the ability to make
+ # fine-grained exceptions.
+ #
+ # This option only affects the ability of non-root users to ptrace
+ # processes that are not a descendent of the ptracing process.
+ # This means that strace ./binary and gdb ./binary will still work,
+ # but attaching to arbitrary processes will not. If the sysctl
+ # option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "harden_ptrace" is
+ # created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.harden_ptrace = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, unprivileged users will not be able to ptrace unreadable
+ # binaries. This option is useful in environments that
+ # remove the read bits (e.g. file mode 4711) from suid binaries to
+ # prevent infoleaking of their contents. This option adds
+ # consistency to the use of that file mode, as the binary could normally
+ # be read out when run without privileges while ptracing.
+ #
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "ptrace_readexec"
+ # is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.ptrace_readexec = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, a change from a root uid to a non-root uid
+ # in a multithreaded application will cause the resulting uids,
+ # gids, supplementary groups, and capabilities in that thread
+ # to be propagated to the other threads of the process. In most
+ # cases this is unnecessary, as glibc will emulate this behavior
+ # on behalf of the application. Other libcs do not act in the
+ # same way, allowing the other threads of the process to continue
+ # running with root privileges. If the sysctl option is enabled,
+ # a sysctl option with name "consistent_setxid" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.consistent_setxid = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, access to overly-permissive IPC objects (shared
+ # memory, message queues, and semaphores) will be denied for processes
+ # given the following criteria beyond normal permission checks:
+ # 1) If the IPC object is world-accessible and the euid doesn't match
+ # that of the creator or current uid for the IPC object
+ # 2) If the IPC object is group-accessible and the egid doesn't
+ # match that of the creator or current gid for the IPC object
+ # It's a common error to grant too much permission to these objects,
+ # with impact ranging from denial of service and information leaking to
+ # privilege escalation. This feature was developed in response to
+ # research by Tim Brown:
+ # http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/whitepapers/memory-squatting-attacks-on-system-v-shared-memory/
+ # who found hundreds of such insecure usages. Processes with
+ # CAP_IPC_OWNER are still permitted to access these IPC objects.
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "harden_ipc" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.harden_ipc = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
+ # supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
+ # These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
+ # root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
+ # is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe = 1
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe_gid = 101
+
+ # If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
+ # decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
+ # option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
+ # users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
+ # entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe_invert = 1
+
+ # If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
+ # a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
+ # the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
+ # "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
+ # Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
+ # execute files in directories they own that are not group or
+ # world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
+ # root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
+ # "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
+ kernel.grsecurity.tpe_restrict_all = 0
+
+
+ #kernel.grsecurity.harden_tty = 1
+ #
+ # Network Protections
+ #
+
+ # Increase Linux auto tuning TCP buffer limits
+ # min, default, and max number of bytes to use
+ # set max to at least 4MB, or higher if you use very high BDP paths
+ # Tcp Windows etc
+ net.core.rmem_max = 8388608
+ net.core.wmem_max = 8388608
+ net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 5000
+ net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 1
+
+ # Both ports linux-blob and linux-libre don't build with ipv6
+ # Disable ipv6
+ net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
+ net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
+ net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1
+
+ # Tuen IPv6
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 0
+
+ # Avoid a smurf attack
+ net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
+
+ # Turn on protection for bad icmp error messages
+ net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
+
+ # Turn on syncookies for SYN flood attack protection
+ net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
+
+ ## protect against tcp time-wait assassination hazards
+ ## drop RST packets for sockets in the time-wait state
+ ## (not widely supported outside of linux, but conforms to RFC)
+ net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1
+
+ ## tcp timestamps
+ ## + protect against wrapping sequence numbers (at gigabit speeds)
+ ## + round trip time calculation implemented in TCP
+ ## - causes extra overhead and allows uptime detection by scanners like nmap
+ ## enable @ gigabit speeds
+ net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 0
+ #net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 1
+
+ # Turn on and log spoofed, source routed, and redirect packets
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
+
+ ## ignore echo broadcast requests to prevent being part of smurf attacks (default)
+ net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
+
+ # No source routed packets here
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
+
+ ## sets the kernels reverse path filtering mechanism to value 1(on)
+ ## will do source validation of the packet's recieved from all the interfaces on the machine
+ ## protects from attackers that are using ip spoofing methods to do harm
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
+ #net.ipv6.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
+ #net.ipv6.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
+
+ # Make sure no one can alter the routing tables
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
+
+ # Act as a router, necessary for Access Point
+ net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1
+ net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 1
+ net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 1
+
+ # Increase system IP port limits
+ net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 2000 65000
+
+ # Increase TCP max buffer size setable using setsockopt()
+ net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 8388608
+ net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 87380 8388608
+
+
+ # If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
+ # destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
+ # sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
+ # This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
+ # loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
+ # makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
+ # visibility against scanners.
+ #
+ # The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
+ # blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
+ # just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
+ # problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
+ # connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
+ # end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
+ # side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
+ # feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
+ # The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
+ # can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
+ # all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
+ # disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
+ #
+ # If the sysctl option is enabled, two sysctl options with names
+ # "ip_blackhole" and "lastack_retries" will be created.
+ # While "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero on/off
+ # toggle, "lastack_retries" uses the same kinds of values as
+ # "tcp_retries1" and "tcp_retries2". The default value of 4
+ # prevents a socket from lasting more than 45 seconds in LAST_ACK
+ # state.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.ip_blackhole = 1
+ #kernel.grsecurity.lastack_retries = 4
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+ # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
+ # applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.socket_all = 1
+
+ # Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
+ # add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
+ # specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
+ # with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.socket_all_gid = 202
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+ # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
+ # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
+ # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
+ # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.socket_client = 1
+
+ # Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
+ # Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
+ # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
+ # option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.socket_client_gid = 203
+
+ # If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
+ # be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
+ # able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
+ # you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
+ # from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
+ # sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.socket_server = 1
+
+ # Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
+ # Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
+ # the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
+ # option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.socket_server_gid = 204
+
+ #
+ # Physical Protections
+ #
+
+ # If you say Y here, a new sysctl option with name "deny_new_usb"
+ # will be created. Setting its value to 1 will prevent any new
+ # USB devices from being recognized by the OS. Any attempted USB
+ # device insertion will be logged. This option is intended to be
+ # used against custom USB devices designed to exploit vulnerabilities
+ # in various USB device drivers.
+ #
+ # For greatest effectiveness, this sysctl should be set after any
+ # relevant init scripts. This option is safe to enable in distros
+ # as each user can choose whether or not to toggle the sysctl.
+ #kernel.grsecurity.deny_new_usb = 0
+
+ #
+ # Restrict grsec sysctl changes after this was set
+ #
+ #kernel.grsecurity.grsec_lock = 1
+
+
+
+ # End of file
+ </pre>
+
+
<a href="index.html">Core OS Index</a>
<p>This is part of the c9-doc Manual.
-Copyright (C) 2016
+Copyright (C) 2017
c9 team.
See the file <a href="../fdl-1.3-standalone.html">Gnu Free Documentation License</a>
for copying conditions.</p>