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diff --git a/article/identity-over-time.html b/article/identity-over-time.html deleted file mode 100644 index f5639d1..0000000 --- a/article/identity-over-time.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> - <head> - <title>In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten?</title> - <link rel="stylesheet" href="/style.css" /> - <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" /> - <link rel="shortcut icon" href="/favicon.ico" type="image/x-icon" /> - <meta charset="utf-8" /> - </head> - <body> - <h1>In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten?</h1> - <p>Article ID: 27</p> - <p>This essay was first submitted in the <a href="https://www.johnlockeinstitute.com/essay-competition">John Locke Institute's Global Essay Competition</a> where it was shortlisted and given a high commendation.</p> - <hr /> -<p>When the Ship of Theseus has its all parts replaced one after another -until no original components remain, is it still the Ship of Theseus, or -is it a new ship altogether? Similarly, when most of my body cells are -constantly renewed, coupled with my mindset being continuously -transformed by new information and acquaintances, am I still the same -person as the ten-year-old “me”?</p> -<p>This essay explores the continued <em>personal</em> identity from two -perspectives. First is the concept of <em>individuality</em>, i.e. -whether there is a delimited, discrete, and cohesive existence of “me” -in the first place. An affirmative answer positing the delineated -boundary of individual existence is the prerequisite to the second -question of <em>uniqueness</em>, which makes each individual different -from others. Two layers of analysis are applied to uniqueness — the -<em>identification</em> of the uniqueness of personal identity at a set -time compared with other individual entities, and the -<em>continuity</em> of the person’s uniqueness over time.</p> -<h2 id="the-individuality-of-me">The Individuality of “Me”</h2> -<p>Aristotelianism portrays the “individual” as a distinct substance, -differentiated from accidents such as qualities, quantities, or -relations <span class="citation" data-cites="MetaphysicsZeta"></span>. -The substance of a human is the body. Each organ and system have their -own functions, yet they orchestrate to keep us alive. Unlike coral reef, -consisting of indistinct strands of polyps, the human body has a -generally clear physical boundary — the skin. Therefore, our body is a -discrete individual entity.</p> -<p>The concept of individuality expands beyond the biological dimension. -<span class="citation" data-cites="LockeHumanUnderstanding"></span> -ascribes personal identity to the continuity of consciousness, hinging -on memory. <span class="citation" data-cites="DavidHume"></span> sees -the self as a ever-changing “bundle” of perceptions or experience. <span -class="citation" data-cites="Mead1934MindSA"></span> defines identity by -social relations, which change over time as we forge new connections and -networks.</p> -<p>Our memory, experience and social relations, which are applied to -define our identity by the above philosophers, can’t exist independently -but are rather supported by the substance of our body, through which we -interact with the world. Our individuality is therefore a unity of -plurality, which comprises of biological, empirical and social -parameters. The analysis of individuality on all its parameters is -beyond the length of this essay. But since they are dependents of our -physical existence that are clearly delineated, this essay will move -from discussing discrete individuality of our substance to the -exploration of the uniqueness of each individual, and the possible -continuity of this uniqueness.</p> -<h2 id="the-uniqueness-of-me-and-its-continuity">The Uniqueness of “Me” -and its Continuity</h2> -<p>Canned tuna on shelves are individual identities but they are -practically not unique to the consumer. As long as they are still in the -shelf life, no one cares to take one can instead of another. There is -nothing particular about an industrial product that makes it stand out -from others mass produced or assembled at the same factory.</p> -<p>Each <em>person</em>, however, is unique in their biological -identity, empirical identity, and social identity. This essay explores -people’s unique characteristics through these three lens, and how they -are continued with the passage of time. I hereby propose that the -uniqueness of a person is preserved over time if the person’s unique -characteristics are preserved over time.