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diff --git a/article/identity-over-time.html b/article/identity-over-time.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5577f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/article/identity-over-time.html @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title>In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten?</title> + <link rel="stylesheet" href="/style.css" /> + <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" /> + <link rel="shortcut icon" href="/favicon.ico" type="image/x-icon" /> + <meta charset="utf-8" /> + </head> + <body> + <h1>In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten?</h1> + <p>Article ID: 27</p> + <p>This essay was first submitted in the <a href="https://www.johnlockeinstitute.com/essay-competition">John Locke Institute's Global Essay Competition</a> where it was shortlisted and given a high commendation.</p> + <hr /> +<p>When the Ship of Theseus has its all parts replaced one after another +until no original components remain, is it still the Ship of Theseus, or +is it a new ship altogether? Similarly, when most of my body cells are +constantly renewed, coupled with my mindset being continuously +transformed by new information and acquaintances, am I still the same +person as the ten-year-old “me”?</p> +<p>This essay explores the continued <em>personal</em> identity from two +perspectives. First is the concept of <em>individuality</em>, i.e. +whether there is a delimited, discrete, and cohesive existence of “me” +in the first place. An affirmative answer positing the delineated +boundary of individual existence is the prerequisite to the second +question of <em>uniqueness</em>, which makes each individual different +from others. Two layers of analysis are applied to uniqueness — the +<em>identification</em> of the uniqueness of personal identity at a set +time compared with other individual entities, and the +<em>continuity</em> of the person’s uniqueness over time.</p> +<h1 id="the-individuality-of-me">The Individuality of “Me”</h1> +<p>Aristotelianism portrays the “individual” as a distinct substance, +differentiated from accidents such as qualities, quantities, or +relations <span class="citation" data-cites="MetaphysicsZeta"></span>. +The substance of a human is the body. Each organ and system have their +own functions, yet they orchestrate to keep us alive. Unlike coral reef, +consisting of indistinct strands of polyps, the human body has a +generally clear physical boundary — the skin. Therefore, our body is a +discrete individual entity.</p> +<p>The concept of individuality expands beyond the biological dimension. +<span class="citation" data-cites="LockeHumanUnderstanding"></span> +ascribes personal identity to the continuity of consciousness, hinging +on memory. <span class="citation" data-cites="DavidHume"></span> sees +the self as a ever-changing “bundle” of perceptions or experience. <span +class="citation" data-cites="Mead1934MindSA"></span> defines identity by +social relations, which change over time as we forge new connections and +networks.</p> +<p>Our memory, experience and social relations, which are applied to +define our identity by the above philosophers, can’t exist independently +but are rather supported by the substance of our body, through which we +interact with the world. Our individuality is therefore a unity of +plurality, which comprises of biological, empirical and social +parameters. The analysis of individuality on all its parameters is +beyond the length of this essay. But since they are dependents of our +physical existence that are clearly delineated, this essay will move +from discussing discrete individuality of our substance to the +exploration of the uniqueness of each individual, and the possible +continuity of this uniqueness.</p> +<h1 id="the-uniqueness-of-me-and-its-continuity">The Uniqueness of “Me” +and its Continuity</h1> +<p>Canned tuna on shelves are individual identities but they are +practically not unique to the consumer. As long as they are still in the +shelf life, no one cares to take one can instead of another. There is +nothing particular about an industrial product that makes it stand out +from others mass produced or assembled at the same factory.</p> +<p>Each <em>person</em>, however, is unique in their biological +identity, empirical identity, and social identity. This essay explores +people’s unique characteristics through these three lens, and how they +are continued with the passage of time. I hereby propose that the +uniqueness of a person is preserved over time if the person’s unique +characteristics are preserved over time.