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<h1>Runxi Yu's Microblog</h1>
<p id="intro">
This is my <i>microblog</i>, a place for me to jot down random thoughts that I want to keep, but are too small enough to constitute a real article/post. Reverse chronological order.
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<p id="37">
In Thaler v. Perlmutter (2023), the Federal District Court for D.C. ruled that "Underlying that adaptability, however, has been a consistent understanding that human creativity is the sine qua non at the core of copyrightability". 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) says that "Copyright protection subsists [...] in original works [...] either directly or with the aid of a machine or device".<br />My question is outside of the scope of this lawsuit: do prompts to AI count as a human using the "aid of a machine or device" to create a creative work? Or, is the transformation from a simple textual prompt to a graphical representation considered transformative under Campbell and 17 U.S.C. § 107, such that the AI is the creator of the secondary graphical work, to the extent that it is not a derivative work of the text prompt? Or would the prompt simply be considered an idea, which is not copyrightable under Baker v. Selden?
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#37">&</a>
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<p id="36">
Should the federal government prevent overreach of <em>state</em> governments?
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#36">&</a>
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<p id="35">
Disclaimers and definitions: This post is written in the context of my school and my group of friends therein. Please note that this post is a pattern-based generalization, and is hopefully not consistently true. Please also note that terms such as "female" and "male" below refer to biological sex, as it is biological sex that this pattern applies to. Due to the small sample of transgender students, and complete lack of intersex students at our school, this conclusion may be unrepresentative in a wider context. Additionally, "homosexual/homosocial" and "heterosexual/heterosocial" when applied to myself are relative to my male biological sex for the sake of this post. However, the essence is likely the same.<br />
<br />
The implicit/instinctual patterns of social interaction in relation to biological sex is uncomforting. It is common to see friends of the same biological sex engage in intimate or intimate-like interactions but are perceived as completely normal, such as written communications involving Unicode code-points often associated with love e.g. the heart emoji ("❤️") and emojis related to kissing ("😘", "😚", "😗", "😙"), physical display of affection which is likely platonic e.g. hugging and patting, et cetera.<br />
<br />
I find it possible to engage in such behaviour with friends of the same biological sex, but generally impossible with friends of another biological sex. This disparity is uncomforting, and definitely violates my postgenderist theory. In fact, should this cause tangible differences in advantages or qualitative changes in relationship because of differences in biological sex, this would satisfy all criteria to be considered a unduly discriminatory act.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it's just people gossiping? Although I have multiple recorded precedents across four years to demonstrate how gossip is likely to arise in platonic heterosocial relationships, but I hardly come across gossip even in obvious instances of homosexual affection. I don't want to just throw it to vague social concepts and just blame the heterosexual-normative social context; after all, fear of gossip is not an effective mitigator for potential undue discrimination.<br />
<br />
Or perhaps, based on the same social context, intimate interactions without explicit consent are more likely to be interpreted as sexual assault, under 18 U.S.C. § 2242 and YKPS Behaviour Policy § 5.4.3? (Technically any intimate interaction with any possibility of a sexual interpretation must be under a contractually valid and informed mutual consent, but it's hard to draw the line, and playing on the safe side would mean asking "may I hug you [for the purpose of …] [no later than …] [no more than …]", which seems rather ridiculous. And that doesn't solve the question why there's a boundary when it comes to biological sex.) This doesn't make sense for me either because I'm pansexual, and there is nothing that makes an act of intimacy with a biologically female person more sexual than that with a biologically male person.<br />
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#35">&</a>
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<p id="34">
Shock<br />
<br />
Squeeze—<br />
For a drip of blood<br />
That bitter-sweet<br />
Drip of blood<br />
My heart's still an enigma<br />
Mysterious, nebulous<br />
—Galling.<br />
<br />
That shadow approached me,<br />
Interrogated me,<br />
Tortured my spirit,<br />
Yet spared my hollow body<br />
<br />
Squeeze—<br />
For a sour drip of<br />
Inflammed fester,<br />
I fought, but barely<br />
<br />
The apocalypse;<br />