</p> -<h3 id="biological-identity-and-its-continuity">Biological Identity and -Its Continuity</h3> -<p>“On average, the cells in your body are replaced every 7 to 10 years” -<span class="citation" data-cites="what-cells"></span>. Despite the -tempting but inaccurate interpretation that human bodies are renewed -every decade or so, there is significant constancy inside our body. For -example, most neurons do not regenerate. But even if all cells do, the -regeneration of our body’s <em>constituent parts</em> does not entail -that our biological <em>properties</em> change over time. Many -biological properties that are perceived to be identifying for -individuals, such as DNA sequence and fingerprints, generally stay -constant throughout our life. The wide application of fingerprints in -identifying people in user authentication and criminal investigations -suggests that fingerprints are unique and enduring.</p> -<p>The uniqueness of our biological system and the continuity of the -uniqueness are reinforced by the “Self/Non-self” theory by virologist -Sir Frank Burnet <span class="citation" -data-cites="BurnetFenner"></span>. The distinction of “self” from most -other entities elicits defensive responses against pathogens, the -tolerance of a graft from itself, and the rejection against grafts from -a donor organism in transplantation with few exceptions such as -isografts (grafts between identical twins) <span class="citation" -data-cites="pradeu2011limits"></span>. Adaptive immunological memory is -formed when specialized memory lymphocytes are produced, which would -trigger a more rapid and effective immune response on the next infection -by a pathogen with similar antigens. Adaptive immunity leaves a -long-term mark on our body; while COVID immunity lasts about 6 months, -smallpox immunity lasts for decades <span class="citation" -data-cites="Taub2008-ps"></span>. Therefore, my special immunity spans -over time due to the existence of immunological memory.</p> -<p>In conclusion, although most cells in our body regenerate constantly, -our biological identity does not change since it consists not in the -collection of components but in the properties that emerge therefrom. -The fact that our identity makers such as our DNA sequence, -fingerprints, and immunity transcend over time warrants the conclusion -that our biological identity spans diachronically.</p> -<h3 id="empirical-identity-and-its-continuity-memory">Empirical identity -and Its Continuity: Memory</h3> -<p><span class="citation" data-cites="LockeHumanUnderstanding"></span> -postulates the memory theory of identity. A person’s identity is tied to -their memory, i.e. their ability to recognize their past experiences as -their own, and to connect them to their present consciousness. Endel -Tulving further analyzes the concept of memory by distinguishing between -procedural memory (skills, e.g. muscle memory), semantic memory (factual -information) and episodic memory (personal experiences) <span -class="citation" data-cites="OutOfThePast"></span>.</p> -<p>Semantic memory as a whole rather than individual piece of factual -information contributes to identity. Many people can retrieve the -knowledge that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, and this does not -grant them identity because this piece of knowledge lacks uniqueness -that tells one person apart from another. However the assembly of -semantic memory of each person is still an idiosyncratic feature, since -one person may share some semantic memories with people of similar -educational background but it is unlikely that the entire knowledge -system of each person is identical. Though semantic memories are -constantly renewed by newly accumulated knowledge or attrition as time -goes by, the changing process is gradual. Moreover, the cognitive -structure underlying the acquired information, the critical thinking -cultivated by the analysis of those information, and the mindset of each -individual are relatively stable, as well as uniquely forged by each -person’s idiosyncratic assembly of semantic memories.</p> -<p>Locke’s theory appeals to episodic memories as a necessary condition -for uniqueness of individuals as well as sameness over time. “As far as -this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or -Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self -now it was then; and ’tis by the same self with this present one that -now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Book II.xxvii.9).</p> -<p>This theory might be challenged from two perspectives. Firstly, -multiple people could have gone through the same events, and the shared -experience lacks uniqueness to individuals, hence absence of identity -since it is based on the premise of uniqueness as previously explained. -However, although different people may share the same episodes, they -were different agents in those moments and engaged from their own angles -respectively. Therefore, one’s memory of these episodes is still -distinct from that of others’.