</p> +<h2 id="biological-identity-and-its-continuity">Biological Identity and +Its Continuity</h2> +<p>“On average, the cells in your body are replaced every 7 to 10 years” +<span class="citation" data-cites="what-cells"></span>. Despite the +tempting but inaccurate interpretation that human bodies are renewed +every decade or so, there is significant constancy inside our body. For +example, most neurons do not regenerate. But even if all cells do, the +regeneration of our body’s <em>constituent parts</em> does not entail +that our biological <em>properties</em> change over time. Many +biological properties that are perceived to be identifying for +individuals, such as DNA sequence and fingerprints, generally stay +constant throughout our life. The wide application of fingerprints in +identifying people in user authentication and criminal investigations +suggests that fingerprints are unique and enduring.</p> +<p>The uniqueness of our biological system and the continuity of the +uniqueness are reinforced by the “Self/Non-self” theory by virologist +Sir Frank Burnet <span class="citation" +data-cites="BurnetFenner"></span>. The distinction of “self” from most +other entities elicits defensive responses against pathogens, the +tolerance of a graft from itself, and the rejection against grafts from +a donor organism in transplantation with few exceptions such as +isografts (grafts between identical twins) <span class="citation" +data-cites="pradeu2011limits"></span>. Adaptive immunological memory is +formed when specialized memory lymphocytes are produced, which would +trigger a more rapid and effective immune response on the next infection +by a pathogen with similar antigens. Adaptive immunity leaves a +long-term mark on our body; while COVID immunity lasts about 6 months, +smallpox immunity lasts for decades <span class="citation" +data-cites="Taub2008-ps"></span>. Therefore, my special immunity spans +over time due to the existence of immunological memory.</p> +<p>In conclusion, although most cells in our body regenerate constantly, +our biological identity does not change since it consists not in the +collection of components but in the properties that emerge therefrom. +The fact that our identity makers such as our DNA sequence, +fingerprints, and immunity transcend over time warrants the conclusion +that our biological identity spans diachronically.</p> +<h2 id="empirical-identity-and-its-continuity-memory">Empirical identity +and Its Continuity: Memory</h2> +<p><span class="citation" data-cites="LockeHumanUnderstanding"></span> +postulates the memory theory of identity. A person’s identity is tied to +their memory, i.e. their ability to recognize their past experiences as +their own, and to connect them to their present consciousness. Endel +Tulving further analyzes the concept of memory by distinguishing between +procedural memory (skills, e.g. muscle memory), semantic memory (factual +information) and episodic memory (personal experiences) <span +class="citation" data-cites="OutOfThePast"></span>.</p> +<p>Semantic memory as a whole rather than individual piece of factual +information contributes to identity. Many people can retrieve the +knowledge that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, and this does not +grant them identity because this piece of knowledge lacks uniqueness +that tells one person apart from another. However the assembly of +semantic memory of each person is still an idiosyncratic feature, since +one person may share some semantic memories with people of similar +educational background but it is unlikely that the entire knowledge +system of each person is identical. Though semantic memories are +constantly renewed by newly accumulated knowledge or attrition as time +goes by, the changing process is gradual. Moreover, the cognitive +structure underlying the acquired information, the critical thinking +cultivated by the analysis of those information, and the mindset of each +individual are relatively stable, as well as uniquely forged by each +person’s idiosyncratic assembly of semantic memories.</p> +<p>Locke’s theory appeals to episodic memories as a necessary condition +for uniqueness of individuals as well as sameness over time. “As far as +this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or +Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self +now it was then; and ’tis by the same self with this present one that +now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Book II.xxvii.9).</p> +<p>This theory might be challenged from two perspectives. Firstly, +multiple people could have gone through the same events, and the shared +experience lacks uniqueness to individuals, hence absence of identity +since it is based on the premise of uniqueness as previously explained. +However, although different people may share the same episodes, they +were different agents in those moments and engaged from their own angles +respectively. Therefore, one’s memory of these episodes is still +distinct from that of others’.