Sepsis.<br />
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#34">&</a>
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<p id="33">
我觉得喜剧和现实之间常常有着太大的落差。在读喜剧的剧本的时候（我很少看 production），如果我能把自己的情绪陷进去，会形成一种很奇怪的感染性的 optimism；但是这种感觉在现实中会很 illusional。至少从我的那一部分理性考虑，相比于梦幻的乐观主义和…有希望的那种感觉，我更希望让自己理解现实，虽然 evidently 我不怎么会这样做。
On the other hand, tragedies do in general have a fatalist element consistent with my view of my subjective experience of reality. I don't think in terms of a reIigious deity, but I like to see exaggerated mirrors of "natural events" and fate that appear in life, rather than attempting to experience an imaginary world that might be deceiving me.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#33">&</a>
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<p id="32">
Quite a significant part of the national sentiment here in China, is that everything doing by the Japanese is somehow bad, somehow wrong. They don't want to learn what tritium and carbon-14 is, they don't look up what the relevant international standards are. They just assume that we'll be making mutated radioactive robotic fish.<br />
Sorry, no.<br />
Problems such as biomagnification are indeed concerning, but it's just counterproductive and unconducive to make claims that it'll poison everyone and appeal to emotions. The world isn't going to implode.<br />
And oh well, what hipocrisy these historical claims are based on.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#32">&</a>
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<p id="31">
Perhaps what I hate or fear isn't the entity itself, but is rather my relationship with that entity. My concept of that entity is integrated into my "self", it's not distinctly an "other"...?
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#31">&</a>
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<p id="30">
Maybe it's being alive that makes them lie, and being almost not alive makes me sort of accidentally truthful...<br />
—Brick, Act 3, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, by Tennessee Williams
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#30">&</a>
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<p id="29">
Looking back, reading opinions, journal entries and poems I wrote a while back, ranging from two years to a month ago. There's something pinching and squeezing my heart. Candle smoke intoxicated my eyes, yet I still could not blow them out. Tears create craters on my dusty face. I need to have a rest, perhaps reflect on my experiences throughout the years. There will not be any sort of "new beginning". History exists, reality is not romantic, and the apparent me of the present is responsible for the past. The most destructive kind of feeling is not loneliness, not even guilt for other people. It's my guilt towards the apparently innocent version of myself of the past.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#29">&</a>
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<p id="28">
I think I still have some blind faith in science and logic, like, I know some statements are not absolutely scientific as they're not repeatable or falsifiable, but are still *intuitively* (aaaaaaa) undeniably true
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#28">&</a>
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<p id="27">
After all, moral theories are a approximations of the moral conscience.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#27">&</a>
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<p id="26">
One part of me: "C'mon I don't want to have to demonstrate my existence every time I talk to a conservative and why trans experiences exist"
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Another part of me: "You must, as far as politics is concerned, hear full arguments of both like-minded and opponents, and exert no censorship over their ideas whatsoever."
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Also, guilt towards myself is the most annoying feeling I have to date
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#26">&</a>
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<p id="25">
Uhhh things seem to boil down to <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/">two concepts of liberty</a> which then boil down to what we consider to be <em>internal</em> or <em>external</em> to a particular being.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#25">&</a>
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<p id="24">
I love how "traditional family values" is the reason that justifies antifeminism, patriarchy, sexism, transphobia, homophobia, and everything in between.
Also, I don't understand how it could be valid to consider a cis person arguing for "trans experiences do not exist". It's a personal experience that exists in some individuals. Not existing in everyone, or one particular person independently chosen, does not mean it doesn't exist.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#24">&</a>
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<p id="23">
I'm seriously considering the moral intuitionist argument of "if anything's wrong, it's wrong for someone to do something that they believe to be wrong".