</p> -<p>The second and more common challenge to Locke’s memory theory is that -I may remember episodes of five years ago, and me of five years ago can -recall events of ten years ago, but the current me cannot recall most of -the life of ten years ago when I was a ignorant and happy kindergartner. -Am I still the same person of ten years ago? I would tackle this -question by the transitivity principle: if <span -class="math inline"><em>a</em> = <em>b</em></span> and <span -class="math inline"><em>b</em> = <em>c</em></span>, then <span -class="math inline"><em>a</em> = <em>c</em></span>. If I share the -identity of me from five years ago, and me of five years ago was still -the same person as the one of ten years ago, I and the one of ten years -ago still have the same identity on the principle of transitivity.</p> -<p>An exception would be rare cases of memory loss due to pathological -conditions in the brain. The loss of memory is a rupture in one’s life. -If that loss is significant enough to affect one’s personality, I argue -that they are not the same person.</p> -<p>Procedural memories are typically diachronically enduring — if we -have learned how to perform a skill in our childhood, the procedural -memory is carried on throughout our life. For example, even if we have -not touched bikes for ten years, once we get onto one, we can still ride -on like we have not stopped riding all these years. As in the case of -semantic memory, the assembly of procedural memories are also -idiosyncratic to each individual. These unique procedural memories stay, -without us being aware of it.</p> -<p>Therefore, the above analysis of semantic, episodic and procedural -memories suggests that what makes people unique and also identical with -themselves along the temporal axis is their remembering or being able to -remember the knowledge assembly, the episodes to which they were witness -or agent, and also the skills they acquire and stay. Personal identity -consists in memory.</p> -<h3 id="social-identity">Social identity</h3> -<p>Our identity is not only biologically and empirically determined, it -is also socially constructed.</p> -<p>According to <span class="citation" -data-cites="Mead1934MindSA"></span>, the self emerges from social -interactions. He divides the self into two components: the “me” and the -“I”. The “me” represents the organized set of attitudes of others that -the individual assumes. It’s the social self, the part of us that is -formed through interaction with others and with the social environment. -It embodies the expectations and norms of the community, allowing us to -predict how others will react to us. The “I” is the immediate response -of an individual to others. It is the spontaneous, unpredictable, and -creative part of the self. The “I” reacts to the “me”, and it’s through -this dialogue that we create meaning, make decisions, and ultimately -take action. So, for Mead, identity is continually created and recreated -through the social interactions we have, the roles we take on, and the -dialogue between the “I” and the “me”. Since social interactions are -dynamic, our identity is fluid rather than fixed.</p> -<p>However, the existence of the “me”, which embodies the attitudes, -roles, and rules assimilated from the social environment, provides a -consistent framework that guides behavior and thought. It ensures the -stability and continuity of our identity. Meanwhile, the elasticity of -social interactions allows us to grow inside the parameters of the -continuity of identity.</p> -<p>The impact of this continuity is huge. Its absence would translate -into lack of accountability for our own behavior and decision-making, -since we would not bear responsibility for our mistakes or crimes if we -could legitimately renew our identity every few years or months. -Property rights would be bygone and personal relationships chaotic since -filial, marital relationships vanished together with the continuity of -social identity.</p> -<h2 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h2> -<p>My identity emerges from my unique biological, empirical and social -properties. In my case, all three of these properties have continuously -developed since I was ten, but always with some constancy, be it the -preservation of the uniquely identifying biological characteristics, my -unique memory, or my our social identity shaped through social -interactions. I maintain my sense of self through time due to the -constancy in these properties. I am therefore intrinsically linked to -the ten-year-old child I was, biologically, empirically, and -socially.</p> - <div id="footer"> - <hr /> - <p><a href="/">Runxi Yu's Website</a></p> - <p>Unless otherwise specified with the "<span class="copyright">copyright</span>" HTML/CSS class, works hosted on this subdomain (<code>www.andrewyu.org</code>) served with the HTTP(S) protocol is available under <a href="https://www.andrewyu.org/note/pubdom.html">Runxi Yu's Public Domain Dedication</a>.</p> - </div> - </body> -</html> |