</p> +<p>The second and more common challenge to Locke’s memory theory is that +I may remember episodes of five years ago, and me of five years ago can +recall events of ten years ago, but the current me cannot recall most of +the life of ten years ago when I was a ignorant and happy kindergartner. +Am I still the same person of ten years ago? I would tackle this +question by the transitivity principle: if <span +class="math inline"><em>a</em> = <em>b</em></span> and <span +class="math inline"><em>b</em> = <em>c</em></span>, then <span +class="math inline"><em>a</em> = <em>c</em></span>. If I share the +identity of me from five years ago, and me of five years ago was still +the same person as the one of ten years ago, I and the one of ten years +ago still have the same identity on the principle of transitivity.</p> +<p>An exception would be rare cases of memory loss due to pathological +conditions in the brain. The loss of memory is a rupture in one’s life. +If that loss is significant enough to affect one’s personality, I argue +that they are not the same person.</p> +<p>Procedural memories are typically diachronically enduring — if we +have learned how to perform a skill in our childhood, the procedural +memory is carried on throughout our life. For example, even if we have +not touched bikes for ten years, once we get onto one, we can still ride +on like we have not stopped riding all these years. As in the case of +semantic memory, the assembly of procedural memories are also +idiosyncratic to each individual. These unique procedural memories stay, +without us being aware of it.</p> +<p>Therefore, the above analysis of semantic, episodic and procedural +memories suggests that what makes people unique and also identical with +themselves along the temporal axis is their remembering or being able to +remember the knowledge assembly, the episodes to which they were witness +or agent, and also the skills they acquire and stay. Personal identity +consists in memory.</p> +<h2 id="social-identity">Social identity</h2> +<p>Our identity is not only biologically and empirically determined, it +is also socially constructed.</p> +<p>According to <span class="citation" +data-cites="Mead1934MindSA"></span>, the self emerges from social +interactions. He divides the self into two components: the “me” and the +“I”. The “me” represents the organized set of attitudes of others that +the individual assumes. It’s the social self, the part of us that is +formed through interaction with others and with the social environment. +It embodies the expectations and norms of the community, allowing us to +predict how others will react to us. The “I” is the immediate response +of an individual to others. It is the spontaneous, unpredictable, and +creative part of the self. The “I” reacts to the “me”, and it’s through +this dialogue that we create meaning, make decisions, and ultimately +take action. So, for Mead, identity is continually created and recreated +through the social interactions we have, the roles we take on, and the +dialogue between the “I” and the “me”. Since social interactions are +dynamic, our identity is fluid rather than fixed.</p> +<p>However, the existence of the “me”, which embodies the attitudes, +roles, and rules assimilated from the social environment, provides a +consistent framework that guides behavior and thought. It ensures the +stability and continuity of our identity. Meanwhile, the elasticity of +social interactions allows us to grow inside the parameters of the +continuity of identity.</p> +<p>The impact of this continuity is huge. Its absence would translate +into lack of accountability for our own behavior and decision-making, +since we would not bear responsibility for our mistakes or crimes if we +could legitimately renew our identity every few years or months. +Property rights would be bygone and personal relationships chaotic since +filial, marital relationships vanished together with the continuity of +social identity.</p> +<h1 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h1> +<p>My identity emerges from my unique biological, empirical and social +properties. In my case, all three of these properties have continuously +developed since I was ten, but always with some constancy, be it the +preservation of the uniquely identifying biological characteristics, my +unique memory, or my our social identity shaped through social +interactions. I maintain my sense of self through time due to the +constancy in these properties. I am therefore intrinsically linked to +the ten-year-old child I was, biologically, empirically, and +socially.</p> + <div id="footer"> + <hr /> + <p><a href="/">Runxi Yu's Website</a></p> + <p>Unless otherwise specified with the "<span class="copyright">copyright</span>" HTML/CSS class, works hosted on this subdomain (<code>www.andrewyu.org</code>) served with the HTTP(S) protocol is available under <a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/note/pubdom.html">Runxi Yu's Public Domain Dedication</a>.</p> + </div> + </body> +</html> |