But this still leaves the questions around the legitimacy of the criminal justice system to punish acts that may be not "wrong" according to the previous statement but still harm society. Sure, the agency of the criminal justice system (or actually the legislature that creates it) may believe that deterring people from doing socially harmful acts, is moral, but the use of force here still bugs me.
I like the argument that only one specific act performed by one abent under specific conditions has moral content. Moral descriptions of abstract classes of acts are systematically necessary, but they aren't the same as moral content because there is no acting agent.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#23">&</a>
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<p id="22">
Random thought: Any historical analysis, and interpretations of evolution (in the biological sense, for why some organisms have their current traits), are not science because conclusions reached therein are not falsifiable
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#22">&</a>
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<p id="21">
Hm, do you think advancements in the understanding of physics could improve understanding on causality, determinism and free will? ("Interpretations" of physics is not my expertise and I'm a bit skeptical, but I'll try to be careful not to get into mysticism…)
(Warning: disgusting) The common argument that collapsing superpositions leads to inherent randomness and thus makes free will possible seems to be misaligned with what people mean when discussing free will. I'll explain my skepticism with an analogy: A scientist will do something differently if they detect that a radioactive sample decays in five seconds. The scientist's state and actions depend on random decay of the sample, and I won't call this free will of the scientist. I don't think there's something fundamentally different about the supposed (and really interpretive and perhaps mystic) collapse of superpositions in the brain causing things to go differently, and my example on radioactive decay. No matter if they're inside or outside the body, truly random events are still spontaneously random
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#21">&</a>
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<p id="20">
Evaluate the claim that "the mere act of giving birth to a child violates the child's consent by coercing the social contract upon them".
Actually, this is called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antinatalism">Antinatalism</a>.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#20">&</a>
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<p id="19">
The consciousness of AI, or the lack thereof, is irrelevant.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#19">&</a>
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<p id="18">
The null hypothesis is haunted. It appears in almost any reasoning/proof/etc.
Typically, when discussing a policy, the null hypothesis is the status quo; when evaluating a statement, the null hypothesis is the current best understanding (which is often unclear), or is simply a negation of the statement.
Where does the burden of proof fall?
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#18">&</a>
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<p id="17">
I used to not really understand utilitarianism, the lack of a universal standard bugged me. But that was Bentham. Mill's theory of utilitarianism seems to be more acceptable to me, it seemed to look into the future and cover how individual cases affect a decision entity, be it personal or systematic, in the long term. Generally when applying Millian utilitarianism, I obtain similar results to when I using existing principles. This somewhat reaffirms my hypothesis that these moral principles still arise from a utilitarian analysis of cost and benefit in the long term.
<br />
I wonder if we have a subconscious intuition to morality anyway, and we're attempting to rationally derive theories that seem to cover the underlying intuition. Is this, dare I say, motivated reasoning?
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#17">&</a>
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<p id="16">
(Rant)
In any social movement, we're dealing with real, live individuals. Individual people. Not some uniform social group as a whole.
Every single time.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#16">&</a>
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<p id="15">
Is freedom of speech absolute? Why do we traditionally see it as a fundamental right? Is it really inalienable?<br />
I think a great portion of this lies upon the dangers to democracy when censoring political speech. Is that a sufficient reason to accept freedom of speech as a universal right, that protects e.g. hate speech and inciting violence?
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#15">&</a>
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<p id="14">
An illusion in a dream overpowers reality.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#14">&</a>
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<p id="13">
Hypocrisy is bad. I know, but I'm still complicit in it.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#13">&</a>
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<p id="12">
Continental liberalism and modern populist democracy eliminate the ruling class external to the people being ruled, leading to self-governance, preventing tyranny. However, the "people" who exercise the power are not always the same people who are affected by the power. The "will of the people", in practice, is the will of the most numerous or active subset of the people. Democracy is, on these grounds, often used as a utility for the tyranny of the majority.
<details>
<summary>A Quote from <i>On Liberty</i> by John Stuart Mill:</summary>
<blockquote>
The tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.
</blockquote>
</details>
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#12">&</a>
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<p id="11">
I think my experience of gender dysphoria has became inconsistent in what I actually think about gender. My belief, in theory, is that gender should be eradicated (see "Postgenderism") altogether, as it's an unnecessary construct that limits people, imposes cisnormativity, etc.
<br />
I try to think along the terms of "gender doesn't matter, at all". But my experience says otherwise: I found myself, perhaps "strangely", more comfortable with she/her pronouns than with they/them. So when interacting with people online, who don't know me IRL, I just declare she/her pronouns and… well, it's a glaring inconsistency in my theory of gender and society and INCONCISTENCIES BUG ME. I started feeling like a hypocrite.
<br />
If gender really doesn't matter to me, why do I have gender dysphoria??.
<br />
To make myself feel better perhaps I could explain it as "I wouldn't feel gender dysphoria if society doesn't impose gender as a socially significant construct altogether". And I can, only, hope so, as a hypocrite.
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<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#11">&</a>
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<p id="10">
I myself live in a string of characters, through emotionless computers, running some old protocols.
The me of appearance is dead.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#10">&</a>
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<p id="8">
Democracy is the protection of negative freedom and civil liberties, not the enforcement of general will.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#8">&</a>
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<p id="7">
Reading <i>雷雨</i> and thinking about <i>A Streetcar Named Desire</i> and <i>The Glass Menagerie</i> There's a commonality in these plays—and perhaps many more—that struck me: The presentation of femininity as dependence.
<br />
I've always tried to fight against such interpretations as I found them to be, perhaps a bit sexist. Yet looking at my own manifestation of femininity, I find shocking ressemblence with my dependence on peopole (and occasionally also abstract entities like knowledge).
<br />
Perhaps it depends on what we mean by the word "femininity". Is it the quality of being female? Or is it the behavioral norms traditionally associated with the female gender?
<br />
(Or perhaps this experience is limited by my perception of my own trans femininity and isn't a common theme upon modern cis femininity?)
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Also, those who don't experience trans experiences cannot assume that trans experiences do not exist.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#7">&</a>
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<p id="6">
I kinda think faith is something we all struggle with, and doesn't seem to be too relevant to whether we are religious in the traditional sense. For me there're things like faith in logic, faith in knowledge, faith in properties of humankind, etc. They seem to be so ungrounded, founded upon beliefs that I cannot support with my own weight.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#6">&</a>
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<p id="5">
As much as I believe in determinism, I do not believe that humans have capacity to pre-determine their own fate.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#5">&</a>
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<p id="4">
My world is still of metaphorical illusions. I need to learn to be afraid of romanticized narratives and perspectives. However, it is apparently hard to do so—I sink into romantic words that create a color filter in my perception, they make reality look so beautiful, so... "sweet", moving me further away from what reality really is.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#4">&</a>
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<p id="3">
I'm probably not the only one who has these dangerous/harmful/unhelpful thoughts:<br />
How different, or perhaps "better' could my life be, if I could go back to the start of Year 9, and make different decisions? Perhaps that would mean choosing something other than IGCSE History. Or perhaps that means... when that was still possible, let my yearn and longing for intimacy with trusted people to discuss philosophy and science with, stay undeveloped.<br />
Perhaps I could have became a happy person. The me of the present could never know.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#3">&</a>
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<p id="2">
To what extent is "it sets a precedent" a concern that justifies or warrants declining a request that is on its own, appropriate?
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#2">&</a>
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<p id="1">
I hereby discard the structuralist view that people are composed of the opposing parts "benign" and "malicious". These simple and perhaps judgemental concepts are insufficient in face of the complexity of the human condition.
<a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/microblog/#1">&</a>
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<p>Unless otherwise specified with the "<span class="copyright">copyright</span>" HTML/CSS class, works hosted on this subdomain (<code>www.andrewyu.org</code>) served with the HTTP(S) protocol is available under <a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/note/pubdom.html">Runxi Yu's Public Domain Dedication</a>.</p>
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